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In this thesis I will argue that the critical project of Gillian Rose can be read 
constructively in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation. Commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project 
as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. This 
way of presenting Rose’s critical project, while not strictly unfounded, has raised, 
and continues to raise, a number of unfortunate and unnecessary borders 
between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries.  
 
In contrast to the way commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical 
project, I will present it as entailing, not a general challenge to the critical projects 
of “postmodernity”, but a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. 
By approaching Rose’s critical project in this specific way, I aim to afford an 
alternative reading of it – that is, a reading in which Rose’s critical project can be, 
in part, clarified and supported by Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation.  
 
My hope is that by affording this alternative reading I will open Rose’s critical 
project up to influence, and be influenced by, number of contemporary debates 
surrounding the practice of criticism. Specifically, the debates surrounding the 
relationship between criticism and normativity, debates in which Foucault’s 
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Difficult friend, I would have preferred 
You to them.1 
 
Look out for dread it’s your red 
letter speciality, bunk of delirium day-trading. ‘External causes 
are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of 
change, and external causes become operative through internal causes.’ 
Mourning does become the law but not this one, to be is not to 
become or at fault with moment practice was what can I say I saw, 








                                            
1 Hill, Geoffrey, King Log, in Broken Hierarchies: Poems 1952-2012, edited by Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 58. The poem from which I take these lines is called Tristia: 1891-1938, A 
Valediction to Osip Mandelstam. See also Hill’s poem In Memoriam: Gillian Rose (in A Treatise of Civil 
Power). For Rose’s account of the relationship between difficulty and friendship see Judaism and Modernity: 
Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 2-5. 
2 Prynne, J. H., Kazoo Dreamboats; or, On What There Is, in Prynne, J. H., Poems (Glasgow: Bloodaxe, 
2015), 642. See also Prynne’s introduction to a seminar at the University of Sussex (a recording of which is 
available at: https://www.archiveofthenow.org/authors/?i=77&f=922#922). During this introduction Prynne 
speaks about reading at Rose’s funeral – saying, specifically: “I had a very brief, but remarkable and 
incandescent, friendship with [Rose], and when I was asked to read at her memorial service I had in my 
hand a copy of a book she had owned, and in which she had made markings in the margins – and I read at 








In this thesis I will argue that the critical project of Gillian Rose can be read 
constructively in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation.3 Commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project 
as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”.4 This 
                                            
3 Throughout this thesis “genealogy” will be taken to denote Foucault’s method of criticism – specifically, a 
method of problematisation. About the term “problematisation” Colin Koopman has helpfully clarified it as 
playing, within the context of Foucault’s work, a dual role. See Koopman, Colin, ‘Problematisation’, in The 
Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, edited by Leonard Lawlor and John Nale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 400: “In its first role, problematisation is a form of analytic activity, or a modality of philosophic 
inquiry. In this sense, “problematisation” is a verb. It denotes something that the inquirer does. [. . .] If 
Foucault problematised, it was because something was already in some way problematic, and yet not 
coherently or sensibly so. If problematisation in the first sense is a mode of the activity of inquiry, then 
problematisation in the second sense is the object of inquiry corollary to such activity. In this sense, 
“problematisation” is a noun, referring to that bundle of problematic material that we find problematic, about 
which we feel anxious, and over which we tend to obsess, both as individuals and at the more general level 
of society and culture. One way of summarising Foucault’s notion of problematisation in its two senses is to 
see acts of problematisation as giving coherence to the extant problematisation that is the object on which 
the act operates. The activity of problematisation renders an object of problematisation more coherent – but 
also more challenging.” Accordingly, to say that genealogy is a method of problematisation is to say that it 
affords the resources (i.e. the empirical / historical insights) through which the act of problematising extant 
problems can be achieved.     
4 See esp. Williams, Rowan, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose,’ 
Modern Theology 11.1 (1995), 3-22; Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism,’ 
Radical Philosophy 105 (2001), 25-36; Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose’s Critique of Violence’, Radical 
Philosophy 197 (2016), 25-35; Gorman, Anthony, ‘Whither the Broken Middle? Rose and Fackenheim on 
Mourning, Modernity and the Holocaust’ in Social Theory after the Holocaust, edited by Robert Fine and 
Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 47-70; Schick, Kate, Gillian Rose: A Good 
Enough Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); Lloyd, Vincent, Law and Transcendence: 
On the Unfinished Project of Gillian Rose (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). See also Pound, 
Marcus, ‘Gillian Rose: From Melancholia to Mourning: A Readers’ Guide’, Telos 173 (2015), 9-19. 
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way of presenting Rose’s critical project, while not strictly unfounded (for Rose 
also presents her critical project in contrast to the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”), raises a number of unfortunate and unnecessary borders 
between her thought and that of many of her contemporaries.5 In contrast to the 
way commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project, I will present it 
as entailing not a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” but 
a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. By approaching Rose’s 
critical project in this specific way, I aim to afford an alternative reading – that is, 
a reading in which Rose’s critical project can be, in part, clarified and supported 
by Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation.  
  
What is Rose’s critical project? 
 
The critical project of Gillian Rose has at its centre a concern with the “renewal 
of critical thought.”6 The aim of this renewal is, centrally, to formulate a practice 
of criticism through which we can recognise, and work though, what Rose 
construes as the “difficulty” of reason.7 For Rose, this difficulty follows from 
reason being, in its actuality, always both unavoidable and partial8 – unavoidable 
                                            
5 Caygill, Howard, ‘The Broken Hegel: Gillian Rose’s Retrieval of Speculative Philosophy’, Women: A 
Cultural Review 9.1 (1998), 24. See also Brower Latz, Andrew, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose: 
Speculative Diremptions, Absolute Ethical Life (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Durham University, 2015), 
12 n55: “Rose’s polemic against [postmodernists] hides substantial similarities between herself and them.” 
6 See esp. Rose, Gillian, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Verso, 2009), preface for 1995 reprint. See also 
Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 211-212. Here, Rose makes reference to a 
“reformed Kriticismus”, by which she means, specifically, Kant’s practice of criticism. I take this to be 
important because it suggests that Rose’s practice of criticism is a renewal of Kant’s practice of criticism – 
a renewal largely informed by Rose’s reading of Hegel. See section 3.2. below.  
7 For Rose’s account of the “difficulty of reason” see esp. Judaism and Modernity,1-10. See also Gillian 
Rose, Love’s Work: A Reckoning with Life (New York: New York Review Books, 2011), 124-125.  
8 See Bernstein, J. M., ‘A Work of Hard Love’, The Guardian (11th December 1995), 12, and Milbank, John, 
‘Obituary’: “[for Rose] reason [. . .] is without foundations and partial.”  
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because concepts are integral to our attempts at understanding our relations to 
others and to ourselves,9 partial because the concepts we employ when 
attempting to understand these relations will, because of these relations, always 
entail “gaps”, “silences”, “surprises” and “misunderstandings”.10 For Rose, it is 
crucial that we recognise, and work through, the difficulty of reason – rather than 
“disown” or “demonise” reason on account of its difficulty11 – because it is through 
this recognition, and through this work, that we are able to, in Rose’s words: 
“resume reflexively what we always do: to know, to misknow and yet to grow.”12 
 
What is the context of Rose’s critical project? 
 
Rose’s critical project touches upon a number of different debates.13 Her concern 
with the renewal of critical thought, specifically, is best construed as a concern 
with negotiating between what she, writing during the late seventies into the early 
                                            
9 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9. 
10 See esp. Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 1996), 7-8. See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 1-10; ‘The comedy of Hegel and 
the Trauerspiel of Modem Philosophy’, in Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. 
11 See esp. Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4.  
12 Rose, Gillian, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 310 and ‘Shadow 
of Spirit’, 48-49. See also Rose, Love’s Work, 127-128. Or, more fully, see The Broken Middle, 88: This 
oscillation in anxiety is the education of existence which, therefore, is not prior to concept, institution, or 
ethic, but is the existential failing towards and away from the middle itself, for ‘education’ is the experience 
of concept, institution, law.” 
13 See Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 6: “[Rose] made interventions into many fields, 
including German idealism, the Frankfurt School, Marxism, postmodernism and poststructuralism, sociology, 
Christian theology, Jewish theology and philosophy, Holocaust studies, architecture and jurisprudence, and 
offered original readings of many figures including Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Arendt, 
Luxemburg, Varnhagen, Girard, Mann and Kafka.” 
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nineties,14 saw as the two predominating approaches to reason: rationalism and 
nihilism.15 Rose writes:  
 
“[E]nlightenment rationalism” means the modern authority of 
unaided human reason, the ability of humanity to achieve unlimited 
progress and perfection; “postmodern [nihilism]” renounces the 
modern commitment to reason in view of its negative outcome — 
the destructive potentiality of science, the persistence of wars and 
holocausts. It proposes pluralism, localism and reservation as 
principles, when it has abandoned principles.”16 
                                            
14 Rose died in Coventry on 9th December 1995, aged forty-eight, after a two-year struggle with ovarian 
cancer. 
15 It is an open question whether these approaches to reason continue to predominate. For a recent and 
critical account of the predominance of the former of these two approaches see e.g. Geuss, Raymond, 
Reality and Its Dreams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), vii-x.  
16 Rose, Love’s Work, 124-125. To render the terminology of this passage consistent with the terminology 
of my argument, I have replaced Rose’s use of “relativism” with “nihilism”. I should also add, to be precise, 
in addition to the two approaches to reason that are mentioned here, Rose also references a third approach 
– that is, “revealed religion”. Within this thesis, there is neither the need or space to consider Rose’s 
complicated references to “religion” in detail. That said, it is this aspect of Rose’s work that has proved 
(rightly or wrongly) the most influential. For an introduction to this aspect of Rose’s work see Shanks, Against 
Innocence. See also Jay, Martin, ‘Force Fields,’ Salmagundi 113 (1997), 41-52. In this essay, and in the 
light of Rose’s decision to convert to Anglicanism on her deathbed, “it is”, Jay writes, “now possible to reread 
her last works as containing, at least between the lines, an anticipation of her [conversion].” (42) As to why 
Rose decided to convert to Anglicanism, Jay offers the following suggestions: “Rose’s decision to turn to 
Anglicanism, not just any version of Christianity, should also be seen as of a piece with her larger intellectual 
project (as well, I have been told, as an echo of a choice her mother had also made some years before). 
Conversion to a more universalist creed like Roman Catholicism might be understood as implying an 
embrace of an abstraction, hovering above the world, while accepting the evangelical imperative to be born 
again through faith in scriptural truth could be read as seeking a kind of ahistorical immediacy. The Church 
of England can be more easily understood as a particular, concrete historical instantiation of the divine 
intervention in the world. As the Tractarian Movement at Oxford in the 1830’s had stressed, the Church, 
even after its break with Rome, should still be seen as an apostolic succession, a Divine Society that 
progressively realised revelation in its own institutional history. For a Hegelian hopeful of realising reason 
over time in the ethical life of community, Anglicanism would thus have an obvious appeal. For a believer in 
healing the diremption between public and private, a state church with little patience for the world-denying 
inwardness of other versions of Protestantism would also be especially attractive. For an adherent of the 
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For Rose, in spite of being seemingly antithetical, these two approaches to 
reason, and their allied critical projects, are, at base, similar. They are similar in 
that, through their respective overstatements of universality and particularity, they 
both betray a misrepresentation of the actuality of reason – an actuality in which 
the justice we seek to achieve with our concepts is always at risk of becoming 
unjust.17 Accordingly, these two approaches to reason result in the 
disempowerment of criticism – which, for Rose, is the practice through which we 
come to recognise, not only the ways in which reason is structured, but also the 
ways in which it is reconstructable.18 Rose writes:  
                                            
stern credo that love has work to do in the world, hard, unrelenting, often unrewarded work, a religion that 
resists the instant gratifications of mystical epiphanies would have its lure.” (48-49) For constructive accounts 
of the role of “religion” in the work of Rose, see e.g. Williams, Rowan, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics: 
Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose,’ Modern Theology 11.1 (1995), 3-22; Rashkover, Randi, 
‘Theological Desire: Feminism, Philosophy, and Exegetical Jewish Thought’, in Women and Gender in 
Jewish Philosophy, edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 314-
339; Rowlands, Anna ‘‘Angry Angels’ as Guides to Ethics and Faith: Reflections on Simone Weil and Gillian 
Rose’, Theology 112.865 (2009), 14-23; Lloyd, Vincent, ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose,’ Journal of 
Religious Ethics 36.4 (2008), 683-705; Lloyd, Vincent, ‘Complex Space or Broken Middle? Milbank, Rose, 
and the Sharia Controversy’, Political Theology 10.2 (2009), 225-245. For a critical account see Gorman, 
Anthony, ‘Nihilism and Faith: Rose, Bernstein, and the Future of Critical Theory,’ Radical Philosophy, 134 
(2005), 18-30. For brief overview of the debates surrounding the role and status of religion within Rose work 
see Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 6-7. 
17 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 5. This use of “unjust” can be construed both epistemologically and 
ethically. To say that a concept does an injustice to its object is to say that, in using that concept, we fail to 
completely conceive that object. This is an epistemological construal. An ethical construal involves 
recognising that such failures have implications in how we think about our relationships with ourselves and 
with others. Central to Rose’s critical project is the contention that the relationship between ethics and 
epistemology is one that does not admit of rigorous distinctions. Rose’s commitment to the idea that 
concepts can be “unjust” (a commitment I infer from her continued appeals to the concepts “identity” and 
“non-identity”) is, as will be explained (see section 1.2.) one of the central respects in which she, following 
Adorno, distinguishes herself from Kant’s critical project. For more on how Adorno’s commitment to identity 
and non-identity (a commitment that I take to be comparable to Rose’s) involves a departure from Kantian 
epistemology see Freyenhagen, Fabian, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 43 n47.   
18 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 5: “To promise anything else, any new righteousness which will not 
be subject of and subject to the difficulty of actuality, which will never become unjust, is to disempower. 
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To destroy philosophy, to abolish or to supersede critical, self-
conscious reason, would leave us resourceless to know the 
difference between fantasy and actuality, to discern the distortion 
between ideas and their realisation. It would prevent the process of 
learning, the corrigibility of experience. This ill-will towards 
philosophy misunderstands the authority of reason, which is not the 
mirror of the dogma of superstition, but risk. Reason, the critical 
criterion, is for ever without ground.19 
 
What is Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”? 
 
For Rose, the critical projects of “postmodernity” involve replacing one mistake 
with another.20 To disown reason in consequence of the perceived failures of a 
universal, authoritative account of reason to capture, and be changed by, the 
particulars of experience is, she argues, to continue the mistaken assumption 
that reason is “necessarily and incorrigibly exclusive.”21 For Rose, it is the 
continuation of this assumption that impedes the potential for critical thought to 
recognise the actual structure of reason, which, in consequence, impedes the 
                                            
Reason that is actual is ready for all kinds of surprises, for what cannot be anticipated, precisely because of 
the interference of meanings which are structured and reconstructable.” Throughout this thesis, I will be 
using the terms “reconstructed” and “reconfigured” (both of which are used by Rose) interchangeably.   
19 Rose, Love’s Work, 127-128. See section 1.2. below.   
20 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 3. Rose will also employ the concept “poststructuralism”, but less so 
than she does the concept “postmodernism”. So far as I can tell, Rose uses these concepts interchangeably.  
21 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 3. 
 11 
potential for critical thought to recognise the ways in which reason could actually 
be restructured.22    
 
What, however, are the critical projects of “postmodernity” to which Rose refers? 
Referencing only her works, they are the critical projects of Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.23 Given this answer, the question then 
becomes as it became for one of Rose’s early reviewers: can one “critique” be 
directed at such a diverse ensemble?24 For Rose, it can. This conviction is 
repeated by a number of her commentators – commentators that consider her 
challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” to be “one of the great 
achievements” of her critical project.25 Consequently, these commentators have, 
following Rose’s own presentations, sought to present the value her critical 
project by contrasting it with and opposite it to the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”. However, in doing so, these commentators continue Rose’s, if 
not mistaken, then questionable assumption that “postmodernity” refers to a 
coherent approach to reason, that can be, in consequence, coherently 
challenged by her critical project. 
 
                                            
22 Within this thesis I will be concerned less with the reconstructions of reason, and more with how Rose and 
Foucault construe criticism as playing a constitutive part in the recognition that reason is reconstructable.     
23 For Rose’s account of Deleuze see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 6: The New Bergsonism: Deleuze. For 
her accounts of Derrida see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 8: Law and Writing: Derrida, ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’, 
in Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 65-87, ‘The comedy of Hegel 
and the Trauerspiel of Modem Philosophy’, in Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63-76. For her account of Foucault see Dialectic of 
Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault. For Rose’s more general accounts of “postmodernity” 
see e.g. Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, The Broken Middle, xi-xv, Judaism and Modernity, 1-10, Mourning 
Becomes the Law, 1-14, Love’s Work, 124-128, 134-140.   
24 See Murphy, W. T., ‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ The Modern Law Review 50 (May 1987), 384. 
25 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4. 
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It is this way of reading Rose’s critical project – that is, reading it as entailing a 
general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – that I aim, in this 
thesis, to contest. It is my contention that, in order to accurately account for 
Rose’s challenge to the “postmodern” approaches to reason, it is necessary to 
focus, not on her general challenge to the critical project of “postmodernity”, but 
on the specific challenges that comprise this general challenge.26 In this thesis, I 
will focus on Rose’s specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy.27 It 
will be on the basis of such specificity that I will aim to afford an alternative reading 
of Rose’s critical project – that is, a reading of Rose’s critical project as being, not 
opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, but as open to being read 
constructively in conjunction with it.  To develop this contention, I will now turn to 
consider, in more detail, the ways in which commentators have construed the 
relationship between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”. 
 
0.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
                                            
26 Throughout her work, Rose will move between making general and specific challenges to the critical 
projects of “postmodernity”. See esp. Dialectic of Nihilism. See also The Broken Middle; ‘Is there a Jewish 
Philosophy?’, 11-24; ‘Shadow of Spirit’, 37-51; ‘Søren Kierkegaard to Martin Buber – Reply from ‘the Single 
One’’, 155-173; ‘Architecture to Philosophy – The Post-modern Complicity’, 225-240; Mourning Becomes 
the Law, 7-14; ‘Athens and Jerusalem: a Tale of Three Cities’, in Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy 
and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-39; ‘Beginnings of the Day - 
Fascism and Representation’, 44-62; ‘The comedy of Hegel and the Trauerspiel of Modem Philosophy’, 63-
76; Love’s Work, 121-144.    
27 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault. 
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The aim of this section is to review the secondary literature on Rose – specifically, 
the ways in which commentators have construed the relationship between Rose’s 
critical project and her challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. 
Following this literature review, I will argue that the ways in which commentators 
have construed this relationship are both helpful and unhelpful. They are helpful 
in that they clarify what is original and resourceful within Rose’s critical project, in 
contrast with the critical projects of “postmodernity”. They are unhelpful, however, 
in that they construe this contrast in general terms – that is, in terms of 
“postmodernity”. Employing the general concept “postmodernity” to describe the 
critical projects with which Rose’s critical project contrasts is unhelpful in that it 
resists engaging critically with Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”, thereby, to repeat, perpetuating the “unfortunate and 
unnecessary borders [. . .] between Rose's thought and that of many of her 
contemporaries”.28  
 
It is on account of this unhelpful aspect that I take the argument of this thesis to 
make an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose. As will be 
explained, central to this contribution is a shift away from construing Rose’s 
critical project in contrast with the critical projects of “postmodernity”, in general, 
towards construing it in contrast with Foucault’s method of genealogy, in 
particular. Through such specificity, I aim to call in to question some of the 
“unfortunate and unnecessary borders [. . .] between Rose's thought and that of 
many of her contemporaries” – that is, I aim to argue that Rose’s critical project 
can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s practice of genealogy. 
Accordingly, within this literature review, I will follow the ways in which 
                                            
28 Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24. See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 12 n55. 
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commentators employ the general concept of “postmodernity” to describe the 




Although the secondary literature on Rose is still relatively small, it is large 
enough for me to have to make a decision about the commentators on which I 
will focus within this literature review.29 Since the overarching argument of this 
thesis concerns, centrally, the relationship between Rose’s critical project and her 
challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – or, to be specific, her 
challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy – I have decided to focus only on 
the commentators that have, to varying degrees and for different reasons 
addressed this relationship – that is, Rowan Williams, Vincent Lloyd, Kate 
Schick.30 As will become evident within this review, while these commentators 
each approach Rose’s critical project with a different agenda, their presentations 
of her critical project each betray a similar structure. The structure being that they 
each present the importance of Rose’s critical project by way of the challenge it 
entails to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, and present this entailed 
challenge as a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. This 
structure will inform the argument of this thesis both positively and negatively. 
Positively in that I will also seek to present the importance of Rose’s critical 
project by way of the challenge it entails to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. 
                                            
29 For a comprehensive bibliography of the work both by and on Rose, see Brower Latz, The Social 
Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 224-256. 
30 I here list these commentators in the order in which they will be reviewed – that is, chronologically. 
Although there is some overlap between them – which is inevitable given how little has been written about 
Rose – no argumentative weight should be given to this ordering.   
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Negatively in that I will not seek to present this entailed challenge as a general 
challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Rather, as I have mentioned, 
I will seek to present this challenge as a specific challenge to Foucault’s critical 
project. 
 
Additionally, although I have mentioned that I take the ways in which Rose and 
her commentators use the concept “postmodern” to work on questionable 
assumptions, I will continue to use it within this literature review. I do so for two 
reasons. First, because it is this concept that is used with the works that will be 
reviewed. Second, it is this aspect of the secondary literature that I aim to, within 
the argument of this thesis, correct. In other words, I will continue to use the 
concept “postmodern” within this literature review because it will be with 
reference to this use that I will, following this review, state the respect in which I 
take the argument of this thesis to make an original contribution to the secondary 




For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism affords, centrally, a way of reading (i.e. 
recognising) “reality” or “actuality” as “difficult”32 – which, in turn, affords the 
resources for “discovering what it might be to exercise a historical freedom, a 
                                            
31 Rowan Williams is a theologian – a theologian that has written widely on Arius, Teresa of Avila, Sergei 
Bulgakov, Dostoyevsky, Hegel, Vladimir Lossky, Wittgenstein. In this brief review, I will be focusing on his 
essay Between Politics and Metaphysics because, as I mentioned, it is within this essay that Williams 
explicitly accounts for Rose’s general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. See also Williams, 
Rowan, ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’, in Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology, edited 
by Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), 116-130, Williams, Rowan, ‘“The Sadness of the King”: Gillian 
Rose, Hegel, and the Pathos of Reason’, Telos 173 (2015), 21-36.  
32 See Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3.  
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determination within constraints of how my and our life is to be shaped.”33 Rose’s 
practice of criticism does this, for Williams, through recognising both the 
unavoidability and partiality of “metaphysics” – that is, “the project of speaking 
with generality about the real or actual.”34 For Williams, the importance of this 
twofold recognition follows from, in his words, “[the] inescapable issue in the 
speech that is actually employed by material and temporal subjects that has to 
do with how what is said is appropriated, how it sustains intelligibility in the 
exchanges and negotiations that constitute our actuality.”35 This, for Williams, “is 
where the difficulty [of the real or actual] lies.”36  
 
For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism contrasts, centrally, with the critical 
projects of “postmodernity” – critical projects that, in Williams’s words, “fail to read 
'reality' or 'actuality' as difficult.”37 This failure, for Williams (thinking in the light of 
what Rose thought), is bound up with the contention that “metaphysics” inevitably 
results in positions (e.g. senses of “what is” and “what ought to be”) that “arrest 
the process of exchange”38 through which we learn about ourselves and others. 
For Williams, this belief implies a failure to read reality or actuality as difficult in 
the sense that fails to recognise that “there are issues of power wherever there 
are questions of proscription, and an intellectual style that declines to engage 
with matters of legitimacy, or even truthfulness, if we want to be primitive, is 
making a strong political bid. It rules out the question of judgement (in various 
                                            
33 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 4. 
34 See Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3. See also A. W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern 
Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1: “Metaphysics is 
the most general attempt to make sense of things.” 
35 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 4. 
36 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 4. 
37 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3. 
38 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3. 
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senses of the word); and in so doing rules out what we could call the question of 
recognition and thus of internal critique.”39 Here Williams is restating Rose’s 
argument the critical projects of “postmodernity” are, in the end, “viciously 
circular”.40 Through their respective attempts at avoiding the generalities of 
metaphysics, the critical projects of “postmodernity” are required to make general 
claims.41 
 
For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism contrasts with the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”, centrally, through recognising the “importance of error and the 
recognisability of error.”42 Recognise error is important for Rose because, in 
Williams words, “[t]o recognise is to learn; to learn is to reimagine or reconceive 
the self [. . .].”43 For Williams, Rose recognises the importance of error on account 
of her reading of Hegel’s idea of “phenomenology”.44 For Williams, “To read the 
Phenomenology adequately we have to enter upon a process that will show us 
that we have not yet understood the nature of thinking; thinking the thoughts of 
the Phenomenology is discovering the ways in which ‘natural consciousness’ 
repeatedly undermines itself and by so doing advances — not towards a 
conclusive theoretical reconciliation, but towards a practice of scepticism that, so 
far from inducing despair or withdrawal or apathy, empowers us to attempt 
transformative action in the clear recognition that any liberation from the 
                                            
39 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3-4. 
40 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 90-91. For my account of this aspect of Rose’s challenge, see section 
2.2. below. 
41 See also Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24. 
42 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 9. 
43 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 9. 
44 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 9-10.  
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distortions of 'natural' thinking is a necessary step to the removal of those social 




For Lloyd, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of resisting what he 
refers to as the “enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary.”47 To 
understand what Lloyd means by this, it is necessary to understand, first, what 
he means by the “enchantment of the ordinary”.48 For Lloyd, the ordinary 
becomes enchanted when certain ways of thinking and acting are taken to be 
authoritative by certain people.49 Such “enchantment” – that is, the process 
through which ideas and acts are taken to be authoritative – provides such ideas 
and acts with a “normative force.”50 On this account, to be “enchanted” by the 
ordinary is to take certain ways of thinking and acting as ways we should think 
and act.   
 
                                            
45 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 10. 
46 Vincent Lloyd is an associate Professor of Theology and Religious Studies. Beyond his work on Rose, 
Lloyd has also written about the philosophy of religion, religion and politics, and race. In this review I will be 
focusing on his book Law and Transcendence. See also ‘Complex Space or Broken Middle? Milbank, Rose, 
and the Sharia Controversy’, Political Theology 10.2 (2009), 225-245; ‘Gillian Rose: Making Kierkegaard 
Difficult Again’, in Jon Stewart (ed.), Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy, Volume 11 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2012), 203-18; ‘Gillian Rose, Race, and Identity’, Telos 173 (2015), 107-124; The Problem with Grace: 
Reconfiguring Political Theology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian 
Rose’;  
47 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2.  
48 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 1-11. 
49 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 1: “The ordinary is seductive: it is enchanted, and we ourselves have 
a role in the magic. ‘We are the People, history is our Story, this land is our World.’”  
50 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 1. 
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For Lloyd (thinking in the light of what Rose thought), “[w]hat is [dangerous] is not 
the enchantment of the ordinary but the enchantment of philosophy, the 
enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary.”51 Lloyd recognises that 
normativity pervades our lives.52 What is dangerous, on his account, is when 
critical reflection regurgitates rather than interrogates the such normativity.53 
“When this occurs, philosophy becomes [critically] impotent” – that is, impotent 
within the task of continually calling into question our ideas and acts that are taken 
to be authoritative.54 “This alliance of philosophy, sociology, legal theory, and 
conventional wisdom had devastating effects. Mass death and humiliation in 
colonialism, the World Wars, and genocide shook confidence in reason in the 
same way that reason had once shaken confidence in pre-modern 
enchantment.”55 
 
For Lloyd, one of the “great achievements” of Rose’s critical project is that it 
demonstrates how the critical projects of “postmodernity” are examples of the 
enchantment of critical reflection.56 They are examples in that they employ certain 
                                            
51 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. I have replaced “troublesome” with “dangerous”. 
52 See O’Neill, ‘Introduction’ in Korsgaard, Christine, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), xi: “Normativity pervades our lives. We not merely have beliefs: we claim that we 
and others ought to hold certain beliefs. We not merely have desires: we claim that we and others ought to 
act on some of them, but not on others. We assume that what somebody believes or does may be judged 
reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong, good or bad, that it is answerable to standards or norms.”  
53 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. See also Raymond Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, in Outside 
Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 159: “In contemporary philosophical discussion the 
concept of normativity (along with the now almost automatically raised question concerning the “normative 
implications” of every theoretical proposal) is surely the most important “self-evident” notion that must be put 
in question.” 
54 See Lloyd, ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose’, 685: “A central motif of Rose’s work, from her first book on 
the Frankfurt School (1978) to her final memoirs (1995, 1999), is the need to acknowledge no other authority 
than experience.” 
55 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3. 
56 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4. 
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concepts to criticise the ordinary world without subjecting these concepts to 
critique.57 For Lloyd, Rose demonstrates this through demonstrating that the 
critical projects of “postmodernity” work on the basis of Kant’s “strict separation 
of transcendental register from empirical world”58 – where the “content of the 
transcendental register is merely an elevated,  sanctified aspect of the ordinary 
world.”59 The critical projects of “postmodernity” “ostensibly reject the 
transcendental register (‘metaphysics’), yet they make use of it all the same.”60 
This “dialectic” results in critical projects that are impotent in the manner 
described above – that is, impotent within the task of continually calling into 
question our ideas and acts that are taken to be authoritative. 
 
To repeat, for Lloyd, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of resisting 
what he refers to as the “enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary” – that 
is, affords a way of resisting what renders critical thought impotent. It does this 
by way of what Lloyd refers to as an “immodest jurisprudence”61 – that is, a way 
of thinking about “law” that “does not confine itself to the courtroom,”62 but rather 
construes all ideas and acts as “individuated social norms”63 The aim of such an 
“immodest jurisprudence” is to overcome the strict distinction between the 
transcendental register and the empirical world. “To be able to talk about the 
social world in terms of law, to say that we do what we do because we are 
following a law, would be reassuring but not enchanting. It would help make 
                                            
57 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4: “will to power (for Nietzsche), Being (for Heidegger), the virtual (for 
Deleuze), différance (for Derrida), and power (for Foucault).” 
58 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3. 
59 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3. 
60 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4. 
61 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 19-28. 
62 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 24. 
63 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 5. 
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sense of our normative vocabulary (better: our normative phenomenology, the 
feeling that some actions are correct and others incorrect) and it would give us a 
way of talking about disquietude. Laws can be arbitrary and unfair; indeed, they 
always are. But laws are also debatable and revisable. Decisions made by a court 
can be appealed. Courts can make systematic errors, getting laws wrong. In 
short, the jurisprudential idiom offers bountiful resources for critical reflection on 
the ordinary.”64 “This task [of criticism] can be accomplished only when 
philosophy understands itself as the study of law, of individuated social norms. 
The only way for philosophy to refuse to be [enchanted by the ordinary] is for 
philosophy to understand itself as jurisprudence.”65 “It is only by understanding 
philosophy as jurisprudence that we can see the ordinary as it is, translucent. 





For Schick, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of taking the political 
seriously.68 Taking the political seriously involves, in Schick’s words, 
“emphasising the need to work towards greater comprehension of socio-political 
                                            
64 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 6. 
65 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 5. 
66 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. For more on what Lloyd refers to as the “necessary failures” of “norms” 
see Lloyd, The Problem with Grace, 211-219. See also Lloyd, ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose’. 
67 Kate Schick is a Lecturer in International Relations. In conjunction with her work on Rose, Schick has 
worked, and continues to work on issue that relate to pedagogy, recognition and vulnerability as they relate 
to international political theory. In this review I will be focusing on her book Gillian Rose: A Good Enough 
Justice. See also ‘Re-cognizing Recognition: Gillian Rose’s “Radical Hegel” and Vulnerable Recognition’, 
Telos 173 (Winter 2015), 87-105; Schick, Kate, Trauma and the Ethical in International Relations 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2008). 
68 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 17. 
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realities, to see how we are implicated in the challenges we face and to take the 
risk of acting politically.”69  Accordingly, for Schick, Rose’s critical project is 
important because it affords a way of retaining the possibility of political 
transformation – that is, the work of coming to know and risking political action in 
the hope that we might instantiate what Rose refers to as “a good enough 
justice”.70 
 
Schick construes Rose’s critical project as contrasting, centrally, with the critical 
projects of “Enlightenment” and “postmodernity”. According to Schick: “Rose 
argues that both Enlightenment and postmodern thought fall into neo-Kantian 
dualisms that reinforce the diremption of modern thought and practice.”71 Rose’s 
concept of “diremption”, to which Schick here refers, is, for Schick, used by Rose 
to refer to the “brokenness between universal and particular, law and ethics, 
actuality and potentiality”72 – a brokenness that, in Rose’s words, “draws attention 
to the trauma of separation of that which was, however, as in marriage, not 
originally united.”73 As Schick emphasises, such diremption (or such brokenness) 
is a fundamental feature of both modern social and political theory and of actual 
social and political life: “the dualisms pervasive in modern thought reflect the 
underlying antagonisms of social and political relations.”74  
                                            
69 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 17. 
70 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 1. See Rose, Love’s Work, 124.   
71 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. 
72 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 5. 
73 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. See Rose, The Broken Middle, 236.  
74 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. See also Milbank, Obituary: “For Gillian Rose this neglect of the 
moment of universality is tantamount to a false attempt to heal the "brokenness" of the middle. For while she 
denounced a facile Kantian resignation to dualisms, she equally insisted that these dualisms were essential 
to the modern state and modern economy, and could never be merely thought away in abstraction. To try to 
do so is to remain "a beautiful soul", to doom oneself always to accentuate only one side of the divide - 
ethics against law for example - and so to contribute to the worsening of our predicament.” 
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When Schick writes that, for Rose, the critical projects of “Enlightenment” and 
“postmodernity” reinforce the diremption of modern thought and practice she 
means that each overemphasises one side of the dualisms that pervade modern 
thought and practice.75 The dualism that Schick focuses on is that consisting of 
the relationship between universality and particularity.76 “Mainstream liberal 
thought is grounded in Enlightenment reason, which offers universal claims to 
authority or ‘oughts’ based on a disembedded and disembodied understanding 
of ethics. Such abstraction results in a profound disconnect between discourses 
of rights and equality on the one hand and actualities of domination and exclusion 
on the other. Postmodern thought, in contrast, draws attention to concrete 
particulars and human experience, in order to counter the abstraction and 
universalism of Enlightenment thought. However, it overemphasises the 
particular and it, too, can end up abstracting from those structures and historical 
processes in which the particular is embedded.”77      
 
For Schick, against such exclusive universality and exclusive particularity – that 
is, against the critical projects of Enlightenment and postmodernity – Rose argues 
for a speculative negotiating of the broken middle between universal and 
particular, law and ethics, Enlightenment ideals and lived experience. She 
maintains that political theorists must attend to particular experience, but that this 
cannot be thought in isolation from the socio-political structures and historical 
processes that facilitate particular experiences. Speculative political theory 
                                            
75 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. 
76 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. 
77 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. 
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recognises that it is impossible to think a particular in isolation: even the very 
process of thinking one thing and not another involves relation to that Other that 
is not thought.”78    
 
Schick develops this way of construing Rose’s critical project centrally (and 
helpfully) in terms of Rose’s concept of the “broken middle”. For Schick, Rose’s 
concept of the “broken middle” can be characterised in several ways: “a break 
between the potentiality and actuality of the world, between universal and 
particular, between freedom and unfreedom, between legality and morality.”79 For 
Schick, this concept of the “broken middle” is “a reaction to an attempt on the part 
of postmodern thinkers to mend this brokenness; an attempt that Rose deems 
doomed to failure”.80 In support of this she cites Rose: 
 
“[Postmodern thought] would mend the diremption of law and ethics 
by turning the struggle between universality, particularity and 
singularity into a general sociology of control. Yet the security of 
this new spectatorship is undermined by the tension of freedom and 
unfreedom which it cannot acknowledge for it has disqualified the 
actuality of any oppositions which might initiate process and pain – 
any risk of coming to know.”81  
 
In other words, on Schick’s account, for Rose, rather than negotiating the broken 
middle, “postmodern” thought looks towards a premature reconciliation. In so 
                                            
78 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6-7. 
79 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.  
80 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38. 
81 Rose, The Broken Middle, xiii. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38. 
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doing, however, it passes over the struggle of living in a world full of contradiction 
and suffering.82   
 
For Schick, Rose’s critical project contrast with the critical projects of 
“postmodernity” centrally through its attempts at “comprehending” the “broken 
middle”.  
 
Not that comprehension completes or closes, but that it returns 
diremption to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or 
in partial action – as long at its political history persists. The 
complementarity of comprehension to diremption involves 
reflection on what may be ventured – without mending diremption 
in heaven or on earth.83  
 
For Schick, Rose’s critical project – specifically, her “speculative negotiations of 
the dirempted middle” – “does not aim to fix what is broken; that would be euporia 
– the easy way. Instead, it works towards comprehension, however partial, or 
dirempted thought and actuality under modernity. It also reflects on ‘what [political 
action] may be ventured’, given this brokenness – knowing that any action will be 
flawed and result in unintended consequences, but clinging to the hope that 
something may be learned.”84  
 
                                            
82 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38. 
83 Rose, The Broken Middle, xv. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 39. 
84 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 39. On the place of “hope” within the work of Rose, compare with Lloyd, 
Law and Transcendence, 2.  
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Assessing the secondary literature 
 
In this section I have reviewed the ways in which certain commentators have 
presented the relationship between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects 
of “postmodernity”. According to this review, commentators have, broadly 
speaking, presented Rose’s critical project as entailing a general challenge to the 
critical projects of “postmodernity”. To present Rose’s critical project in this way 
is to present it as recognising and redressing a mistake that underlies and unifies 
the critical projects of “postmodernity”.85 I take this presentation to be both helpful 
and unhelpful.  
 
I take it to be helpful for two reasons. First, presenting Rose’s critical project as 
involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” is helpful, 
I think, because it is, in part, accurate. Rose also presents her critical project as 
involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Second, 
by presenting Rose’s critical project as contrasting, in general, with the critical 
projects of “postmodernity”, commentators are able to emphasise (albeit often at 
the risk of overemphasising) what makes Rose’s work, in general, important and 
original.  
 
However, I also take this presentation to be unhelpful for two reasons.  First, 
presenting Rose’s critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical 
projects of “postmodernity” is unhelpful, I think, because it works on the 
questionable assumption that “postmodern” captures a coherent set of critical 
                                            
85 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 2-5. 
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projects that can be, in consequence, coherently challenged in general.86 
Second, it is unhelpful, I think, because it implies a reluctance to engage critically 
with Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. In other words, 
construing Rose’s critical project as generally contrasting with the critical projects 
of “postmodernity” is unhelpful, I think, because it risks hiding the specific and 
substantial similarities between herself and them.87 As I mentioned above, such 
a reluctance is a problem in that it reinforces the unfortunate and unnecessary 
borders between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries88 – 
which, as I see it, has the consequence of impeding the potential for the 
importance and originality of Rose’s critical project to influence, and be influenced 
by, the critical projects of her contemporaries.  
 
The argument of this thesis is motivated by what I have here described as 
unhelpful within the ways in which commentators have presented the relationship 
between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects of “postmodernity”. For 
the two reasons that I have just given, I will, in contrast to the commentators 
considered above, present Rose’s critical project as involving, not a general 
challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, but a specific challenge to 
                                            
86 This is a continuation of the assumption on which Rose often, but not always, works – an assumption that 
was recognised as questionable within some of the reviews of Dialectic of Nihilism. See e.g. W. T. Murphy, 
‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ The Modern Law Review 50 (May 1987), 384: “Yet can one “critique” 
be directed at such a diverse ensemble?” For Murphy, Rose’s way of directing one “critique” at the 
poststructuralist / postmodern tradition within Dialectic of Nihilism proves to be “what is most stimulating and 
yet most unconvincing about this book.” Just as it is questionable to think that one “critique” can be directed 
towards the critical projects of “postmodernity”, it is also questionable, as Raymond Geuss has argued, to 
think that one concept (e.g. “liberalism”) can afford a coherent and general framework for orientating political 
action within the contemporary world. See also Goodrich, Peter, ‘Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism 
and Law by Gillian Rose’, Journal of Law and Society, 12.2 (1985), 241: “The disciplines and thinkers 
included in such a designation are, however, too disparate to form a coherent group.”  
87 See Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 12 n55. 
88 See Gaygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24. 
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Foucault’s practice of genealogy. In doing so, it is not my aim to render redundant 
the commentaries considered above. Rather, it is my aim to account for some of 
the specifics that these commentaries do not account for, and consequently risk 
hiding. Given this account of the motivation behind the argument of this thesis, I 
will now turn to consider the details of this argument.    
 
0.3. ARGUMENT / CONTRIBUTION / METHODOLOGY 
 
What is the argument of this thesis?  
 
In this thesis I will argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in 
conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. It is my 
contention that while Rose is clear about what she takes the requirement of 
criticism to be, she is unclear about how this requirement can be effectively 
achieved by the practice of criticism. Rose takes the requirement of criticism to 
be twofold, and continuous – that is, to continually call into question the authority 
of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring this 
authority. For Rose, effectively meeting this requirement involves, in part, 
criticism yielding, in her words, the experience of identity and non-identity – that 
is, the experience of the ways in which our concepts, when actually used, entail 
both successes and failures. As to how the practice of criticism yields this 
experience, however, Rose’s account is at best ambiguous. Such ambiguity is a 
problem in that it makes it difficult to see how Rose’s critical project does not 
result in the same critical blindness that she claims is the result of other critical 
projects. Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation, I will argue, affords 
a way of clarifying this pivotal, but ambiguous, part of Rose’s critical project.  
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What contribution does the argument of this thesis make? 
 
The argument that I have just schematised makes an original contribution to the 
secondary literature on Rose in that it affords an alternative way of reading Rose’s 
critical project – alternative in two respects. First, my approach to Rose’s critical 
project will be more specific than the approaches of the commentators 
considered above – more specific in the sense that I will not present Rose’s 
critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical projects of 
“postmodernity”. Rather, I will present it as involving a specific challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy. Second, on account of such specificity, Rose’s 
critical project will be presented as being, not opposed to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy, but open to be read constructively in conjunction with it.   
 
I recognise that approaching and presenting Rose’s critical project in this specific 
way risks simplifying its complexity – a complexity that many commentators 
appeal to when describing what makes Rose’s critical project original and 
important. I take this risk centrally because it is my contention that through 
showing the specific respect in which Rose’s critical project can benefit from 
being read alongside Foucault’s practice of genealogy, I will thereby afford a 
basis on which others might begin thinking about how Rose’s critical project could 
inform, and be informed by, debates from which it might have otherwise been 
barred. It is on account of this contention that I focus on Rose’s specific challenge 
to Foucault’s practice of genealogy. Foucault’s practice of genealogy has proven, 
and continues to prove, influential for those concerned with, broadly speaking, 
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the development of critical thought.89 The hope is that by showing how Rose’s 
critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s 
genealogy I will thereby show that Rose’s critical project is open to being both 




Having now explained what the argument of this thesis is, and what contribution 
this argument makes to the secondary literature on Rose, I will now turn to 
consider some of the central methodological assumptions upon which argument 
of this thesis will work.  
 
                                            
89 See esp. Allen, Amy, ‘Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress: Critical Theory in Postcolonial Times’, 
in Critical Theory in Critical Times: Transforming the Global Political and Economic Order, edited by 
Penelope Deutscher and Cristina Lafont (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 183-206, ‘Foucault 
and Enlightenment: A Critical Reappraisal’, Constellations 10.2 (2003), 180-198, The End of Progress: 
Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 
The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), 183-206; Butler, Judith, ‘What is Critique: An Essay on Foucault's Virtue’, 
in The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy, edited by David Ingram (London: Blackwell, 2002), 
212-226; Hoy, David Couzens, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT, 2004), The Time of Our Lives A Critical History of Temporality (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2009); 
Koopman, Collin, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013). See also Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(London: Routledge, 1999); Sluga, Hans, Politics and the Search for the Common Good (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). For accounts of the relationship between Foucault and 
Habermas see e.g. Ashenden, Samantha and Owen, David (eds.), Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting 
the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Theory (London: Sage, 1999); Dreyfus, Hubert and Rabinow, 
Paul ‘What is Maturity? Foucault and Habermas on “What is Enlightenment?”’, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, 
edited by David Couzens Hoy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-121; Kelly, Michael (ed.), Critique and 
Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994). Reference must also be 
made to work of Raymond Geuss – work which has proven pivotal for the conception of certain aspects of 
this thesis. For an account of the part played by Foucault’s method of genealogy within his work see Janosch 
Prinz, Radicalizing Realism in Political Theory (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, 
2015).    
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How will I approach Rose’s work? 
  
The first methodological point concerns my approach to Rose’s work. Up to this 
point I have been describing Rose as having a “critical project” – which is to say, 
it is my contention that underlying and unifying Rose’s work is a practice of 
criticism. In other words, while the object of Rose’s practice of criticism changes 
throughout her work, the practice of criticism itself remains roughly the same.90 
This is a contention corroborated, I think, by Rose. For example, in her preface 
to the 1995 reprint of Hegel Contra Sociology, Rose writes: 
 
The speculative exposition of Hegel developed in this book [an 
exposition in which Rose first presents her practice of criticism] still 
provides the basis for a unique engagement with post-Hegelian 
thought, especially postmodernity [. . .]. This book, therefore, 
remains the core of the project to demonstrate a nonfoundational 
and radical Hegel, which overcomes the opposition between 
nihilism and rationalism. It provides the possibility for renewal of 
critical thought in the intellectual difficulty of our time.91  
 
More will be said about the claims of this preface below. I cite it here simply 
because it serves to corroborate my contention that underlying and unifying 
Rose’s work is a practice of criticism. Rose first presents this practice of criticism 
within her second book (Hegel Contra Sociology, 1981 – a book influenced by 
                                            
90 For chronological accounts of Rose’s work see Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, and Pound, Marcus, ‘Gillian 
Rose: From Melancholia to Mourning: A Readers’ Guide’, Telos 173 (2015), 9-19. 
91 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, preface for 1995 reprint. 
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her first, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. 
Adorno,1978),92 and continued to practice this form of criticism within her 
subsequent books (Dialectic of Nihilism, 1984; The Broken Middle, 1992; 
Judaism and Modernity, 1993; Love’s Work, 1995; Mourning Becomes the Law, 
1996, Paradiso, 1999).93 
 
This way of reading Rose’s work – that is, reading it as forming a unified whole – 
is not the only way. An alternative is given by Anthony Gorman. He writes: “Rose 
represents her oeuvre as a unified philosophical project centred around her three 
main texts: Hegel contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The Broken Middle. 
However, this claim does not withstand critical examination.”94 Stating it simply – 
for I will be returning to the details of Gorman’s argument below95 – Gorman 
argues that Rose’s work comprises, in his words (paraphrasing Adorno), “two 
halves that do not add up.”96 “The difference is this: in Hegel Contra Sociology, 
the antinomies of sociological reason are comprehended and criticised from the 
standpoint of the universal (‘the Absolute’) which, though not ‘posited’ or ‘pre-
judged’, is nonetheless understood to be latent or implicit within the antinomies 
                                            
92 For more on the extent to which Adorno influenced Rose see esp. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of 
Gillian Rose, Chapter 2: Rose’s Frankfurt Inheritance. See also Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 18-25; 
Bernstein, ‘A Work of Hard Love’: “[Rose] couldn’t distinguish between her thought and Adorno’s. This is a 
telling half-truth: her thought is easily distinguishable from Adorno’s but she shared with him a project: to 
renew the claim of Hegelian philosophy by using it as an instrument in a critique of contemporary 
philosophical theories and ideals.” 
93 For similar readings of Rose’s work forming a unified whole see Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of 
Gillian Rose; Schick, Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice; Naomi Felicity Hammond, Philosophy and the 
Facetious Style: Examining Philosophy as a Method in the Works of Gillian Rose (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Winchester University, 2002), Chapter Four: The Facetious Style. For a different reading see 
Anthony Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’.  
94 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 26.  
95 See section 3.2. below.  
96 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35. 
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themselves. In The Broken Middle, on the other hand, the antinomies of 
theological reason are comprehended from the standpoint of a particular culture 
which is taken to stand for or point towards the universal.”97 For Gorman, this 
reorientation – a reorientation that results in Rose’s critical project “relativising 
the relation to the universal to the fate of a particular culture and of a single 
individual within that culture”98 – forecloses the critical potential of her critical 
project.99   
 
I – following, in part, the work of Andrew Brower Latz and Naomi Felicity 
Hammond – think that Gorman’s argument is misguided. As I read it, Gorman’s 
argument involves reading Rose’s work as comprising two halves. The first half 
is oriented by Rose’s concern with thinking the particular from the standpoint of 
the universal. The second half is oriented by her concern with thinking the 
universal from the standpoint of the particular. For Gorman, whereas the first half 
has a critical potential to transform our social-political relations, the second half 
does not. I think that Gorman’s argument is misguided because I think that Rose’s 
critical project is, as a whole, oriented by both of these halves. In other words, I 
think that the practice of criticism central to Rose’s critical project is concerned 
with revealing the relationship between the universal and the particular – between 
theory and praxis – to be “equivocal”100 or, to use Foucault’s concept that will 
prove central in what follows, “problematic”. Explaining the critical potential of 
                                            
97 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 54. 
98 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 55. 
99 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 25. 
100 See Bernstein, J. M., ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, Prospect 6 (1996): “This is the leitmotiv of Rose’s 
philosophy: there is an unavoidable anthropomorphism in every concept; no concept can escape 
equivocation and complicity.” See also Jarvis, Simon, ‘An Undeleter for Criticism’, Diacritics 32.1 (2002), 3-
18, and Rowlands, Anna, Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’ (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Manchester 
University, 2007), 130:  
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such equivocality / problematisation will be one of the central aims of this 
thesis.101       
  
Accordingly, for reasons that relate both to how Rose understood her work, and 
to how I understand her work, it is my contention that Rose’s work forms a unified 
whole. It is on account of this contention that I will treat all of Rose’s works as a 
potential resource for supporting the argument of this thesis. This is not to say 
that the argument of this thesis has the aim of affording an exhaustive account of 
Rose’s works.102 Rather, it is to say that since the argument of this thesis is 
concerned centrally with Rose’s practice of criticism, and since this practice is at 
play within all of her works, I will treat all of her works as a potential resource for 
developing the argument of this thesis.     
 
That said, I must also say that there will be aspects of Rose’s work that I will not, 
within the argument of this thesis, deal with in detail. The aspects of Rose’s work 
that I will deal with in detail are those that I take to relate directly / indirectly to her 
challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. In consequence, I will have little to 
say about the influential, complicated and substantive relationships Rose’s work 
bears with that of the Frankfurt School and theology.103 
                                            
101 Contra Gorman. See ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 65: “The absence of an implied extensional concept 
of the good in Rose’s account renders her concept of the political deeply equivocal in the pejorative sense.” 
102 To date, the most comprehensive, critical and generous account of Rose’s work is given by Brower Latz, 
The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose. 
103 For accounts of the relationship between Rose’s work and the Frankfurt School / Critical Theory see esp. 
Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 2: Rose’s Frankfurt Inheritance; Schick, Gillian 
Rose: A Good Enough Justice, 17-25, and Trauma and the Ethical in International Relations, Chapter 4. See 
also Anthony Gorman, ‘Nihilism and Faith: Rose, Bernstein, and the Future of Critical Theory,’ Radical 
Philosophy, 134 (November/December, 2005), 18-30. For accounts of the relationship between Rose’s work 
theology / religion see n16 above.  
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Rose’s difficult style  
 
The second methodological point concerns Rose’s recourse to a “difficult style.” 
As has been mentioned, and as will be developed, Rose’s critical project is 
concerned, centrally, with affording a way for us to recognise, and work through, 
the “difficulty” of reason – that is, the ways in which reason is always both 
unavoidable and partial. One of the consequences of this concern is that Rose 
often writes in a way that is difficult. In his introduction to Rose’s posthumously 
published Paradiso, Howard Caygill writes:  
 
[Rose’s] recourse to a difficult style did not arise from an incapacity 
to write clearly – as testified by the limpid essays that make up 
Judaism and Modernity (1996) and the posthumous Mourning 
Becomes the Law (1996) – but reflected the working through of the 
intrinsic difficulty of a ‘trauma within reason itself’.104    
 
In other words, Rose’s recourse to a difficult style is a direct consequence of her 
critical project.105 As was partially evinced in the literature review, Rose’s work is 
riddled with difficult concepts (e.g. “anxiety of beginning”, “equivocation of the 
ethical” and “agon of authorship”, etc.) – concepts that are difficult both because 
                                            
104 Caygill, Howard, ‘Editors Preface’, in Rose, Paradiso (London: Menard Press, 1999), 7. In this preface, 
Caygill also notes that Rose “enjoyed the reputation of being a difficult author.” See J. M. Bernstein, 
Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), 8: 
“A phenomenology of modern theory that works within the dialectic of ethical life rather than be about it is to 
be found in Gillian Rose’s exuberant and demanding The Broken Middle.”  
105 See Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style, 173: “The style of Rose's work is itself difficult but 
only as difficult as actuality or reality requires it to be.” 
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Rose rarely affords a clear account of what these concepts are meant to capture, 
and because what they are meant to capture is inherently unclear or 
“equivocal”.106 Conceding this close connection between the central argument of 
Rose’s critical project and the difficult style in which Rose presents this argument 
means, among other things, that a decision needs to be made about the extent 
to which Rose’s recourse to a difficult style needs to be repeated when 
representing her critical project.    
 
This is not a decision that can be taken lightly – at least, not without the risk of 
missing one of the important messages of Rose’s critical project. For Rose, as 
will be explained, the relationship between theory and praxis (or, in her words, 
between “idea and act”107) is one that does not admit of any sharp distinctions. 
One of the ways in which theory and praxis can be sharply distinguished is 
“implied in the ideal that philosophy should provide demonstrations that no one 
could rationally deny.”108 Rose (arguably following Adorno) opposes the 
disavowal of the responsibilities and risks of authorship implied by this ideal.109 
“Rose’s style in The Broken Middle (and to some extent in some other works)”, 
Andrew Brower Latz writes, “[is] intended as a literary equivalent to legitimate 
authority rather than illegitimate power, because its irony, facetiousness and 
poeticism (its Kierkegaardian indirect communication) force the reader into doing 
work, undergoing an experience of thought, rather than providing ready-made 
                                            
106 See Jarvis, ‘An Undeleter for Criticism’, 6: “Few things are less tolerable to modem protocol than 
equivocality; and since this equivocal field, the field of criticism, was first discovered, its fate has usually 
been to be destroyed.” 
107 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4. 
108 Bernstein, J. M., Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
132. [Cited by Brower Latz, Andrew, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose: Speculative Diremptions, 108] 
109 See esp. Rose, The Broken Middle. For an exposition of Rose’s “style” see Hammond, Philosophy and 
the Facetious Style.  
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propositions.”110 On this account (an account with which I largely agree), failing 
to recognise Rose’s difficult style means, potentially, missing one of the important 
messages of her critical project – that is, the dual implication of theory and 
praxis.111     
 
However, Rose’s difficult style is not without its difficulties. For example, with 
reference to the style of The Broken Middle, Simon Jarvis writes: “the question of 
the truth of this work, because it aims at much more than correctness, will not be 
entirely separable from that of its reception. It must be too early to say yet whether 
the original rubrics of Rose’s work – the triple configuration of “anxiety of 
beginning”, “equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship” – will remain an 
idiolect, or whether they can take the critical purchase for which they hope on the 
ethical and political life which they address.”112 In response to this difficulty, 
Brower Latz writes: “Twenty years on and the critical purchase is yet to emerge, 
despite signs of increasing interest in Rose’s work.”113 While it is true that the 
critical purchase of the rubrics of Rose’s work is yet to emerge, it does not 
necessarily follow from this truth that it will never emerge.114 
                                            
110 Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 108-109. See Rose, Love’s Work, 134: “Does not all 
writing, even if it aims at Gelassenheit – to let things be – arrogate such illegitimate authority?” See also 
Milbank, John, ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek’, 
in The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, edited by Creston Davis (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2009), 
217-218.   
111 I am here adapting Rose’s claim that there is a “dual implication of law and ethics.” See Rose, The Broken 
Middle, xiv-xv.  
112 Jarvis, Simon, ‘Review of The Broken Middle’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 27/28 (1993), 
92. Cited by Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 110. 
113 Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 110. 
114 See Bernstein, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’: “The fundamental task of avant-gardism is to keep culture 
moving and open in dark times; alas, a modernist sensibility and avant-garde aspiration are all but absent 
from contemporary philosophy. Her voice is not enough. Worse still, I suspect the reason why Gillian Rose’s 
work failed to find a wide readership in her lifetime was that she too often focused on easy, fashionable or 
little known “continental” targets rather than taking on the more permanent and recalcitrant philosophical 
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I have spent some time explaining the importance and the difficulties of Rose’s 
recourse to a difficult style both because I take it as an integral part of Rose’s 
critical project, and because the respect in which it is an integral part relates to a 
central concern with the argument of this thesis – that is, the relationship between 
theory and praxis. That said, in the argument of this thesis, I will not, insofar as I 
am able, repeat Rose recourse to a difficult style – that is, I will not repeat Rose’s 
difficult conceptuality.115 Rather, my concern will be making explicit what I take to 
be implicit within Rose’s difficult style. This approach is motivated by the 
overarching argument of this thesis. To repeat, in this thesis I will be concerned, 
centrally, with showing how Rose’s practice of critical thought can be read 
constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s genealogy. Showing this will involve 
                                            
mammoths of modernity: Enlightenment rationalism, naturalism, scientism, pragmatism, liberalism. None 
the less she is an exemplary figure, revealing in word and deed, in success and failure, how indigent our 
state is.” 
115 One of the implications of this is that little, within what follows, will be given up to unpacking The Broken 
Middle – which is, as Williams writes, Rose’s “most hermetic and taxing work”. (‘Between Politics and 
Metaphysics’, 10) For anyone with any familiarity with Rose’s work, this decision will likely appear peculiar. 
The reason being, of all Rose’s “difficult” books, this book – the most “difficult” of them all – has proven the 
most influential, or, at least, the most widely discussed. However, it is precisely because of this that I have 
decided to resist relying on the conceptuality that pervades, and that is provoked by this book. In other 
words, since this book, and the concepts it introduces, have been accounted for at length by others, I have 
decided to resist repeating this accounts. Additionally, and this touches upon what has already been 
mentioned, I am of the opinion that the concepts that Rose employs within The Broken Middle (e.g. “anxiety 
of beginning”, “equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship”, etc.) depend, to a certain extent, on the 
stylistic (or syntactic) structures within which they occur. Accordingly, any application of these concepts risks 
rendering them “lifeless” in a way comparable to the way Hegel thought Kant’s method “reduced 
[conceptuality] to a lifeless schema”. (See e.g. Hegel, G. W. F., The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 
Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §50) In short, just as it is arguable that 
reading, for example, To Pollen by J. H. Prynne is the best way of working out and through the implications 
of this work, reading The Broken Middle is arguably the best way of working out and through its implications. 
It is for this reason, and those mentioned above, that I will have little to say directly about The Broken Middle. 
For more on Rose’s sensitivity to style see The Melancholy Science, Chapter 2: The Search for Style. See 
also Hammon, Philosophy and the Facetious Style. For more on The Broken Middle see esp. Brower Latz, 
The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 4: The Broken Middle; Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 
Chapter 2: The Broken Middle.    
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showing how Rose is, in part, unclear about her practice of criticism – unclear in 
a way that can be made clearer when combined with Foucault’s method of 
genealogy. Accordingly, the argument of this thesis will involve augmenting 
aspects of Rose’s argumentation with aspects of Foucault’s argumentation – and 
it is on account of this that I will not remain too tightly bound to Rose’s 
conceptuality.  
 
Discrepancy between Rose and Foucault 
 
The third methodological point concerns the discrepancy between my accounts 
of Rose and Foucault. Primarily, the argument of this thesis will be concerned 
with clarifying, corroborating and potentially expanding an aspect of Rose’s 
critical project – that is, the practice of criticism that I take to underlie and unify 
Rose’s work. Central to this clarification, corroboration and potential expansion is 
Foucault’s method of genealogy. Although Foucault’s method of genealogy will 
play a central part in the argument of this thesis, the part it will play will be one 
that is, nevertheless, subservient to my primary concern. This means that the 
aspects of Foucault’s method of genealogy on which I will focus will follow from 
my presentation of Rose’s critical project. That said, within my accounts of these 
aspects I will be concerned with remaining as close as possible to Foucault’s own 
accounts of these aspects.  
 
The concept of criticism 
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The forth methodological point concerns Rose’s concept of criticism, which is, 
within the context of her critical project, a multifaceted concept.116 Within this 
thesis, the facet with which I will be centrally concerned is that in which “criticism” 
refers specifically to the self-reflexive practice of using reason to call into question 
the authority (or legitimacy or lawfulness) of reason – or, more specifically, the 
authority of the concepts that comprise reason.117 Given this specification, as will 
be explained, criticism is concerned centrally with calling into question the 
relationship between theory and praxis – that is, the relationship between our 
concepts and their supposed normative force.118 I focus on this facet of Rose’s 
concept of criticism because it is with respect to this facet that, I will argue, Rose’s 
                                            
116 For a resourceful account of the concept of criticism see esp. Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘Hegel, Adorno 
and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.6 (2014), 1142-1166. 
I take this account to be resourceful because it serves to contextualise and unpack the concept of criticism 
in ways that apply both directly and indirectly to Rose’s critical project. See also Ruth Sonderegger and Karin 
de Boer (eds.), Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy (London: Palgrave, 2012). 
See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?’; Geuss, Raymond, ‘Must Criticism Be Constructive?’, in A World Without 
Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 68-90. 
117 For some, this self-reflexive form of criticism is a form of “immanent criticism”. See e.g. Karin de Boer, 
‘Hegel’s Conception of Immanent Critique: its Sources, Extent and Limit’, in Ruth Sonderegger and Karin de 
Boer (eds.), Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy (London: Palgrave, 2012), 83 
and Karen Ng, ‘Ideology Critique from Hegel and Marx’, Constellations 22:3 (2015): 394. However, this is 
not the only way to construe this form of criticism. See e.g. Michael A. Becker, ‘On Immanent Critique in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology’, Hegel Bulletin (2018), 1-2: “More concretely, a review of the literature suggests 
that criticism — whether philosophical, social or more broadly cultural — may be ‘immanent’ in two distinct 
respects: when it (1) measures an object against norms, criteria or potentialities that (somehow) ‘belong’ to 
that object; and when it (2) self-reflexively recognises an object as (somehow) continuous with its own 
standpoint, or as that standpoint’s condition of possibility. Both ideals of Immanent Critique are operative in 
the intellectual tradition that begins with Kant and continues through Hegel to Marx and beyond, and both 
are singled out — albeit for different reasons — as the radical red thread running through that tradition.” For 
more general accounts of this tradition, see esp. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of 
the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986) and Rahel Jaeggi, Critique 
of Forms of Life, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). For my account of 
Rose’s place within this “tradition”, see section 3.2. below.  
118 I take this way of framing my focus, in part, from Geuss. See Geuss, Raymond, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 
in Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 153-160. 
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critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method 
of genealogy.  
 
Within this specification, and above, I have claimed that Rose’s practice of 
criticism involves, centrally, calling into question the relationship between our 
concepts and their supposed normative force. The debates surrounding the 
relationship between criticism (especially as it has been construed and practiced 
by Frankfurt School theorists) and normativity are manifold and complicated.119 
That said, I think it is worth saying something briefly about one of these debates 
– if only because I think it will serve to clarify what will be in question within the 
argument of this thesis.  
 
The debate stems from Nancy Fraser’s early, but influential, criticism of 
Foucault’s method of genealogy – specifically, as a form of critique.120 Fraser 
criticises Foucault’s method of genealogy for being, in her words, “normatively 
confused.”121 This criticism is based on an interpretation of Foucault’s use of 
                                            
119 For a resourceful account see Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘Morality and Critical Theory: On the Normative 
Problem of Frankfurt School Social Criticism’, Telos 146 (2009), 7-41; Honneth, Axel, The Pathologies of 
Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory, translated by James Ingram (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009). See also O’Connor, Brian, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of 
Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004), 1-2.   
120 See Fraser, Nancy, ‘Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions’ in Fraser, 
Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989). For different, but similarly influential, critiques of Foucault, see esp. Habermas, 
Jürgen, The Philosophical discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1987), Chapter 10: Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again; McCarthy, Thomas, 
‘The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School’, in Ideals and Illusions: On 
Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991); Taylor, 
Charles, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, edited by David Couzens Hoy 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 69-102; Walzer, Michael, ‘The Politics of Michel Foucault’, in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, edited by David Couzens Hoy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 51-68. See also See also Kelly, 
Michael (ed.), Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994). 
121 See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’. 
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genealogy according to which the “genealogist deploys carefully developed 
empirical insights in combination with some minimal set of other relevant 
considerations so as to establish the normative conclusion that certain of our 
practices are unjust, oppressive, or in some other way bad.”122 “But”, Fraser 
writes: 
 
why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought 
domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative 
notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such 
questions. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he 
begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge 
regime and why we ought to oppose it.123  
 
In other words, Fraser interprets Foucault’s practice of genealogy as being 
concerned with revealing the contingency of normativity, and then, confusedly, 
construing such contingency to have normative implications. 
 
I will return to this debate below.124 I mention it here because it serves to clarify 
what will be in question within the argument of this thesis. In the context of this 
thesis, Fraser’s criticism of Foucault’s method of genealogy is significant for two 
reasons. First, Fraser’s criticism is comparable to Rose’s criticism. As will be 
explained, Rose, like Fraser, criticises Foucault’s method of genealogy for, in her 
                                            
122 Koopman, Collin, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 88.  
123 See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 29. 
124 See section 2.2. below.  
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words, “[falling] into vicious circularity”.125 Second, Fraser’s criticism is 
comparable to criticisms that have been made against Rose’s own critical 
project.126 As I understand it, at the centre of these criticisms is the contention 
that criticism necessarily carries normative implications – that is, implications for 
how we should think and act. While this contention is well placed when construing 
certain critical projects, when construing the critical projects of Rose and 
Foucault, I think it is misguided. For both Rose and Foucault, I will argue, one of 
the central tasks of criticism is to render the relationship between theory and 
praxis “equivocal” / “problematic”. Such a rendering of this relationship does not 
necessarily imply that the normative force of certain of our concepts (or, as Robert 
Brandom has stated it, “the normative force of the better reason”127) should be 
rejected, or viewed in a strictly negative light.128 Rather, it implies only that such 
normative force is corrigible.129 Detailing what it means to recognise reason as 
corrigible, and detailing how this recognition carries a critical potential, will be one 
of the central aims of this thesis.  
   
                                            
125 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 190-191. However, as will be explained, the challenges of Rose and Fraser 
are crucially different. See section 2.2. below.  
126 See esp. Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’; ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’. 
127 Brandom, Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity: “Genealogies directly challenge 
the very idea of the normative force of the better reason, which lies at the core of the Enlightenment rationalist 
successor to the traditional subordination model of authority.” 
128 See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’. 
129 Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 5: “What distinguishes critical social theory from positivistic 
sociology then is its emphatic normative dimension. The scientific analysis of the social world is not an end 
in itself, but a necessary step of enlightenment in the process of transforming this world into one “which 
satisfies the needs and powers of men.” Through this emphatic normative dimension, critical theory 
preserves the intentions of practical philosophy to rationally articulate a more adequate form of human 
existence and to enlighten them in its attainment.” 
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0.4. CHAPTER OUTLINES 
 
Structure of chapters 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to argue that Rose’s critical project can be 
read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. This 
argument makes an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose in 
two respects. First, it affords a more specific way of engaging with Rose’s 
challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – more specific in the sense 
that I will focus solely on Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. 
Second, and on account of such specificity, it affords an alternative way of 
reading Rose’s critical project – alternative in the sense that Rose’s critical project 
will be presented as being, not opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, but 
open to being read constructively in conjunction with it.  
 
Achieving this aim will involve, centrally, arguing that Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, but resourcefully so. As I have 
explained, commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project as being 
generally opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity” on basis of her 
general challenge to these critical projects.130 While I will not be presenting 
Rose’s critical project as entailing such a general challenge, I still recognise that 
her specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy constitutes the central 
basis for reading Rose’s critical project as being opposed to Foucault’s method 
                                            
130 I write “challenge / challenges” to call attention to the fact that Rose – specifically, within Dialectic of 
Nihilism – can be read as advancing a general challenge to the work of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault – a 
general challenge that comprises more specific challenges.    
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of genealogy. It is for this reason that my argument for reading this specific 
challenge as misguided will constitute the central chapter of this thesis – with the 
argument of the chapter that comes before this providing the basis for this central 
argument, and with the argument of the chapter that follows this working out the 
potential implications of this central argument.   
 
Accordingly, the argument of this thesis will consist of three arguments – each of 
which will constitute a separate chapter. These three arguments will interrelate 
with each other in that the argument of chapter two will, in part, depend on the 
argument of chapter one, and the argument of chapter three will depend, in part, 
on the arguments of chapters one and two.    
 
Outline of chapter one 
 
In chapter one I will argue that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault have 
aims that are comparable. Making this comparison will involve explicating the 
ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively read Kant’s critical project, and 
have these readings inform their respective critical projects. As I will show, the 
critical projects of Rose and Foucault have at their centre a concern with 
continuing and correcting Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation and a 
correction that results in both being concerned with, not the purification of reason, 
but the recognition of the dangers and difficulties of reason. In other words, both 
Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to be twofold and continuous – to 
continuously call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that 
affords the resources for potentially reconfiguring that authority. The argument of 
this chapter contributes towards the overarching argument of this thesis in that it 
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affords a basis on which to begin explicating and assessing Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy – for in order to understand Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s genealogy, it is necessary to understand Rose’s reading of Kant, and 
in order to understand why Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy is 
misguided, it is necessary to understand Foucault’s reading of Kant.       
 
Outline of chapter two 
 
In chapter two I will argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is misguided, but resourcefully so. Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s 
method of genealogy is that it is critically blind. This challenge works on the 
premise that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic – that is, concerned 
exclusively with undermining the authority of reason by revealing it to be 
contingent. On this premise, Rose argues that Foucault’s method of genealogy 
is viciously circular in that, through revealing the authority of reason to be 
contingent, it is required to blindly assume that reason is authoritative. I will argue 
that Rose’s challenge is misguided because it recognises only one of the two 
integrated aspects that constitute Foucault’s method of genealogy. This method 
reveals both that and how the authority of reason is contingent. Recognising the 
integration of these two aspects is important, I will argue, because it is on account 
of this that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as problematising the 
authority of reason, and as having thereby a critical potential – that is, through 
revealing that the authority of reason is contingently configured, it reveals how 
such authority could potentially be reconfigured. In spite of being misguided, 
Rose’s challenge remains resourceful in that it encourages an account of 
Foucault’s method of genealogy that can help to clarify an unclear part of her own 
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critical project. The argument of this chapter contributes towards the overarching 
argument of this thesis in that it serves to remove the basis on which Rose’s 
critical project can be, and has been, read as opposed to Foucault’s critical 
project. In other words, the argument of this chapter opens up the possibility of 
reading Rose’s critical project constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s 
method of genealogy.      
 
Outline of chapter three 
 
In chapter three I will argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively 
in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. This argument will involve 
developing Rose’s renewal of critical thought by way of her reading of Hegel’s 
idea of phenomenology. As will be shown, Rose’s critical project requires a form 
of criticism that can yield the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, the 
experience of reason being always both unavoidable and partial. While Rose is 
clear about this requirement, she is not clear about how criticism can achieve this 
requirement. In other words, Rose’s critical project will be shown to be beset with 
a methodological deficit – a deficit that can be filled, I will argue, by Foucault’s 
method of genealogy. As will be shown, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s 
method of genealogy is consistent with a sense of universality – a sense in which 
concepts are universalised through complex, historical and contingent 
processes. Through revealing this, Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a way 
of clarifying what it is to recognise that reason is always both unavoidable and 
partial. It is for this reason that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively 





ON ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCAULT’S 






In this chapter I will argue that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault have 
aims that are comparable. Through explicating the ways in which Rose and 
Foucault respectively engage with Kant’s critical project, and the ways in which 
they have these engagements inform their respective critical projects, I will argue 
that the critical projects of both imply a continuation and a correction of Kant’s 
practice of criticism. In other words, I will argue that Rose and Foucault are both 
concerned with practicing a form of criticism that is able to continually call into 
question the authority of reason, and do so in a way that affords the resources 
for thinking about the potentialities and limitations of reconfiguring the authority 
of reason. 
 
The argument of this chapter contributes to the overarching argument of this 
thesis centrally by affording a basis on which to explicate and assess Rose’s 
challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. It is my contention that, just as 
Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy can only be understood in 
the light of her engagement with Kant, the respects in which this challenge is 
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misguided can only be understood in the light of Foucault’s engagement with 
Kant.     
 
The structure of the argument 
 
The argument of this chapter will consist of three sections. First, I will explicate 
how Rose engages with Kant’s critical project, and how she has this engagement 
inform her “renewal”131 of critical thought. Second, I will explicate how Foucault 
engages with Kant’s critical project, and how he has this engagement inform his 
“transformation”132 of critical thought. Third, I will argue that Rose’s renewal and 
Foucault’s transformation of critical thought are comparable in that they both 




Before turning to the first of these three sections, it is necessary for me to make 
one qualification about the content of this chapter. Within this chapter I will be 
concerned with explicating the ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively 
read Kant, and have their readings inform their respective critical projects. Within 
these explications I will not be concerned (at least not explicitly) with comparing 
the ways in which Rose and Foucault read Kant with the ways in which others 
have read Kant. This is not to say that I do not think that this is, or could be, a 
worthwhile task. Rather, it is to recognise that, given that the central aim of this 
                                            
131 See esp. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface for 1995 reprint; Dialectic of Nihilism, 211-212. 
132 Foucault, Michel, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, 
ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 315. 
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chapter is to argue that Rose and Foucault read Kant in a way that is comparable, 
comparing the ways in which Rose and Foucault read Kant with the ways in which 
others have read Kant is at risk of detracting from the central aim of this chapter.  
 
1.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S RENEWAL OF CRITICAL THOUGHT?                                                                   
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
The aim of this section is to explain Rose’s reading of Kant – specifically, the 
aspect of this reading that informs her “renewal” of critical thought. As will be 
explained, Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves both a continuation and a 
correction of Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation in that Rose, like Kant, 
thinks that the task of criticism involves calling into question the authority of 
reason, a correction in that Rose, unlike Kant, does not think that criticism 
discloses the “purification” of reason. Rather, for Rose, criticism discloses the 
“difficulty” of reason – that is, the ways in which reason is always both 
unavoidable and partial. 
 
How has Rose’s reading of Kant been accounted for in the secondary 
literature? 
 
Within the secondary literature on Rose, there has been little critical attention 
given to her reading of Kant.133 In the cases where Rose’s reading of Kant is 
                                            
133 To date, the most comprehensive account is given by Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 
Chapter 3: Jurisprudential Wisdom.  
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mentioned, Rose is almost always presented as being opposed to Kant.134 The 
reason for this way of presenting Rose relates, largely, to commentators being 
concerned with explicating Rose’s reading of Hegel, which has at its centre a 
critique of Kant.135 Presenting Rose in this way is understandable. Throughout 
her works, Rose’s references to, and engagements with, Kant are almost always 
oppositional.136 However, in spite of being understandable, such a way of 
presenting Rose’s reading of Kant is, I think, short-sighted – a short-sightedness 
that prevents, among other things, critically engaging with Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s genealogy. 
 
How will I account for Rose’s reading of Kant? 
 
Within this chapter I will be concerned with explicating Rose’s reading of Kant 
largely without reference to her reading of Hegel.137 For some, this approach will 
seem misguided. They might object, for example, that in order to understand 
Rose’s reading of Kant, it is necessary to understand her reading of Hegel – for 
it is by way of Hegel that she reads Kant. In response to this possible objection I 
would say that, at this stage of my argument, I am concerned centrally with 
affording a basis on which to explain and assess Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s 
method of genealogy. An explication of Rose’s reading of Kant affords such a 
                                            
134 See esp. Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, Chapter 1: Gillian Rose, Philosopher of Law.  Schick, A Good 
Enough Justice, 28-34. 
135 See esp. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 44-50. 
136 See e.g. Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, in Judaism and Modernity, 27: “These antinomies in the conceiving 
of law in Kant may be said – quite simply but dramatically – to have led to the breakdown of philosophy and 
the development of social theory.” See also The Broken Middle, 18. 
137 An aspect of Rose’s reading of Hegel will be explicated in chapter three of this thesis.  
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basis because, as will be explained in the following chapter, Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy bears a similar structure to her critique of Kant.  
 
What is at the centre of Rose’s reading of Kant? 
 
With the aim of explaining Rose’s renewal of critical thought, and with the aim of 
affording a basis on which to explain and assess Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s 
method of genealogy, of central importance within Rose’s reading of Kant is the 
concept of law.138 It is, I will argue, with respect to this concept that Rose’s 
practice of criticism can be said to both converge with and diverge from Kant’s 
practice of criticism. To unpack this concept of law, it is helpful to contextualise 
Kant’s practice of criticism by considering, first, Kant’s concept of enlightenment. 
Considering Kant’s concept of enlightenment serves also to contextualise Rose’s 
own practice of criticism. As I will explain, one of the respects in which Rose’s 
practice of criticism involves a continuation of Kant’s practice of criticism is that it 
remains motivated by Kant’s concept of enlightenment – a concept that involves 
situating the task of criticism between reason and freedom.139         
                                            
138 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to Jurisprudence.  
139 Contextualising Kant’s practice of criticism by way of his concept of enlightenment is not the only way. 
An alternative way would be to see it as Kant attempt at affording a “third way” or “middle way” between 
“rationalism” and “empiricism”. See Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Pure 
Reason’, in Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 20: “The Critique has perhaps most often been seen as marking out a third way 
that combines the virtues, while avoiding the pitfalls, of both the “rationalism” of Descartes and Leibniz and 
the "empiricism" of Locke and Hume. This way of reading the Critique, however, even though to some extent 
suggested Kant himself, depends on a simplified reading of the history of modern philosophy and at the very 
least on an incomplete assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's modern predecessors. Less 
controversial is the observation that the Critique's main intention is to find a middle way between traditional 
metaphysics, especially its attempts to bolster a theistic view of the world with a priori rational arguments, 




Enlightenment and criticism 
 
Central to Kant’s concept of enlightenment is the connection it makes between 
reason and freedom.140 Kant writes:     
 
[enlightenment requires nothing but] freedom, and indeed the least 
harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, 
freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters.141 
 
In other words, for Kant, enlightenment refers to a certain way of thinking and 
acting – a certain way that follows from the “freedom to make public use of one's 
reason in all matters.” In this passage, Kant emphasises that the use of reason 
that is in question is “public.” This is important for a number of reasons – one of 
which being that it helps explain what is at stake within Kant’s practice of 
criticism.142 Kant contrasts “public” uses of reason with “private” uses of 
                                            
140 See also Brandom, Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity: “What is wholly new in 
Enlightenment philosophy is rather its identification of reason with freedom.” And: “This intoxicating 
identification of freedom and reason is the beating heart of German Idealism.”  
141 Kant, Immanuel, ‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’, in Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18. See also O’Neill, 
Onora, Constructing Authorities Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30: “[What is Enlightenment?] has often been condemned as a shallow 
defence of freedom of opinion, which endorses ‘enlightened’ despotism. This focus wholly fails to face the 
central puzzle of the text, which is that Kant equates enlightenment not with reason but with an oddly 
characterised practice of reasoning publicly.”  
142 My aim here is to specify the aspects of Kant’s concept of enlightenment that help contextualise his 
concept of criticism, and consequently help contextualise the critical projects of Rose and Foucault. That 
said, for Rose’s reading of Kant’s distinction between “public” and “private” uses of reason see Love’s Work, 
136-137. For Foucault’s account of this distinction see ‘What is Critique?’, 77-79. See also O’Neill, Onora, 
Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), Chapter 2: The Public Use of Reason. It should also be mentioned that the distinction Kant 
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reason.143 For Kant, the speech of officers to troops, of ministers to their 
congregations, of officials to taxpayers are all said to be “private” uses of reason. 
The point is that they are incomplete uses of reason. In all such uses there is a 
tacit, uncriticised and unjustified premise of submission to the “authority” that 
power of office establishes. The antithesis to these private, partial uses of reason 
must be a more fully public use of reason that steadfastly renounces reliance on 
powerful but ungrounded “authorities” in favour of self-discipline.144 Accordingly, 
in emphasising the public over the private use of reason Kant is specifying a kind 
                                            
makes between private and public uses of reason is a distinction upon which John Rawls arguably bases 
his “idea of public reason”. See Rawls, John, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 440-441: “The idea of public reason, as I understand it, belongs to a conception of 
a well-ordered constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason – the way it is 
understood by citizens and how it interprets their political relationship – are part of the idea of democracy 
itself. This is because a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a 
plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal 
result of its culture of free institutions.” (I write “arguably” because Rawls rejects the idea that his views entail 
an appropriation of Kant’s views. See e.g. Political Liberalism, 438: “Many readers got the idea that my view 
is Kant’s or similar to it, but that is a serious mistake.”) I mention Rawls, and cite this passage from Political 
Liberalism, simply to distinguish the way he (arguably) reads Kant from the ways in which Rose and Foucault 
read Kant. Implied by Rawls’s use of “reasonableness” is a commitment to a sense of reason that possesses 
a transcendental authority – that is, to put it crudely, the condition of the possibility of experiencing a 
democratic society. As will be explained, it is precisely this sense of reason (or “reasonableness”) that Rose 
and Foucault are concerned with resisting through their respective critical projects – albeit not directly. For 
a wonderful account of problems that pervade Rawls’s appeals to a sense of “reasonableness” see 
Finlayson, Lorna, The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), Chapter 2: ‘Beware! Beware! The Forest of Sin!’: 
Reluctant Reflections on Rawls. 
143 Kant, ‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’, 18. See also Kant, Immanuel, ‘What does it 
mean to orient oneself in thinking?’, in Religion and Rational Theology, edited by Allen W. Wood and George 
Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
144 I am here following an account given by O’Neill. See O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 17. In this book 
O’Neill also affords a resourceful reading of the motto with which Kant begins his Critique of Pure Reason – 
that is, the motto taken from the last paragraph of Bacon's preface to his Instauratio Magna. According to 
O’Neill, this motto is of note because it implies an explicit contrast with the starting point of the Cartesian 
enterprise. “Bacon refuses to speak of himself. His undertaking is not solitary: He invites readers to join in a 
common task. [. . .] Kant too says nothing about himself.” (7) In other words, O’Neill reads Kant as beginning 
the Critique of Pure Reason in a way that contrasts with Descartes’s beginning in that Kant, unlike Descartes, 
begins with an account of reason that is already public. Robert Brandom describes this as Kant’s “normative 
turn” (Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 58).   
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of authority – a kind of authority that resides, not in institutions or individuals, but 
in the nature of reason itself. For Kant, “freedom in thinking signifies the 
subjection of reason to no laws except those which it gives itself”.145 
 
In the context of Kant’s concept of enlightenment, therefore, his practice of 
criticism can be said to be concerned, centrally, with ascertaining a certain kind 
of authority – that is, the authority that resides in the nature of reason itself.146 For 
Kant, ascertaining this kind of authority is important because it affords the 
possibility for enlightened / free forms of thought and action.147 In other words, for 
Kant, the kind of authority with which the practice of criticism is centrally 
concerned is the kind of authority that gives reason a normative force.148  More 
                                            
145 Kant, ‘What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?’, 16.  
146 For an account of what followed Kant’s attempt at ascertaining the authority of reason see e.g. Beiser, 
Frederick C., The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 1: “During the period between Kant's first Kritik and Fichte's first Wissenschaftslehre 
(1781-1794), philosophers devoted themselves to a single fundamental problem. They returned again and 
again to this problem, though it had many guises, and though its presence was not always clearly 
recognised. If we were to formulate this issue in a single phrase, then we might call it 'the authority of reason'. 
It arises as soon as we begin to question our apparently healthy and natural faith in reason. Why should I 
listen to reason? What reason do I have to obey it? We demand that a person's beliefs and actions be 
rational; to say that they are irrational is to condemn them. But why do we make such a demand? What is 
the justification for it? Or, in short, whence the authority of reason?”  
147 See Kant, ‘What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?’. See also Guyer and Wood, ‘Introduction to 
the Critique of Pure Reason’, 2: “The Critique of Pure Reason was the work in which Kant attempted to lay 
the foundations both for the certainty of modern science and for the possibility of human freedom.” See also 
Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, 
translated by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 155: “Still less should one 
expect here [in the Critique of Pure Reason] a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but of the 
faculty of pure reason itself. On the basis of this critique alone does one have a sure touchstone for 
appraising the philosophical import of old and new works in this field; otherwise, one unauthorized reporter 
and judge assesses the baseless assertions of another by means of his own, equally baseless, assertions.” 
148 There is neither the space nor the need to go into the complexities of Kant’s account of reason as 
normative. That said, I have found the following accounts to be especially helpful in illuminating these 
complexities: Allison, Henry E., Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Brandom, Robert, ‘Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning’, 
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12 (1998), 127-139, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and 
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will be said about this kind of authority below – for it is this kind of authority that 
is, I think, at stake within Rose’s concept of law. Here, my aim is to simply 
introduce the concept of authority that will be, within what follows, considered at 
greater length.    
 
Just as Kant’s concept of enlightenment motivates his practice of criticism, I think 
that a similar (which is not to say the same) concept motivates Rose’s practice of 
criticism. If by “enlightenment” we mean simply a way of thinking and acting that 
is founded upon a practice of criticism – specifically, a self-reflexive practice of 
criticism – then Rose’s critical project can be thought of as motivated by a concept 
of enlightenment.149 Thinking of Rose’s critical project in this way is helpful, I 
                                            
Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), Chapter 1: Toward a Normative 
Pragmatics, Reason in Philosophy, Chapter 1: Norms, Selves, and Concepts; Deligiorgi, Katerina, Kant and 
the Culture of Enlightenment (New York: SUNY, 2005). For a response to the objection that using the 
concept “normativity” to capture Kant’s account of reason is anachronistic, see Pollok, Konstantin, Kant’s 
Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2: 
“Yet, is the title of this study not a grave anachronism? After all, Kant never uses the term ‘normativity.’ 
‘Normativity,’ it may seem, is a contemporary buzzword that has its home in debates on meta-ethics and 
perhaps some other sub-disciplines of analytic philosophy. Historically, however, this is not correct. In 
eighteenth-century Germany the noun Normativ was used in legal matters for ‘bill,’ and the adjective 
normativ was used in the juridical sense of ‘binding.’ The noun Normativität was, presumably for the first 
time, used in nineteenth-century theological and juridical treatises in the sense of ‘authority,’ relating to the 
Scripture and the law respectively. Kant himself uses the term Norm in a number of theoretical, practical, 
and aesthetic contexts, meaning “a prescribed rule, or law, that one has to observe strictly and must not 
contravene,” as Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon defines it in 1740.” For a historical account see e.g. Beiser, 
Frederick C., ‘Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall’, International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 17:1 (2009).  
149 See e.g. Love’s Work, 136-140. As these pages from Love’s Work evince, Rose is not committed to a 
concept of enlightenment that claims “absolute and universal authority, without awareness of history, 
language or locality”. (137) However, given Rose’s many references to the possibility of “something 
understood” (The Broken Middle, xi, see also Judaism and Modernity, 1-10), I take her to be committed to 
be committed to the possibility of a form of enlightenment. See also Geuss, Outside Ethics, 10: “The idea of 
some perfect or universal Enlightenment in which one has got everything that is important in the right 
perspective with the right consequences probably does not make sense, but what follows from that is that 
there are different degrees of enlightenment and perhaps different ways of being enlightened, not that the 
concept does not make any sense at all.”  
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think, for a number of reasons – centrally, for the reason that it serves to specify 
the twofold orientation of her practice of criticism. As will be explained, for Rose, 
similar to Kant (and Foucault), the practice of criticism has both a negative and a 
positive orientation – “negative” in the sense that criticism involves calling into 
question the authority of reason, “positive” in the sense that through calling into 
question the authority of reason, criticism affords the possibility for thinking and 
acting in ways that are enlightened.150 On this account, what it is, or what it could 
be, to think and act in ways that are enlightened depends largely on what follows 
from the process of calling into question the authority of reason. As will be 
explained, Rose’s critical project diverges from Kant’s critical project on account 
of a difference within what she takes as following from the practice of criticism. 
To begin explaining this divergence, I will now turn to explaining the relationship 
between criticism and law.  
 
Criticism and law 
 
About the task of criticism, Kant writes: 
 
that [it involves] reason [taking] on anew the most difficult of all its 
tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a court of 
justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while 
                                            
150 For Kant’s account of the positive and negative aspects of criticism see Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxiv-
Bxxv: “Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but 
because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of 
reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced 
ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason 
unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from 
speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against any counteraction from the latter, in 
order not to fall into contradiction with itself.”  
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dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere 
decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; 
and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.151  
 
In this passage, Kant compares the practice of criticism to a “court”152 – a court 
in which reason is tasked with the investigation of itself. The aim of this 
investigation is to determine the “laws” of reason.153 Although it is not explicit 
within this passage, the “laws” of reason to which Kant here refers are concepts 
– specifically, concepts that constitute cognition, and which have been 
determined as lawful through the practice of criticism.154 For Kant, to state it 
                                            
151 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi-Axii. See Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent 
Criticism’, 30: “Kant gave his own technical philosophical meanings to the quasi-technical term ‘Kritik’ that 
he inherited, from English and French with referred to the scholarly practice of restoring and authenticating 
ancient manuscripts. One of the most important of Kant’s technical meanings is to vindicate philosophical 
concept or principle by demonstrating the right to its legitimate use.” 
152 For Rose’s account of this comparison see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to 
Jurisprudence. Additionally, see Cutrofello, Andrew, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and 
the Problem of Resistance (New York: SUNY, 1994), 6: “In Kant's view, the entire critique of reason must 
be juridical because reason itself is inherently juridical, acting like a court even when it is not engaged in 
critique. Gillian Rose calls attention to this fact, characterising the invitation to critique as an invitation to 
witness a court that is always already in session.” See also Deligiorgi, Kant and the Culture of 
Enlightenment, 8: “Kant starts with a conception of reason that is already normative [. . .].” 
153 In other words, determine the authority of reason / the normative force of reason. See Pollok, Kant’s 
Theory of Normativity, 2: “the ubiquity of concepts such as ‘law,’ ‘lawfulness,’ ‘rule,’ ‘objectivity,’ ‘validity,’ 
and the like in Kant’s major writings serves as a first clue to the centrality of problems of normativity [. . . 
and] that Kant does have a systematic account of what it means for judgments to be normative.”  
154 In other words, for Kant, concepts are “rules” / “norms”. See Wood, Allen W., Kant (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2005), 173: “[For Kant,] to talk about law (or right) at all is always to speak normatively, not merely to report 
what will happen but to say what ought to happen according to a set of norms that conform at least minimally 
to certain rational standards.” See also Allison, Kant's Transcendental Deduction, 115: “[Kant’s] normative 
notion of “universal validity” [. . . the point of] which [. . .] is that the unity produced by the rule-governed act 
is taken to be not merely one that holds for a given perceiver under contingent conditions, but one that 
possesses normative force because it is claimed to hold for any discursive cognizer (hence its universal 
validity).” See also Longuenesse, Béatrice, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in 
the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 2: Concept and Object: The Concept as Rule; Neiman, Susan, 
The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7. 
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simply, to determine a concept as lawful is to determine it as necessary and 
universal.155 On Kant’s account, therefore, the practice of criticism ascertains the 
authority of reason through determining the concepts with which we think, and on 
the basis of which we act, as necessary and universal.  
 
To repeat, the aim of this section is to explain how Rose’s practice of criticism 
implies both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism. Like 
Kant, Rose thinks that the practice of criticism involves, centrally, calling into 
question the authority of reason. However, unlike Kant, Rose does not think that 
the practice of criticism results in the ascertainment of the necessity and 
universality of reason.156 In other words, Rose does not think that Kant’s practice 
of criticism does, or could, afford the authority of reason to which it aspires. To 
begin explaining both why Rose does not think this, and what she does think the 
practice of criticism results in, I will now turn to explaining one of the central 
assumptions on which Kant’s practice of criticism works – that is, the assumption 
that there is a rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. 
For reasons that will be explained, Rose contests this distinction – arguing that it 
leaves Kant’s practice of criticism incapable of relating to, and therefore 
reconfiguring, the reality of reason.  
 
                                            
155 See e.g. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A111: “Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts 
would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be 
possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. 
But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack 
connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, 
but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.”   
156 See esp. Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 2-5 and Love’s Work, 134-140.  
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Kant makes a rigorous distinction between, in his words, the “question of fact” 
and the “question of right [or question of law]”.157 In making this distinction, Kant 
is, as Henry Allison writes, “alluding to the juridical sense of “deduction” as the 
determination of a legal right or claim to possession of some property, as opposed 
to the fact of possession and how it was acquired.”158 The “possessions” in 
question concern “the many concepts [. . .] that constitute the very mixed fabric 
of human cognition”.159 This distinction informs Kant’s practice of criticism in that 
it informs the sense of “lawfulness” that he takes the practice of criticism to be 
tasked with determining. For Kant, the “lawfulness” of our concepts cannot be 
determined by way of experience. This is because experience, for Kant, refers 
only to the processes through which concepts are “encountered” (or “acquired”), 
which is contingent.160 Rather, determining the “lawfulness” of our concepts 
demands that they be “transcendentally deduced” – that is, determined as the 
necessary and universal “conditions of the possibility of experience.”161 For my 
purposes, what is important here is recognising both how the “lawfulness” that 
Kant takes the practice of criticism to be tasked with determining bears the marks 
                                            
157 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A84-A85: “Jurists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, 
distinguish in a legal matter between the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and which concerns the 
fact and since they demand proof of both, call the first, which is to establish the entitlement or the legal claim, 
the deduction.”   
158 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Deduction, 181. 
159 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A85. 
160 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A94-B127, A111 cited above n155. See also Allison, Kant's 
Transcendental Deduction, 182: “By the “lawfulness” of the use of such concepts Kant means their warrant, 
which in their case cannot be provided by experience. Although Kant does not here specify why this is the 
case, we know from the Introduction to the Critique that it is because such concepts and the propositions in 
which they are used make a claim for strict universality and necessity, which cannot be justified empirically.” 
161 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A771-B799.  
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of necessity and universality, and how this task works on the assumption of their 
being a rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental.162  
 
It is on account of this sense of “law” – that is, the sense of law that bears the 
marks of necessity and universality – that Rose thinks that Kant’s practice of 
criticism is in need of renewal.163 For Rose, Kant’s practice of criticism, on 
account of the sense of law that it takes itself as tasked with determining, results 
in what she calls an “antinomy of law.”164 In spite of the important part played by 
this concept – both within her reading of Kant, and within her challenge to 
Foucault’s genealogy – it is difficult to specify what Rose means precisely by 
antinomy of law. This difficulty stems from the fact that this concept plays both a 
                                            
162 This brief account of Kant’s construal of the relationship between criticism and law is oriented, centrally, 
towards accounting for Rose’s construal this relationship – or, more specifically, towards accounting for her 
renewal of critical thought. Given this orientation, it might be objected that I am overemphasising Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason – overemphasising because Rose’s reading of Kant involves engagements with, 
among other works, the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (see esp. Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to Jurisprudence, 
Chapter 2: Law and the Categories). In other words, it might be objected that I am emphasising Kant’s 
theoretical works over his practical works. In response to this possible objection I would claim that, in the 
case of both his theoretical and his practical works, Kant adheres to the same rigorous distinction between 
the transcendental and the empirical – that is, the distinction he develops within the Critique of Pure Reason, 
and of which I have here given a brief account. To make this point specific to the concept of “law”, it can be 
said that, for Kant, the lawfulness of reason, be it theoretical or practical, derives a priori (i.e. 
transcendentally) from pure reason. See e.g. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and 
edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4:389, 4:409, 4:412; Critique of 
Practical Reason, 5:15-5:16: “It is pure reason that itself contains the standard for the critical examination of 
every use of it. It is therefore incumbent upon the Critique of Practical Reason as such to prevent empirically 
conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the 
will.” For more on this common ground between Kant’s theoretical and practical works see also e.g. Ameriks, 
Karl, Interpreting Kant's Critiques (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), Introduction: The Common 
Ground of Kant's Critiques, Korsgaard, Christine, ‘Introduction’, in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), O’Neill, 
Constructions of Reason, Chapter 1: Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise.   
163 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 211-212.  
164 See esp. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, 18, 25, 32, 38. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, xiv-xv and 
Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, 27. 
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negative and a positive part within Rose’s critical project – “negative” in the sense 
that it is with reference to this concept that Rose contests the assumptions on 
which Kant’s practice of criticism works, “positive” in the sense that it is this 
concept that informs Rose’s renewal of critical thought.165 To unpack these two 
parts, it is necessary to be clear about what Rose is attempting to conceive by 
way of the concept “antinomy of law”. As I understand it, and as I will explain, 
what Rose is concerned with conceiving by way of this concept is, for her, what 
results from the practice of criticism when it is tasked with determining Kant’s 
sense of the “lawfulness” (or authority) of reason – that is, a “lawfulness” that 
bears the marks of both necessity and universality. For Rose, such a practice of 
criticism will inevitably result in a “break” between the universality of our concepts 
and the particulars of experience that these concepts purport to conceive – a 
break that is integral to the actuality of reason, but which Kant’s practice of 
criticism is impotent (or blind) to recognise as such. It is roughly this “break” 
between universality and particularity that Rose is conceiving by way of the 
concept “antinomy of law”.  
 
To substantiate this reading of Rose’s concept of the antinomy of law, I think it is 
helpful to consider, first, the account of cognition with which she can be read as 
working – that is, an account of cognition in which the concepts of “identity” and 
“non-identity” both play a part. As will be explained, it is in consequence of this 
                                            
165 For a similar account see Beck, Anthony, ‘Review of Dialectic of Nihilism’, British Journal of Sociology 
37.4 (1986), 597. For an alternative, more comprehensive account see Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy 
of Gillian Rose, 123: “In The Dialectic of Nihilism, the ‘antinomy of law’ names the speculative unity of law 
and ethics in absolute ethical life, which, we have seen, is an extrapolation from the ever-shifting diremptions 
between law and ethics.” 
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account of cognition that Rose reads Kant’s practice of criticism as resulting in 
an antinomy of law.166  
 
Identity and non-identity 
 
Throughout her work Rose uses the concepts of identity and non-identity to 
describe her critical project and her practice of criticism. For example, Rose 
writes: 
 
This is my apologia pro vita sua: the only way I can approach my 
life is by attempting to explore how the difficulties with which I 
engage may articulate that life. The speculative method of engaging 
with the new purifications whenever they occur, in order to yield 
their structuring but unacknowledged third, involves deployment of 
the resources of reason and of its crisis, of identity and lack of 
identity. This results in what I call the facetious style – the mix of 
severity and irony, with many facets and forms, which presents the 
discipline of the difficulty.167 
 
What does Rose mean by “identity” and “non-identity”? In spite of the central part 
these concepts play within Rose’s critical project, in general, and within her 
                                            
166 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 5: “In turn this is part of a larger endeavour to retrieve the speculative 
identity of form and history which appears in these most recent works as the opposition of metaphysics and 
law. Just as I read Hegel's exposition of the antinomy of law as the speculative identity and non-identity of 
the state and religion – of 'politics' and 'ideology', as we have come to call them – so I read the antinomy in 
the work of our contemporaries as presenting us with a pale cousin: the nihilistic identity and non-identity of 
law and metaphysics. The case beyond nihilism – from Heidegger's 'magical' version to Foucault's 
'administrative' version - will be shown to yield to an historical dialectic which it claims to surpass.” 
167 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, x-xi. 
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practice of criticism, in particular, commentators on Rose have made little attempt 
at answering this question. Likewise, and this is explicit within the passage cited 
above, when Rose does employ the concepts of identity and non-identity, she 
does so largely without explaining what she means by them. Accordingly, what 
Rose means by identity and non-identity can only be inferred from what is largely 
implicit within her work.168 
 
One way of thinking about what Rose means by “identity” and “non-identity” is to, 
first, think of her as working with an account of cognition that is roughly Kantian 
– “roughly” on account of it being arguably influenced by her reading of Adorno.169 
According to this account, cognition170 is accounted for as a composite of 
concepts and sensory input, such that the latter is subsumed under the former. 
This process of subsumption (or, in Kant’s terminology, “synthesis”) involves 
bringing something particular (the “manifold” given to us by way of the senses) 
under something general / universal (concepts).171  On this account, cognition is, 
                                            
168 In other words, I recognise that my reading of what Rose’s means by these concepts – or, more 
specifically, what work these concepts do within Rose’s work – is open to interpretation. I should also add 
that my reading draws from Adorno’s account, and the accounts of his commentators, of these concepts. 
However, because my aim is primarily to explicate Rose’s use of “identity” and “non-identity”, the way in 
which I will draw from these accounts will inevitably be selective. For more substantive accounts of this 
aspect of Adorno see esp. Adorno, T. W., Adorno, T. W., Lectures on Negative Dialectics, translated by 
Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (London: 
Routledge, 1973), O’Connor, Brian, Adorno (London: Routledge, 2013), 76-85, O’Connor, Brian, Adorno’s 
Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004), 
Chapters 2 and 3.     
169 As was mentioned above (see n92), while Adorno’s remained a resource for Rose, the precise points at 
which she appealed to this resource remain open to interpretation. For my framing of this account of 
cognition I am indebted to an account given by Fabian Freyenhagen in Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living 
Less Wrongly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 41-51. 
170 For Kant, “cognition” is a technical term. See e.g. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvi. For the sake of 
simplicity, I am not using “cognition” strictly as Kant used it.  
171 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 73-74. See also Baumann, Charlotte, ‘Adorno, Hegel and the 
Concrete Universal’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 37 (2011), 74: “There are two common 
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in effect, a process of identification – that is, a process in which particulars are 
identified as falling under something general / universal.172 One important 
implication of this account of cognition – especially when understanding what 
Rose means when she claims that conceptuality is always unavoidable – is that 
experience is always mediated by concepts. In other words, all thinking is “identity 
thinking”.173 
 
To this extent, Rose can be read as working with a roughly Kantian account of 
cognition. What causes Rose’s account of cognition to differ from Kant’s relates 
to the differing assumptions on which this accounts work. While Rose thinks, like 
Kant, that conceptuality is unavoidable, she also thinks, unlike Kant (and like 
Adorno), that the processes of subsumption that are constitutive of cognition do, 
or could, ever completely capture the particulars that they purport to capture.174 
                                            
conceptions of universal concepts: the first, one might say the subjectivist one, takes universals to be ways 
in which we group things together in our minds. We can arbitrarily use the general terms ‘dog’, ‘red’, ‘living’, 
‘Australian’ and so on to categorise things, and each time different objects will be grouped together. The 
second position would claim on the contrary that universals denominate a real similarity between things; 
there is or are thus only one or a few universals which truly describe what something is. In Platonian terms 
dogs are only, however imperfect, copies of the idea of dogness; this universal is therefore essential to what 
they are. [. . . ] however different both accounts are, they have something in common: in both cases, the 
universal does unite or subsume particulars, dogs, red things, etc., but it is also something different from 
them. In the first conception, it is a category we have in our minds; in the other account, it is an idea or a 
pure form that exists in something like a heaven of ideas, beyond the world of particular things.”  
172 For more on the distinction between describing concepts an entailing generalisations and entailing 
universalisations see section 3.3. below.   
173 To be sure, Rose only uses the concept “identity thinking” within her account of Adorno, and does so in 
a way more complicated than I have here done. See esp. The Melancholy Science, 56-59. That said, to the 
extent that “identity thinking” implies that conceptuality is unavoidable, then using this concept to describe 
the account of cognition with which Rose works is not entirely misplaced.      
174 I take Rose to be committed to this idea both on account of both her continued use of the concept “non-
identity”, and her commitment to a “non-foundational” account of reason. As an aside, it can also be 
mentioned that, for Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can be read in terms of both “identity” and “non-
identity”. See Adorno, T. W., Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 66: “On the one hand, we think of the Critique of Pure Reason as a kind of identity-
thinking. This means that it wishes to reduce the synthetic a priori judgements and ultimately all organised 
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To think that our concepts always fall short of their objects is not simply to think 
that we sometimes make use of inappropriate or misguided concepts.175 Rather, 
what is here in question is something more fundamental. It concerns Rose’s 
commitment to the idea that all concepts, even the most seemingly appropriate 
concepts, fail to capture something significant about the particulars that they 
purport to, and should, capture.176 It is, I think, this “something significant” that 
concepts fail to, and should, capture – or, as Rose writes, these “gaps and 
silences” of conceptuality177 – that she can be read as having in mind when using 
the concept of non-identity.   
 
For the purposes of understanding how these two concepts contribute towards 
Rose’s practice of criticism, it is important to recognise that, for Rose, the concept 
of non-identity refers not simply to that which falls short of cognition, of our 
concepts, but also to the possibility for an alternative, fuller form of cognition – a 
form of cognition that evinces, in Rose’s words, “different ways towards the good 
enough justice”.178 It is, I think, on account of this possibility that Rose couples 
                                            
experience, all objectively valid experience, to an analysis of the consciousness of the subject. It wishes to 
do this because – to use the language of the later idealists – there is nothing in the world that is not mediated. 
This means that we have no knowledge apart from what we know through the medium of our reason, apart 
from what we know as knowing beings. On the other hand, however, this way of thinking desires to rid itself 
of mythology, of the illusion that man can make certain ideas absolute and hold them to be the whole truth 
simply because he happens to have them within himself. In this sense Kantian philosophy is one that 
enshrines the validity of the non-identical in the most emphatic way possible. It is a mode of thought that is 
not satisfied by reducing everything that exists to itself. Instead, it regards the idea that all knowledge is 
contained in mankind as a superstition and, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, it wishes to criticize it as it 
would criticise any superstition. It wishes to say that to make an absolute of everything human is not 
significantly different from endorsing the customs of shamans who regard their own rites as objectively valid, 
even though in reality they are no more than subjective abracadabra.”    
175 See Freyenhagen in Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 43. 
176 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52. See Chapter 3 for my account of this aspect of Rose’s work. 
177 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 8-9. 
178 See Rose, Love’s Work, 124. For an alternative way of substantiating this passage see Schick, ‘Re-
cognizing Recognition’, 87-105. 
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her use of “non-identity” with the word “should”. For Rose, to recognise that our 
concepts entail a lack of identity is to recognise that they entail certain injustices 
towards their objects – injustices that should be, and can only be corrected 
through the work within which we attempt to re-conceive or “re-cognise” our 
concepts.179 This is a point that Rose develops within her own explication of the 
concept of non-identity as Adorno understands it.      
 
[C]ognition of non-identity lies exactly in that it also identifies, but to 
a greater extent and in a different way from identity thinking. This 
cognition seeks to say what something is, while identity thinking 
says under what something falls, of what it is a specimen or 
representative, what it thus is not itself.180  
 
On this account, identity and non-identity are always coupled in that non-identity 
refers to that which identity thinking always fails to think, but which it should think, 
                                            
179 See esp. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 91-112.  
180 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 150. Cited and translated by Rose, The Melancholy Science, 57. See also 
Adorno, T. W., Lectures on Negative Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 8: 
“Now you may well say, this discrepancy is not necessarily a contradiction. But I believe that it offers us a 
first insight into the necessity of dialectical thinking. Any such predicative judgement that A is B, that A = B, 
contains a highly emphatic claim. It is implied, firstly, that A and B are truly identical. Their non-identity not 
only does not become manifest; if it does manifest itself, then according to the traditional rules of logic, 
predicative logic, that identity is disputed. Or else we say: the proposition A = B is self-contradictory because 
our experience and our perception tell us that B is not A. Thus because the forms of our logic practise this 
coercion on identity, whatever resists this coercion necessarily assumes the character of a contradiction. If, 
therefore, as I observed at the outset, the concept of contradiction plays such a central role in a negative 
dialectics, the explanation for it is to be found in the structure of logical thought itself, which is defined by 
many logicians (though not in the way it operates in the various current trends in mathematical logic) by the 
validity of the law of contradiction. And what this means then is that everything that contradicts itself is to be 
excluded from logic – and, in fact, everything that does not fit in with this positing of identity does contradict 
itself. Thus the fact that our entire logic and hence our entire thinking is built upon this concept of 
contradiction or its denial is what justifies us in treating the concept of contradiction as a central concept in 
a dialectics, and in subjecting it to further analysis.” 
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and can potentially come to think through the work of “re-cognition”. The 
experience of identity and non-identity plays a pivotal part within Rose’s critical 
project in that, as will be explained, Rose takes the central task of criticism to 
consist in yielding the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, yielding 
the experience of the ways in which our concepts both succeed and fail to 
conceive their objects.  
 
In this account I have claimed, among other things, that Rose associates a 
“should” with the experience of identity and non-identity. Having claimed this, it is 
important that I now qualify this – that is, explain what work this “should” is doing 
within Rose’s critical project. This is important because the reading of Rose’s 
critical project that I will, within this thesis, present is one in which Rose’s practice 
of criticism is concerned not with affording normative conclusions, but with calling 
normativity into question.181 For some commentators, to read Rose in this way is 
to implicate her critical project in what Fabian Freyenhagen has called the 
“Problem of Normativity.”182 To state it simply, this problem concerns the 
confusions that can arise when normative claims (e.g. claims about what we 
should think, do, believe, admire, etc.) are made without the foundations to do 
so, at least not justifiably.  
 
Like the critical projects of Foucault and Adorno, albeit not nearly to the same 
extent, Rose has been challenged along these lines – that is, the normative 
claims of her critical project are, for some, seemingly precluded by the practice 
                                            
181 Or, and this is to say the same thing, calling the relationship between theory and praxis into question.  
182 Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 7. For Freyenhagen, the Problem of Normativity refers to 
a set a challenges to which Adorno’s work has been subject. Accordingly, my application involves a 
simplification.     
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of criticism upon which this project is based.183 If Rose’s practice of criticism is, 
as I think it is, concerned with calling into question the authority of reason or, to 
be more specific, the normative force of conceptuality, then it would seem to 
preclude the possibility of her making normative claims. Here, to repeat, I am 
concerned with the “should” that Rose associates with the experience of identity 
and non-identity. As I read it, this “should” refers strictly to the practice of criticism 
as Rose construes it – not to what follows from this practice of criticism. In other 
words, for Rose, we should engage in a rational critique of rationality because it 
is through this practice of criticism that we come to recognise the “actuality of 
reason”184 – that is, the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and 
partial. This is, for Rose, what it is for criticism to yield the experience of identity 
and non-identity.    
 
A tension arises, however, when this construal of criticism is considered in the 
context of Rose’s critical project more generally. For Rose, the experience of 
identity and non-identity is important because it is this experience that affords the 
ability to reason by way of “speculative identities” – identities that stem from the 
experience of identity and non-identity, and which are, in her words, “uncertain 
and problematic, [and which] gradually [acquire] meaning as the result of a series 
of contradictory experiences.”185 For Rose, speculative identities are, in turn, 
important because they afford a reason for continuing to use reason – for they 
suggest that by continuing to use reason we will be better placed to recognise 
                                            
183 I am here thinking in particular of Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 
35.  
184 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 10. I am here echoing a passage from Adorno. See Adorno, Negative 
Dialectics, 85: “Today as in Kant’s time, philosophy demands a rational critique of reason, not its banishment 
or abolition.” See also Bernstein, Adorno, 1-4. 
185 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52. 
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the reconfigurations that reason undergoes, and thereby better placed to play a 
part in such reconfigurations. The tension is whether Rose’s critical project 
implies that criticism affords normative conclusions – conclusions about what we 
should think / do for speculative identities to acquire their meaning. 
 
More will be said about this tension below.186 I make reference to it here simply 
to introduce a problem – that is, the problem that Rose’s critical project is 
implicated in the problem of normativity – that will appear and reappear through 
what follows. Thinking about Rose’s critical project and Foucault’s method of 
genealogy through the lens of this problem will prove pivotal for the overarching 
argument of this thesis. As will be explained, Rose’s critical project is, in part, 
unclear – unclear in a way that gives the impression of it falling foul of the problem 
of normativity. In other words, Rose appears to be making normative claims about 
what should follows from her practice of criticism – normative claims that her 
practice of criticism appears to preclude. In short, Rose’s critical project appears 
to be normatively confused. I do not think that this is the case. However, 
demonstrating that it is not the case demands a clarification of Rose’s practice of 
criticism – a clarification that, I will argue, is afforded by Foucault’s method of 
genealogy.   
 
Having explained what Rose means by “identity” and “non-identity”, and giving 
an indication of the part they play within Rose’s critical project, I will now return 
to her reading of Kant – and explain how these concepts inform her argument 
that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy of law.  
 
                                            
186 See section 3.2. 
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Antinomy of law 
 
To repeat, my aim in explaining Rose’s account of cognition – an account largely 
inferred from Rose’s use of the concepts of identity and non-identity – is to 
develop her concept of the antinomy of law. I said above that this concept 
captures Rose’s argument that Kant’s practice of criticism inevitably results in a 
“break” between the universality of our concepts and the particulars that our 
concepts purport to conceive – a break that is integral to the actuality of reason, 
but which Kant’s practice of criticism is impotent to recognise as such. In the light 
of what has been said above about what Rose means by “identity” and “non-
identity”, this argument can be developed as follows.  
 
For Rose, to task criticism, as Kant does, with ascertaining the necessary and 
universal laws of reason is to assume that our concepts can adequately conceive 
the particulars that they purport to conceive. Rose does not assume this. Rather, 
as has been explained, she thinks that our concepts inevitably fail to adequately 
conceive the particulars that they purport to conceive. It is, I think, on account of 
this that Rose construes Kant’s way of conceiving law as resulting in an antinomy 
– specifically, an antinomy between universals and particulars.187 Implied by 
Rose’s commitment to the concepts of identity and non-identity, is the thought 
that both universals and particulars play a dynamic part in the actuality of reason 
– that is, the experience of reason actually used, be it for the purposes of 
                                            
187 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 15-16. I am here accounting for only one of the antinomies that, for 
Rose, result from Kant’s concept of law. Rose also references the following “oppositions”: “metaphysics and 
science; theory and practice; freedom and necessity; history and form” (Dialectic of Nihilism, 212). See also 
Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, 27: “Law in Kant is split demonstrably in these two ways into four meanings: 
morality / legality; necessity / freedom.”  
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understanding or explaining why we think and act in certain ways, or why we 
should think and act in certain ways. For Rose, Kant’s way of conceiving law, 
because it works on the assumption that there is a rigorous distinction between 
the transcendental and the empirical, keeps universals separate from particulars. 
This separation – a separation in which the particulars and the contingencies of 
experience are kept from informing and reconfiguring the concepts we use to 
make sense of these particulars and these contingencies – is, broadly speaking, 
what Rose’s concept of the antinomy of law is concerned with capturing.188   
 
With the aim of explaining Rose’s renewal of critical thought, what needs to be 
emphasised here is that, for Rose, it is not simply that Kant’s practice of criticism 
results in an antinomy between universality and particularity, but also that it does 
so blindly.189 Such blindness is, again, a consequence of the rigorous distinction 
between the empirical and the transcendental on which Kant’s practice of 
criticism works. For Rose, through working on this assumption – that is, through 
working on the assumption that the contingencies and particularities of 
experience can in no way contribute to the task of criticism to determine the 
lawfulness of our concepts – Kant’s practice of criticism is blind to the ways in 
which our concepts inevitably fail to adequately conceive the particulars that they 
purport to conceive. For Rose, therefore, rather than determining the authority of 
reason, Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism demarcates “new areas of 
ignorance.” Rose writes:    
 
                                            
188 I write “broadly speaking” because I recognise that I am passing over in silence much of Rose’s complex 
argument. For a fuller account see esp. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 
3: Jurisprudential Wisdom. 
189 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 211: “Kant's strange way of not answering his own question”. 
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Kant’s intention to justify cognition before practising it (method) was 
also intended to demonstrate that justified cognition is restricted to 
possible objects of experience. However, if the idea of a justification 
of thought prior to its employment (method) is contradictory, then 
thought has made a mistake. It does not know itself at the very point 
where its self-examination commences. The demarcation of 
legitimate theoretical and practical knowledge turns out to be the 
demarcation of new areas of ignorance [. . .].190 
 
For Rose to say that Kant’s criticism results in an antinomy of law is, therefore, 
for her to say two things. First, that the “lawfulness” it is tasked with ascertaining 
results in an antinomy between universals and particulars. Second, that it, on 
account of the strict separation between the empirical and the transcendental that 
this “lawfulness” assumes, cannot recognise this antinomy. It is on account of 
these two things that, for Rose, Kant’s criticism, rather than determine the 
authority of reason, leaves us ignorant about the actuality of this authority.  
 
Before turning to explain how this reading of Kant’s practice of criticism informs 
Rose’s renewal of critical thought, it is worth considering whether Rose is correct 
to use the concept of antinomy in the way that I have described her as doing. On 
this account, antinomy describes the relationship between concepts (universals) 
                                            
190 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 47. For an alternative account of the difficulties that arise as a result of 
Kant’s “method” see Brandom, Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity. In this essay, 
Brandom (following Hegel) describes Kant as having a “two-stage story” and writes: “The Kantian division 
of semantic and epistemic labour seems unable to exclude the possibility that “whatever seems right to me 
is right” – in which case the issue of correctness does not get a grip (as Wittgenstein puts the point). There 
is nothing in the picture to confer determinate contents on concepts, nor to hold them in place as 
determinate.”    
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and what concepts purport to conceive (particulars). The question is: Does this 
relationship constitute an antinomy?191 Would it not be better, or more accurate, 
to describe this relationship as entailing a tension or a contradiction? While 
contradiction is a crucial concept within Rose’s work, it would be a mistake to 
equate it with her use of antinomy.192 In using the concept of antinomy in the way 
that she does, I think that Rose is gesturing towards an important aspect of her 
renewal of critical thought – that is, her commitment to the difficulty of reason.193  
 
For Kant, an antinomy is, in his words, “a decisive test, which must necessarily 
disclose to us a fault that lies hidden in the presuppositions of reason.”194 Rose, 
I think, works with a similar sense of antinomy.195 The difference is that, whereas 
                                            
191 See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 124-126. 
192 As will be explained, for Rose, the antinomies of reason are irreducible. In this respect, her critical project 
can be compared with Hegel. See e.g. Hegel, G. W. F., Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic 
Outline: Part 1: Science of Logic, translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), §48: “This thought that the contradiction posited in the realm of reason 
by the determinations of the understanding is essential and necessary must be regarded as one of the most 
important and profound advances in the philosophy of recent times. The resolution is as trivial as the view 
is profound.” As to why Hegel thought this view “profound” see Priest, Graham, Beyond the Limits of Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-104: “Hegel thinks that the Kantian Antinomies are but the tip 
of an iceberg. All our concepts, and not just the generated infinities of the Antinomies, are embroiled in 
antinomic arguments. These are the arguments which drive forward our thinking from one category to the 
next, and so generate the dialectical progression of categories in the Logic.” According, to reduce (or 
“resolve”) the antinomies of reason would be to bring its capacity to change to a standstill. That said, for 
Rose, to simply recognise the antinomies of reason has a similar result. (See Rose, ‘From Speculative to 
Dialectical Thinking’ 60-61. Here, Rose argues that Adorno’s Negative Dialectics has such a result.) The 
task, for Rose, is to work through these antinomies, without thereby reducing them.  
193 See Rose, The Broken Middle, 206 n217: “While ‘contradiction’ is a logical term, which, applied to social 
structure, implies possible resolution, ‘aporia’ is prelogical, it refers to lack of way, and implies no exit from 
its condition.”  
194 Kant, Prolegomena, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, §52b.  
195 See Rose, The Melancholy Science, 70: “An antinomy is a conflict of two arguments or doctrines, each 
of which taken in itself is cogent, but they cannot both be valid, and one cannot establish superiority over 
the other.” 
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for Kant these faults or errors indicate the need to “purify” reason,196 for Rose 
they indicate the need to recognise, and consequently work through, the 
“difficulty” of reason.197 As has been mentioned, and as will be developed, the 
difficulty of reason is, for Rose, a result of it being always both unavoidable and 
partial – unavoidable because we need concepts to make sense of the particulars 
of experience; partial because these concepts will always fail to completely 
capture, or make sense of, the particulars of experience.198  
 
                                            
196 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B25: “Such a science should not be called a doctrine, but only a 
critique of pure reason, and its benefit, with respect to speculation, would actually be only negative, serving 
not for the expansion but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping reason free of error, which 
is already a very great gain.”   
197 See esp. Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 1-10. Rose’s insistence that we “work through” difficulties – be 
they epistemological, social, political, ethical, or whatever – rather than attempt to dissolve them, or purify 
them, is one that pervade her work. Such instance is at its most exuberant in The Broken Middle. See 
Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life, 8. See also Rose, Gillian, ‘O! untimely death. / Death!’ in Mourning 
Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141: 
“The virtuous life involves some impure relation between power in the human psyche and in human 
association.” For an account of such “impurity” see Williams, ‘“The Sadness of the King”’, 31-32.  
198 On my reading, the “antinomy of law”, which I have explicated in terms of the relationship between the 
universality (or lawfulness) of concepts and the particularities of experience is, for Rose, irreducible – 
“irreducible” because, for Rose, thinking about the world in which we act is irreducibly antinomical: just as 
our concepts can exert authority over experience, experience can exert authority over our concepts. For a 
different response to a similar antinomy see McDowell, John, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), Here McDowell describes himself as responding to “an antinomy: experience both 
must [. . .] and cannot [. . .] stand in judgement over our attempts to make up our minds about how things 
are.” (xii-xiii) He then goes on to write that this antinomy is an expression “of a deeper anxiety – an inchoately 
felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves mind simply out of touch with the rest 
of reality, not just questionably capable of getting to know about it.” (xiii) In other words, as Paul Franks 
notes, the threat of “post-Kantian scepticism”. (See Franks, Paul W., All or Nothing: Systematicity, 
Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 199-200 n114) In Mind and World, McDowell’s aim is “not to answer sceptical questions, but to begin 
to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat them as unreal, in the way that 
common sense has always wanted to.” (113) Rather, "we need to exorcize the questions rather than set 
about answering them.” (xxiv) Accordingly, while McDowell is working with a similar sense of “antinomy” as 
Rose, he, unlike Rose, is concerned with exorcising it.             
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Rose’s renewal of critical thought  
 
Having now explained what I take to be the central aspect of Rose’s reading of 
Kant, I will now explain how this reading informs Rose’s renewal of critical 
thought. Centrally, Rose’s renewal of critical thought is motivated by a concern 
with avoiding the ignorance that she, as has been explained, construes as the 
consequence of Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism. To say that Rose’s 
renewal of critical thought is concerned, centrally, with avoiding this ignorance is 
to say it is concerned with recognising the antinomy of law.199 In other words, 
Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves tasking criticism with the “struggle” 
between the universality of our concepts and the particularity that they purport to 
conceive.200 For Rose, therefore, it is not through Kant’s “purification” of reason 
that its authority is determined. Rather, as has been suggested and as will be 
explained, it is through this struggle – that is, the experience of the difficulty of 
reason – that the authority (or “lawfulness”) of reason is determined.201 Rose 
writes: 
                                            
199 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 212: “The procedure in this work has been both more implicated and 
more preliminary; by drawing out the legal arguments and the legal history at the heart of post-metaphysical 
reason, an attempt has been made to draw us back into the antinomy of culture, into the tradition which 
holds us, and, so, to open it again – in this aporetic way - under the title, if there must be one, of jurisprudential 
wisdom.”  
200 Rose’s idea of “struggling” with the relationship between universality and particularity is one that I will 
return to below. As to the origin of Rose’s use of the word “struggle” to conceive of our relationship with, and 
within, this relationship, it is possible that it stems from her reading of Kierkegaard. See The Broken Middle, 
23. Here Rose cites Kierkegaard: “The whole thing is a wrestling match in which the universal breaks with 
the exception, wrestles with him in conflict and strengthens him through this wrestling . . . The legitimate 
exception is reconciled in the universal . . .” (Kierkegaard, Søren, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, translated 
by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, 227.) See also Rose, 
Gillian, ‘Hermann Cohen: Kant Among the Prophets’, in Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 120. For more on Rose’s reading of Kierkegaard see Lloyd, ‘Gillian Rose: Making 
Kierkegaard Difficult Again’. See also Bernstein, Adorno, 4. 
201 See also Rose, The Broken Middle, 155-156: “How to represent the aporia between everyone and every 
‘one’ is the difficulty – difficulty of the difficulty.”  
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[T]he difficulty with reason, theoretical and practical (ethical), lies 
not in its initial, abstract universality; the difficulty of reason rests on 
whether the initial, abstract universal (the meaning or idea) comes 
to learn: whether something can happen to it; whether (to recall the 
one with a difficult friend, who discovered it was a matter of friends 
in difficulty) one abstractly universal individual enters into 
substantial interaction with another abstractly universal 
individual.202 
 
The claim that Rose’s practice of criticism involves struggling with the relationship 
between universals and particulars is one I base on the claims of both Rose and 
her commentators.203 That said, what more can be said about this struggle? One 
way of answering this question is to think of Rose as seeking to replace the 
asymmetrical relationship between universals and particulars, which underpins 
Kant’s practice of criticism, with a symmetrical relationship. Kant’s practice of 
criticism is underpinned by an asymmetrical relationship between universals and 
particulars in the sense that it, to repeat, works on the assumption that the 
contingencies and particularities of experience can in no way contribute towards 
the universality (or lawfulness) of our concepts.204 Accordingly, to say that Rose 
                                            
202 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 8. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, Chapter 5: ‘Love and the State: 
Varnhagen, Luxemburg and Arendt’. In this chapter, through her readings of Varnhagen, Luxemburg and 
Arendt, Rose accounts for what it is for an individual to relate to, be excluded and changed by the “abstract 
universal”. For a lucid account of this aspect of Rose’s work see esp. Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 88-
98. 
203 See Rose, The Broken Middle, xiii. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38. 
204 In using the terminology of “symmetry” and “asymmetry” I am following Brandom. See esp. Reason, 
Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity. See also Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, 66-
68.  
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is seeking to replace this asymmetrical relationship with one that is symmetrical 
is to say that she is seeking a practice of criticism that works on the assumption 
that, just as the universality of our concepts can exert authority over the 
particulars of experience, the particulars of experience can exert authority over 
the universality of our concepts. To assume this is, in other words, to assume 
both that our concepts can be wrong, and that we can, with work, make them 
“less wrong”.205  For Rose, it is this reciprocity (or “dynamic” motivated by the 
“unanticipated outcome of idea and act”206) that constitutes the “actuality of the 
concept”.207 
 
For Rose, therefore, a renewal of critical thought involves, centrally, taking the 
practice of criticism to be that through which we struggle with (as opposed to 
purify) the relationship between universality and particularity – that is, struggle to 
recognise the respects in which our concepts are wrong and, on the basis of this 
recognition, work to make our concepts less wrong. Accordingly, Rose’s critique 
                                            
205 I am here using an expression from Freyenhagen’s Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, and do so because I 
take it as an alternative to Rose’s expression “good enough justice”. 
206 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 6. Although I am here describing Rose in contrast with Kant, it is worth 
mentioning that similar description have been made of Kant. See e.g. Deligiorgi, Kant and the Culture of 
Enlightenment, 8: “Kant starts with a conception of reason that is already normative, arguing that if reason 
is to be authoritative, it must be autonomous, and if it is to be autonomous, it must be free. As a result, the 
character of a culture of enlightenment is essentially agonistic and dynamic. This is because it is through 
disagreement and criticism that we make clear to ourselves our implicit normative commitments and are 
able to stake our membership in a potentially universal culture of enlightenment. Making public use of one’s 
reason is always at the same time a testing of the boundaries of interpretation of the principles that shape 
this culture.” See also O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 18: “To have a tribunal is not to have an algorithm 
that the tribunal follows. If that were what tribunals did, they would be redundant. Tribunals deliberate and 
reach verdicts; there are moves that they may not and had better not make as they move toward a verdict, 
but their charters and procedures do not fully determine every move. Theirs is the genuinely practical task 
of judging; hence the tribunal provides an appropriate image for a critique or judging of reason. If Kant 
depicts the authority of reason as a tribunal that judges and deliberates, then presumably he thinks that 
reason too does not consist of algorithms for thinking or acting, which can be formulated as abstract rules.”  
207 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4. 
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of Kant’s way of conceiving law is not strictly a critique of his idea that certain of 
our concepts have the mark of universality. Rather, it is a critique of the idea that 
such universality can only be achieved transcendentally. For Rose, by contrast, 
the universality of our concepts, and the consequent authority of reason, can only 
be achieved through the continuous work of attending to the actuality of our 
concepts. Rose writes:  
 
Reason in modernity cannot be said to have broken the promise of 
universality – unless we have not kept it; for it is only we who can 
keep such a promise by working our abstract potentiality into the 
always difficult but enriched actuality of our relation to others and to 
ourselves. Whether disturbing or joyful, reason is full of surprises.208 
 
On this account, Rose’s renewal of critical thought – which has here been 
presented as a renewal of Kant’s practice of criticism – entails a twofold and 
continuous task: to continually use reason to call into question the authority of 
reason, and to do so in way that affords the resources for reconfiguring the 
authority of reason.209 For Rose, as I read her, it is through this practice of 
criticism that we remain continuously attentive to the actuality of reason – an 
actuality in which our concepts are often wrong, but which can be made less 
wrong – and thereby remain attentive to the ways in which reason could 
                                            
208 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9. See also Mourning Becomes the Law, 72-73. 
209 As I mentioned above (see section 0.3.), within this thesis my concern is to make explicit what I take to 
be implicit within Rose’s difficult conceptuality. This description of Rose’s renewal of critical thought is, in 
part, implicit in the following: “To keep this work in the middle, yet risk comprehension of the broken middle, 
means returning beginnings to their middle and middles to their beginnings incessantly. This alertness to 
implication, in its facetious and suspended presentation, yields the pathos of the concept.” (Rose, The 
Broken Middle, 308-309) 
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potentially be reconfigured, transformed, enriched, enlightened on account of its 




Before summarising this section, it is important to relate this account of Rose’s 
practice of criticism to her concept “aporia”.210 About this concept, Rose writes: 
 
Philosophy as I practise it has a different orientation based on a 
different logic and a different story. From Plato to Marx, I would 
argue, it is always possible to take the claims and conceptuality of 
philosophical works [. . .] deterministically or aporetically – as fixed, 
closed conceptual structures, colonising being with the garrison of 
thought; or according to the difficulty which the conceptuality 
represents by leaving gaps and silences in the mode of 
representation.211  
 
Rose’s practice of criticism – that is, as has been explained in this section, the 
practice in which reason is used to continually call into question the authority of 
reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring the 
authority of reason – yields an aporia. Of this word, Liddell and Scott give the 
                                            
210 My concern is to here adumbrate Rose’s construal of the “aporia”. For an alternative account see also 
Greer, Clare, A Critical Conversation Between Gillian Rose and John Milbank and its Implications for an 
Aporetic Political Theology (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester, 2011), 28-29. For a 
more general and detailed account of this concept – specifically, as it occurs within a genealogy of nihilism 
– see Cunningham, Conor, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology 
(London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 10: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology, Sartre, 
Lacan, Deleuze, Badiou and Creation out of No-one.     
211 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 8. 
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following definitions: “without passage [. . .] I. of places, impassable, pathless, 
trackless [. . .]. II. Of circumstances, hard to see one’s way through, impracticable, 
very difficult [. . .].”212 Given these definitions, to claim that Rose’s practice of 
criticism yields an aporia is to claim, among other things, that it yields an account 
of rationality / conceptuality which, in Rose’s words, “warns against [. . .] any 
proscription or prescription, any imposition of ideals, imaginary communities or 
‘progressive narrations’. Instead the ‘idealisations’ [or conceptualisations] of 
philosophy would acknowledge and recognise actuality and not force or fantasise 
it.’”213  
 
What Rose is here, in her appeals to the concept of aporia, gesturing towards is 
an account of reason that is, in her words, “non-foundational”214 – non-
                                            
212 Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, An intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980). 
213 Rose, The Broken Middle, xi. See also 7: “This admitted ‘incorporation’ which is yet no ‘mastery’ may be 
traced to the implicit, yet astonishing, assumption that any ‘development’ could occur without stumbling 
blocks or ‘surprises’ – that development does not presuppose aporia but excludes it.” See also Rose, 
Judaism and Modernity, 10: “The dubious angel, bathetic angel, suits reason: for the angel continues to try 
to do good, to run the risk of idealisation, of abstract intentions, to stake itself for ideas and for others. 
Experience will only accrue if the angel discovers the violence in its initial idea, when that idea comes up 
against the actuality of others and the unanticipated meanings between them.” 
214 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface for 1995 reprint’. Judaism and Modernity, 10; Love’s Work, 
127-128, 138-139: “There is no rationality without uncertain grounds, without relativism of authority. 
Relativism of authority does not establish the authority of relativism: it opens reason to new claimants.” For 
more on what it means to maintain a form of “non-foundationalism” (or “anti-foundationalism”) see e.g. 
Dreyfus, Hubert and Taylor, Charles, Retrieving Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
41-42: “antifoundationalism seems the received wisdom of our time. Almost everyone seems to agree that 
the great enterprise of Descartes, to build up certain knowledge from undeniable building blocks, is 
misconceived. Everyone from Quine to Heidegger, passing through various postmodernists, can sign on to 
this conclusion. [. . .] And yet this wide agreement hides yawning disparities in outlook. There is in fact more 
than one antifoundationalist argument; and the different approaches start from quite different basic ideas, 
and generate very different conclusions, and quite divergent anthropological and political consequences. 
Moreover, the different ways of conceiving the common antifoundationalist thesis account for most of the 
major differences in outlook. Understanding antifoundationalism as they do, each looks at the others as 
betraying a grievous lack of understanding of the common point.” See also Marker, William, Philosophy 
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foundational in the sense that there is nothing intrinsically unchangeable or 
incorrigible about reason, about the concepts by which we reason. This is not to 
say that Rose thinks that reason / concepts can be easily changed.215 It is 
precisely, and centrally, this idea that Rose’s renewal of critical thought is 
concerned with warning against. Rather, if there is to be such change, then it will, 
on her account, occur gradually through the difficult experience of coming to 
recognise that the concepts by which we reason inevitably entail “gaps and 
silences”216 – gaps and silences that demonstrate, in Rose’s words, that “[t]here 
is no rationality without uncertain grounds, without relativism of authority. 
Relativism of authority does not establish the authority of relativism: it opens 
reason to new claimants.”217 Criticism is crucial, for Rose, because it affords a 
way for us to use reason to gain some control from within this process through 
which authority has been, is and will continue to be arrogated to reason.218 
Accordingly, when Rose refers to reason as “non-foundational”, she does so not 
because she thinks that there is nothing substantive underpinning it. Rather, she 
does so because she recognises (albeit often only implicitly / indirectly) that 
                                            
Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (New York: SUNY, 1994), and Sembou, Evangelia, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 
215 See also n441 below.  
216 See also Williams, ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’, 116: “To think a particular is to think ‘this, not that; here, 
not there; now, not then’: to map it on to a conceptual surface by way of exclusions or negations, yet in that 
act to affirm also its relatedness, its involvement; from empty identity, thinkable only as a kind of absence 
and indeterminacy, to the specific position, this not that, and by way of that ‘contradictory’ state to arrive at 
thinking the ‘individual’ as a convergence of the universal and the particular.” 
217 Love’s Work, 138-139. 
218 For more on Rose’s concept of the arrogation of authority see The Broken Middle.  See also Geuss, 
History and Illusion in Politics, 10: “There are limits to how far one can actually succeed in reflecting and 
probably even more narrowly set limits to the extent to which one can gain any control. We can never 
absolutely free ourselves from history and attain an absolutely clear and coherent set of action-orienting 
views about our political world. It does not follow from this – and it seems self-evidently false – that we are 
no better off in any respect when we are enlightened about our concepts and theories than when we were 
not.”  
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reason has a history – a history in which the authority of reason has been 
successively opened to new claimants, and which, Rose infers, will continue to 
be so.  
 
To say, as I have said, that Rose construes criticism as yielding an aporia – or, 
and this is to say the same thing, yields a non-foundational account of reason – 
is to say two things. First, that she construes it as a way for us to become aware 
of how the present authority of reason has been actually structured through 
history. Second, that she construes it as a way for us to thereby become aware 
of how the present authority of reason could be potentially restructured in the 
future. In short, criticism, for Rose, is crucial because it reveals to us the aporia 
of reason – that is, reveals to us precisely how the present authority of reason is, 
on account of its actual foundations, without certain or unchanging 
foundations.219               
 
In the context of this thesis, relating Rose’s practice of criticism to her concept of 
aporia is important for at least two reasons. First, it serves to clarify the respect 
in which Rose’s practice of criticism yields a non-foundational account of 
reason.220 Second, and relatedly, it serves to clarify the basis on which Rose’s 
critical project has been challenged. For some commentators, as I mentioned 
briefly above (albeit with different words), that Rose’s practice of criticism should 
                                            
219 See also Rowlands, Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’, 130: “[Criticism, for Rose,] has the power to 
render us attentive to `the broken middle' of the relation between theory and practice, an aporetic relation 
which inaugurates, as we have seen hinted, most especially in Graham and Arendt, neither despair nor the 
rush to an impossible healing or transcendence.” See also Love’s Work, 124: “If metaphysics is the aporia, 
the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way, then ethics is the development of it, the diaporia, 
being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which 
recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.” 
220 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface for 1995 reprint.  
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yield an aporia seems, to them, to preclude it from having formative or 
constructive implications.221 I will return to this challenge in chapter three – 
arguing that it involves a misreading of Rose’s practice of criticism. For Rose, I 
will argue, the central task of criticism is not that should have constructive 
implications, but that it should encourage an ability to recognise the “vagueness, 
ambiguity, indeterminacy, the shifting, unbounded, amorphous nature and sheer 
randomness”222 of the reality of reason as we use it, and as we experience it 
being used by others. As to how this does not implicate Rose’s critical project in 
the aforementioned “Problem of Normativity” will involve, to repeat, clarifying 




In this section I have explained Rose’s reading of Kant – specifically, the aspect 
of this reading that informs her “renewal” of critical thought. As I have explained, 
Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves both a continuation and a correction 
of Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation in that Rose, like Kant, thinks that 
the task of criticism is to investigate the authority of reason, and a correction in 
that Rose, unlike Kant, does not think such an investigation discloses the “purity” 
of reason. Rather, for Rose, criticism discloses the “difficulty” of reason – that is, 
the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and partial.223    
                                            
221 See Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’.  
222 Geuss, Raymond, ‘Vix intellegitur’, in A World Without Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 
44.  
223 See Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 8: “The crisis of confidence at the end of the eighteenth century 
deepened when another of the Enlightenment's most cherished convictions was thrown into question – that 
reason is universal and impartial.” For an alternative account of the “dangers” of thinking of reason, or 
“reasonableness”, as impartial in the context of political philosophy see Finlayson, The Political is Political, 
Chapter 2: ‘Beware! Beware! The Forest of Sin!’: Reluctant Reflections on Rawls. 
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1.3. WHAT IS FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT? 
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
The aim of this section is to explain how Foucault reads Kant, and how he has 
this reading inform his method of genealogy. As will be explained, like Rose’s 
practice of criticism, Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as implying 
both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism.  
 
How has Foucault’s reading of Kant been explicated within the secondary 
literature? 
 
Unlike Rose’s reading of Kant, much critical attention has been given to 
Foucault’s reading of Kant. The consequences of this critical attention can be 
divided roughly into three conclusions. Simplifying greatly, these conclusions can 
be schematised as follows.224 For some commentators, Foucault’s reading of 
Kant entails centrally a rejection of Kant. For other commentators, while Foucault 
can be read as continuing certain aspects of Kant’s critical project, his way of 
doing so results, ultimately, in a practice of criticism that is, at best, ambiguous 
and, at worst, incoherent.225 For yet others, Foucault continues certain aspects 
                                            
224 For more detailed accounts of the debates surrounding Foucault’s reading of Kant see esp. Allen, 
‘Foucault and Enlightenment’; Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.  
225 See esp. Habermas, Jürgen, ‘Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's Lecture on Kant's 
What Is Enlightenment?’, in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate, edited in 
Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 153-154.  
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of Kant’s critical project, and does so in a way that is both coherent and 
resourceful.226  
 
How will I approach Foucault’s reading of Kant? 
 
In my own account of Foucault’s reading of Kant, my aim is not to adjudicate on 
these different readings of Foucault.227 Rather, my aim is to account for 
Foucault’s reading of Kant specifically as he takes it as informing his method of 
genealogy. On this account, an account that will be based largely on Foucault’s 
essay What is Enlightenment?,228 Foucault’s method of genealogy will be 
presented as both a continuation and a “transformation” of Kant’s practice of 
criticism. 
 
What is at the centre of Foucault’s reading of Kant? 
 
At the centre of Foucault’s reading of Kant – at least, as it relates to his method 
of genealogy – is what he calls the “ethos of enlightenment”.229 For Foucault, 
what is important within Kant’s critical project is that it is motivated by a certain 
                                            
226 See esp. Allen, ‘Foucault and Enlightenment’; The Politics of Our Selves, Chapter 2: Foucault, 
Subjectivity, and the Enlightenment; Hoy, Critical Resistance, Chapter 2: Foucault: “Essays in Refusal”, 
Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.  
227 For a comprehensive and generous account of Foucault in this regard see Koopman, Genealogy as 
Critique.     
228 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ This essay has been similarly emphasised by Allen, The Politics of 
Our Selves, Chapter 2: Foucault, Subjectivity, and the Enlightenment; Geuss, Genealogy as Critique; Hoy, 
Critical Resistance, Chapter 2: Foucault: “Essays in Refusal”. By contrast, Butler, in ‘What is Critique?’, 
emphasises Foucault, Michel, ‘What is Critique?’, in Lotringer, Sylvère (ed.) The Politics of Truth, translated 
by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007). 
229 See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312: “I do not pretend to be summarising in these few lines either 
the complex historical event that was the Enlightenment, at the end of the eighteenth century, or the attitude 
of modernity in the various guises it may have taken on during the last two centuries.” 
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ethos230 or attitude that Foucault describes as “a permanent critique of our 
historical era.”231 Following his reading of Kant’s essay What is Enlightenment?232 
– which Foucault describes as a “minor text” 233, but one that “marks the discreet 
entrance into the history of thought of a question that modern philosophy has not 
been capable of answering but has never managed to get rid of either”234 – and 
relating it to Kant’s critical project more generally, Foucault writes: 
 
I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasise the extent to 
which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that 
simultaneously problematises man's relation to the present, man's 
historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an 
autonomous subject – is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other 
hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread which may 
connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal 
elements but, rather, the permanent reactivation of an attitude – 
that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era.235  
 
To this ethos / attitude of “permanent critique” – which is what, to repeat, Foucault 
reads as motivating Kant’s practice of criticism – Foucault attributes both a 
“negative” and a “positive” aspect – two aspects that roughly correspond to the 
                                            
230 For more on Foucault’s concept of “ethos” see e.g. Foucault, Michel, ‘Ethics of the Concern of the Self 
as a Practice of Freedom’, in Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul 
Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 286. 
231 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
232 Kant, ‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’  
233 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 303. 
234 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 303. 
235 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
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way in which Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to continue and correct 
Kant’s practice of criticism.236 To develop this point, I will explain each aspect in 
turn. As will be explained, it is with respect to the negative aspect of the “ethos of 
enlightenment” that Foucault can be said to continue Kant’s practice of criticism, 
and it is with respect to the positive aspect that he can be said to transform Kant’s 
practice of criticism.  
 
What is the negative aspect of the ethos of enlightenment? 
 
Foucault begins his account of the negative aspect of the ethos of enlightenment 
with what he calls the “blackmail”237 of the Enlightenment.238 Foucault accepts 
that the Enlightenment, “as a set of political, economic, social, institutional, and 
cultural events”239, is something “on which we still depend in large part”240, and 
which, therefore, “constitutes a privileged domain for analysis.”241 The “blackmail” 
of the Enlightenment is, for Foucault, to think that this dependence means that 
we have to be either “for” or “against” the Enlightenment.242 To think this is to 
miss the “negative” aspect of the ethos of enlightenment – that is, the way in 
                                            
236 See also Foucault, Michel, ‘“Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in Essential 
Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 298-299: “[S]ince 
Kant, the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in 
experience; but from the same moment – that is, from the development of modern states and political 
management of society – the role of philosophy has also been to keep watch over the excessive powers of 
political rationality, which is rather a promising life expectancy.” 
237 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313, 314. See also Foucault, Michel, ‘Structuralism and Post-
Structuralism’, Essential Works, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion 
(New York: New Press, 1998), 441. 
238 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
239 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
240 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
241 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
242 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313. 
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which Kant, within the historical period of the Enlightenment, introduced243 a 
“certain manner of philosophising.”244 Crucially, for Foucault, this manner of 
philosophising involves: 
 
precisely that one must refuse everything that might present itself 
in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either 
accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its 
rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by 
others, on the contrary, as a reproach), or else you criticise the 
Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of 
rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad).245  
 
In other words, what Foucault is here claiming is that the ethos of enlightenment 
is negative in that it demands, precisely, the “questioning of all givens.”246 
Importantly, as Raymond Geuss has pointed out with direct reference to this 
aspect of Foucault’s reading of Kant, “[to] question something is naturally not 
necessarily to reject it.”247 This point is helpful for a number reasons. Regarding 
the passage that is here in question, it is helpful in that it serves to clarify what 
Foucault means by the idea that we “must refuse everything that might present 
itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative”248. In the light of 
                                            
243 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 305: “Now, the way Kant poses the question of Aufklärung is entirely 
different: it is neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the 
dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines Aufklärung in an almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, 
an "exit," a "way out."” 
244 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313. 
245 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313. 
246 See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 155. 
247 Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 155. 
248 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313. 
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Geuss’s point, what Foucault may be understood to mean here is that the ethos 
of enlightenment demands not that we should necessarily reject anything that 
might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative. Rather, 
for Foucault, it demands that we should call it into question – to investigate the 
assumptions on which such simplistic and authoritarian alternatives work. This is, 
in short, the negative aspect of the ethos / attitude that Foucault takes to be 
underpinning Kant’s practice of criticism. It is this negative aspect that Foucault 
aims to continue within his method of genealogy. To explain this, it is necessary 
to first explain the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment.  
 
What is the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment? 
 
Foucault begins his account of the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment 
by characterising it as a “limit-attitude.”249 The ethos of enlightenment – that is, 
“a philosophical ethos consisting in a [permanent] critique of what we are saying, 
and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves”250 – is, for Foucault, a “limit-
attitude” not, as has been explained, because it entails a “gesture of rejection.”251 
For Foucault, “[w]e have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have 
to be at the frontiers.”252 That is, to employ the terminology used to describe 
Rose, we have to recognise that we are, when it comes to reason, not working 
with something pure, something that we can either support or reject, but 
something that is impure, something in which what we think and do is always both 
unavoidably and partially implicated, something on which what we think and do 
                                            
249 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
250 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
251 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
252 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
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is always both unavoidably and partially dependent. On this account, when 
Foucault insists that “we have to be at the frontiers” he can be construed as 
insisting that reason, while it limits what we can think and do in the present,253 it 
also has a history, a history that can potentially inform the ways in which reason 
might limit what we can think and how we can act in the future.254 It is in this 
respect that Foucault thinks that the ethos of enlightenment has a positive aspect, 
and it is on account of this positive aspect that Foucault thinks that Kant’s practice 
of criticism needs to be “transformed”.255    
 
Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. But 
if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge 
must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question 
today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to 
us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by 
whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique 
that takes the form of a possible crossing-over.256  
 
                                            
253 In the context of this thesis, to say that reason can limit what we can think and do in the present is to say 
that reason can be normative – that is, reasons (or concepts) can function as collective rules or standards 
for thinking and acting. To say this, however, is not to say that reason is necessarily normative. See e.g. 
Geuss, Raymond, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 12: 
“Dostoyevski’s Underground Man decides he would rather be anything than a piano key or an organ stop. 
There is nothing unreasonable about not wanting to be fully “rational” if “rationality” is understood in a 
sufficiently narrow way.”  
254 See Dean, Mitchell, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 56. 
255 See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
256 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
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One of the consequences of this “transformation” of critique is that, as Foucault 
writes, “criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal 
structures with universal value”.257 Rather, for Foucault, it is going to be practiced 
“as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, 
saying.”258 In other words, for Foucault, the practice of criticism is the practice of 
genealogy. 
 
What is Foucault’s transformation of criticism / method of genealogy? 
 
On this account, it is both the negative and the positive aspects of the ethos of 
enlightenment that contribute towards Foucault’s method of genealogy.259 
Foucault writes: 
 
                                            
257 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. See section 3.3. below. 
258 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
259 In what follows, my concern will not be with Foucault’s concrete genealogies. Rather, my concern will be 
with the practice / method by which such genealogies were able to become manifest. In consequence, my 
explication of Foucault’s method of genealogy might appear to some to be too abstract – or, and this is to 
say the same thing, lacking the historical / empirical details on account of which genealogy can be said to 
have a critical potential. In response to this I would say that genealogy, as with all forms of criticism, “varies 
according to domain, according to its object, and according to its purpose” (Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and 
the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, n12), and it is for this reason that I have resisted, and will continue to 
resist, appealing to Foucault’s concrete genealogies. In other words, my aim in this thesis is not to give a 
genealogical critique of something. Rather, it is to adumbrate genealogy as a method of criticising the 
authority of reason, and use this adumbration to clarify and support a part of Rose’s critical project. That 
said, for examples of Foucault’s concrete genealogies see e.g. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); ‘“Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique 
of Political Reason’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New 
Press, 2000), 298-325; The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, translated by 
Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self, 
translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).   
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[C]ritique will be genealogical260 in the sense that it will not deduce 
from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and 
to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made 
us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking 
what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a 
metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give 
new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of 
freedom.261  
 
In other words, for Foucault, the practice of genealogy has both a negative and a 
positive aspect. Genealogy is negative in that it involves calling into question the 
authority of reason – that is, the universal value that certain concepts come to 
acquire within the present, and which is tacitly and / or explicitly appealed to when 
using these concepts to understand and explain how we think and act, and how 
                                            
260 Within this essay Foucault will speak of his sense of criticism as being “genealogical in its design and 
archaeological in its method.” (315) The issues concerning the relationship between Foucault’s genealogical 
and archaeological methodologies are complicated, and exceed the remit of this thesis. That said, such 
issues relate roughly to the question of whether, for Foucault, the method of genealogy marks a break from 
or a continuation of the method of archaeology. For more on the relationship between Foucault’s 
genealogical and archaeological methodologies see e.g. Flynn, Thomas R., Sartre, Foucault, and Historical 
Reason, Volume Two: A Poststructuralist Mapping of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2005), Chapter One: Foucault and the Historians, Gutting, Gary, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific 
Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Han, Béatrice, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between 
the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).	For 
a helpful account of these complications see e.g. Koopman, Colin, ‘Foucault’s Historiographical Expansion: 
Adding Genealogy to Archaeology’, Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008), 338–362. 
261 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315-316. See Dean, Critical and Effective Histories, 49: “What 
appears to interest Foucault most in these reflections on Kant is the sharpness with which the latter brings 
the nature of the present into focus, the open-endedness of the present as a project and an arena of 
individual and collective experiment, the role of contingency, of events and the play of the undefinable space 
of freedom in the formation of the future.”  For more on this “undefined work of freedom” towards which 
Foucault here gestures see e.g. Hoy, Critical Resistance, Chapter 2: Foucault: “Essays in Refusal”; Oksala, 
Johanna, Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Prozorov, Sergei, 
Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
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we should think and act.262 The method by which it does this involves revealing 
the ways in which such universality is, at root, the result of various complexes of 
historical and contingent processes. Genealogy is positive in the sense that, for 
Foucault, the contingencies that it uncovers do not serve to strictly undermine the 
authority of reason. Rather, such contingencies serve to problematise the 
authority of reason – that is, serve to show that the authority of reason, because 
it could have had a different past, could have a different future.263 This positive 
aspect is captured, in part, by Guess when he writes: 
 
One of the great uses of history is to show us what, because it has 
in the past been real, is a fortiori possible. This can give rise to 
various illusions. Something can be thought to be politically 
possible now because it actually existed in the past, but it may have 
been possible in the past because of circumstances that have 
                                            
262 I am here giving a particular account of Foucault’s method of genealogy – an account that takes its focus 
from the focus on this thesis. More generally, genealogies can be described as follows: “Genealogies 
articulate problems. But not just any problems. Genealogies do not, for instance, take up those problems 
that come with supposed solutions readily apparent, or those problems that appear difficult to many but are 
simple for those few who are in the know. Genealogies are generally not targeted at problems that are 
themselves readily apparent to everyone or even just to everyone who ought to know them. Genealogies 
are concerned, rather, with submerged problems. The problems of genealogy are those problems found 
below the surfaces of our lives – the problems whose itches feel impenetrable, whose remedies are ever 
just beyond our grasp, and whose very articulations require a severe work of thought. These submerged 
problems are those that condition us without our fully understanding why or how. They are depth problems 
in that they are lodged deep inside of us all as the historical conditions of possibility of our present ways of 
doing, being, and thinking. Yet despite their depth, these problems are also right at the surface insofar as 
they condition us in our every action, our every quality, our every thought, our every sadness and smile.” 
(Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 1)   
263 See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?’: “He will be particularly interested in the problem of how that delimited 
field forms the subject and how, in turn, a subject comes to form and reform those reasons. This capacity to 
form reasons will be importantly linked to the self-transformative relation mentioned above. To be critical of 
an authority that poses as absolute requires a critical practice that has self-transformation at its core.” I state 
this schematically because it will be developed below. See section 2.3.  
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meanwhile changed. This is a case in which further development of 
the very historical consciousness that gave rise to the problem will 




In this section I have accounted for how Foucault reads Kant, and how this 
reading informs his practice of genealogy. On this account, Foucault reads Kant’s 
practice of criticism as being underpinned by an ethos of enlightenment – an 
ethos to which he attributes both a positive and a negative aspect. The negative 
aspect consists in the practice of questioning all givens. The positive aspect 
consists in having the practice of questioning all givens afford the resources for 
thinking about how such givens might be reconfigured. As has been explained, 
within his account of the negative aspects of the ethos of enlightenment Foucault 
can be read as continuing an aspect of Kant’s practice of criticism, and, within his 
account of the positive aspect, Foucault can be read as transforming an aspect 
of Kant’s practice of criticism. Both aspects have been explained as contributing 
towards Foucault’s method of genealogy, which is to say, Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is his transformation of Kant’s practice of criticism. 
 
1.4. CAN ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF 
CRITICAL THOUGHT BE COMPARED? 
  
                                            
264 Geuss, Raymond, ‘Neither History nor Praxis’, in Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 39.  
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What is the aim of this section?         
 
The aim of this section is to bring the accounts of the previous two sections 
together, and argue that the ways in which Rose and Foucault have their 
respective readings of Kant inform their respective critical projects are 
comparable. In other words, in this section I aim to argue that the critical projects 
of Rose and Foucault – specifically, the ways in which they are concerned with 
“renewing” and “transforming” Kant’s practice of criticism – have orientations that 
are comparable. To make this argument I will, first, briefly repeat the aims / 
orientations of these critical projects. Following this, I will argue that a comparison 
can be made between them.    
 
What is the orientation of Rose’s renewal of critical thought? 
 
To repeat, on the account I have given, Rose’s renewal of critical thought follows 
from her argument that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy of law. 
This argument has two parts. First, Rose thinks that the “lawfulness” that Kant’s 
practice of criticism is tasked with determining results in an antinomy, or a 
separation, between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of 
experience. Second, Rose thinks that Kant’s practice of criticism, on account of 
it working on the assumption that there is a rigorous distinction between the 
transcendental and the empirical, is blind to this result – which, for Rose, is 
tantamount to it being incapable of recognising, and consequently transforming, 
the actuality of reason. 
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Rose’s renewal of critical thought does not involve separating the universality of 
our concepts from the particulars of experience but instead struggling with the 
difficult relationship between them. This struggle involves working on the 
assumption that, just as the universality of our concepts can exert authority over 
the particulars of experience, the particulars of experience can exert authority 
over the universality of our concepts.265 To assume this is, in other words, to 
assume both that our concepts can be, to varying degrees, deficient, and that we 
can, with work, make them less so. On this account, Rose’s practice of criticism 
entails a twofold task: to continually call into question the authority of reason, and 
to do so in a way that affords the resources through which we reconfigure the 
authority of reason.  
 
What is the orientation of Foucault’s transformation of critical thought?  
 
To repeat, Foucault’s transformation of critical thought follows from his reading of 
Kant’s practice of criticism as being motivated by the ethos of enlightenment – an 
                                            
265 I write “assumption”, and recognise that doing so gives rise to a potential tension. As I have explained, 
and as I will explain further, one of the central consequences of Rose’s construal of criticism is that it yields 
a “non-foundational” account of reason – non-foundational in the sense that the future of reason cannot be 
prejudged. Accordingly, is it not inconsistent of me to speak of Rose as working on the assumption that there 
is a reciprocal relationship between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience? It 
would be inconsistent – but only if I were claiming that Rose thought the result of such reciprocity could be 
prejudged, which I am not. To assume that there is a reciprocal relationship between the universality of our 
concepts and the particulars of experience is, in the context of Rose’s critical project, to assume only that 
there social-historical dimension to conceptuality. That said, in this regard, reference can be made to Lloyd 
and Milbank – specifically, to their respective claims that, for Rose, there is a close connection between 
reason and faith. See Milbank, ‘Obituary’: “Hence reason [for Rose] must be conjoined with faith, faith even 
in the rationality of an infinite which must elude our grasp, faith therefore in perhaps a full religious sense. 
Such reason with faith allows us to take the risk of action, which is always a risk of power and even of 
violence against the other. For without such risk there can be no generosity and no exercise of desire, 
whether for ideas or the goodness of persons.” See also Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 28-32; ‘The Secular 
Faith of Gillian Rose’.  
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ethos that has both a negative and a positive orientation. The negative orientation 
consists in the practice of questioning all givens. The positive orientation consists 
in the practice of having what is revealed through such questioning contribute 
towards the possibility of reconfiguring such givens in the future. It is these two 
orientations that are at play within Foucault’s method of genealogy – which is to 
say, for Foucault, the method of genealogy is a transformation of Kant’s practice 
of criticism.  
 
Foucault’s method of genealogy involves, in his words, asking continuously266 
“[i]n what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is 
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints?”267 As has been explained with respect to the authority of reason, 
Foucault’s method of genealogy answers this question through uncovering the 
ways in which the universality of certain concepts is, at root, the result of various 
complexes of historical and contingent processes. For Foucault, through asking 
and attempting, by way of his method of genealogy, to answer such a question 
that we are afforded the resources for a “possible crossing-over”268 – that is, the 
resources for recognising the possibilities and the limits for thinking and acting 
differently.269   
                                            
266 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312. 
267 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
268 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
269 For an account of how the ability to “think differently” can contribute towards political theory see esp. 
Prinz, Radicalizing Realism in Political Theory, 94-95 where Prinz cites Geuss as writing: “First of all, under 
current political circumstances, political theory should mainly “contribute to enabling thinking ‘differently’ 
(penser autrement) [. . .]. A philosophy which is true to the best of its traditions, should refrain from delivering 
additional ‘philosophical grounding’ for what already exists, for our contemporary liberal-democratic social 
order.” Following this Prinz writes: “This commitment to the resistance to the dominant (neo-liberal) political 
order and systems of thought unites the efforts of genealogy and criticism of ideology in the versions 
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Are these orientations comparable? 
 
Given these brief restatements of the ways in which Rose and Foucault 
respectively read Kant, and allow these readings to inform their respective critical 
projects, I suggest that they can be compared in the following way. Rose’s 
renewal of critical thought and Foucault’s transformation of critical thought can 
be read as comparable on account of the way in which each construes the 
relationship between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of 
experience, and consequently construe the relationship between theory and 
praxis. Both Rose and Foucault, in contrast with Kant, take the task of criticism 
to consist in recognising the dangers and the possibilities of these 
relationships.270 In other words, they recognise that the authority arrogated to 
reason is real – real in the sense that we really think and act on the basis of 
reasons; and that it is, therefore, dangerous – dangerous in the sense that the 
concepts that comprise such reasons can be, to differing degrees, wrong.271 For 
both Rose and Foucault, criticism is the practice through which we come to 
recognise such dangers – that is, come to recognise the ways in which our 
                                            
preferred by Geuss, i.e. respectively, Foucauldian genealogy and Adornian criticism of ideology [. . .].” [See 
below] 
270 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9: “The discovery of the difficult, dangerous and irrational impulses 
and actualities of individual and social life can only be the work of faceted and facetious reason, which – like 
Socratic irony equally beyond irony – is at the same time beyond its facetiousness.” It is helpful, I think, to 
consider the idea that reason is dangerous in the light of Rose’s accounts of “violence”. See esp. The Broken 
Middle, Chapter 4: Repetition in the Feast, Mann and Girard, ‘Angry Angels: Simone Weil and Emmanuel 
Levinas’, ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’, ‘Søren Kierkegaard to Martin Buber:  Reply from ‘the Single One’’, ‘Walter 
Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism’. I lack the space to deal with Rose’s complicated, but 
resourceful, account of “violence”. For helpful discussions of this aspect of Rose’s work see esp. Brower 
Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 4: The Broken Middle, Williams, ‘Between Politics and 
Metaphysics’, 10-15.   
271 [wrong] 
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concepts are wrong – not in order to reject or disown the critical project of 
ascertaining the authority of reason, but in order to recognise the limits and the 
possibilities of reconfiguring this authority.272  
 
Additionally, both Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to be continuous. 
For Kant, criticism constitutes a method by which we, once and for all, ascertain 
the authority of reason – and thereby afford, once and for all, a reliable way for 
each of us to obtain guidance for thinking and acting.273 For Rose and Foucault, 
by contrast, criticism is continuous.274 The reason for this relates to the way in 
which their accounts of criticism imply a certain relationship between universals 
                                            
272 For a “realistic” account of what such reconfiguration might be, and why we might have reason to construe 
reason as reconfigurable see e.g. Geuss, Raymond, ‘Morality and Identity’, in Christine Korsgaard, The 
Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 197: “I think it is a grave mistake 
to run together questions of the understanding of motives, reasons, and values and questions of 
endorsement. We understand perfectly well why certain groups of Muslims might want to kill Rushdie - he 
is a threat to their identity — and we can fully appreciate that the considerations that move them are quite 
good reasons for them without in the least thinking that they, or anything like them, are or would be reasons 
for us (and also without thinking that we stand under any obligation whatever to fail to try to protect Rushdie 
from their acting on their good reasons). We also assume, quite rightly I think, that the only way to change 
their minds would not be to present them with some new argument — they will have heard those that will 
occur to us and are not impressed – but to engage in some much more complicated process of restructuring 
[or reconfiguring] their [and our] way of life.” See also Geuss, Raymond, Philosophy and Real Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-18. 
273 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxi: “For there has always been some metaphysics or other to be 
met with in the world, and there will always continue to be one, and with it a dialectic of pure reason, because 
dialectic is natural to reason. Hence it is the first and most important occupation of philosophy to deprive 
dialectic once and for all of all disadvantageous influence, by blocking off the source of the errors.” (My 
emphasis.) Wood, Kant, 84: “For Kant the most essential drama of philosophy is this struggle of reason with 
itself, and this is why he entitles its fundamental work 'The Critique of Pure Reason' - in other words, it is 
reason's own criticism, which triumphs over the illusions of which reason itself is the author.” (My emphasis.) 
See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Chaos and Ethics’, in Reality and Its Dreams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 51-63. 
274 See Rose, The Broken Middle, 308-309. See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 10: “The dubious angel, 
bathetic angel, suits reason: for the angel continues to try to do good, to run the risk of idealisation, of 
abstract intentions, to stake itself for ideas and for others. Experience will only accrue if the angel discovers 
the violence in its initial idea, when that idea comes up against the actuality of others and the unanticipated 
meanings between them.” (My emphasis) See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312, 313. 
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and particulars – that is, to repeat, a relationship in which, just as the universality 
of our concepts can exert authority over the particulars of experience, the 
particulars of experience can exert authority over the universality of our concepts. 
If criticism is the practice through which we call into question the authority of 
reason, then it is, for Rose and Foucault, continuous – for the actualities of 
experience (e.g. the fact that experience happens in a specific space and through 
a specific time) will always potentially yield recalcitrant particulars over which the 
universality of our concepts will struggle to exert their authority. 
 
It is for these reasons, therefore, that I take Rose’s renewal of critical thought and 
Foucault’s transformation of critical thought to be comparable. This comparison 
can be schematised as follows. Both Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism 
to be twofold and continuous – to continually call into question the authority of 
reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for, not disowning the 
critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, but reconfiguring this 
authority. At this stage, I recognise that this comparison is tenuous, and that it 
does not address some of the substantive differences between Rose and 
Foucault. As will be explained, the practice of calling into question the authority 
of reason assumes different forms for Rose and Foucault – for Rose, it assumes 
the form of phenomenology, for Foucault, it assumes the form of genealogy. This 
difference will prove crucial for the overarching argument of this thesis – for it will 
be on account of this difference that I will argue that Foucault’s genealogy can 
help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project.275    
 
                                            




In this section I have, building on the arguments of the previous two sections, 
argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable – 
comparable in the sense that they both understand the practice of criticism in 
terms of a twofold and continuous task: to continuously criticise the authority of 
reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for thinking about how 




What have I argued within this chapter? 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are 
comparable. This argument has consisted of three sections. The first two sections 
involved explaining how Rose and Foucault read Kant, and have their readings 
of Kant inform their critical projects. As I explained, Rose’s “renewal” and 
Foucault’s “transformation” of critical thought are both a continuation and a 
correction of Kant’s practice of criticism. In the third section I argued that the 
critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable in that they both 
understand the practice of criticism in terms of a twofold and continuous task: to 
continuously criticise the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords 
the resources for thinking about how the authority of reason could potentially be 
reconfigured.    
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The overarching aim of this thesis is to argue that Rose’s critical project can be 
read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. As I have 
explained, this way of reading Rose is prevented centrally by her challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy. The argument of this chapter contributes 
towards this overarching argument in two ways. First, through affording a basis 
on which to read the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of 
criticism as comparable. Second, through affording a basis on which to begin 
explaining and assessing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. 
Just as Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy can only be 
understood in the light of her engagement with Kant, the respects in which this 
challenge is misguided can only be understood in the light of Foucault’s 
















ON THE MISGUIDEDNESS AND RESOURCEFULNESS 







In this chapter I will argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy is misguided. Rose challenges Foucault’s practice of genealogy for 
being critically “blind”, and does so because she reads it as “nihilistic” – that is, 
as being concerned exclusively with undermining the authority of reason through 
revealing it to be contingent. This challenge is misguided, I will argue, because it 
acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method 
of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent. On the account I 
will give, Foucault’s method of genealogy is, specifically, a method of 
problematisation – that is, a method by which we come to recognise both that 
and how the authority of reason is contingent. It is from the integration of these 
two respects that the critical potential of Foucault’s practice of genealogy follows: 
through revealing that the authority of reason is contingent, its reveals how it has 
changed, and how it could potentially be changed. Rose’s challenge, by 
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acknowledging only one of these two integrated respects, fails to recognise the 
critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy.      
 
Although I will argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is 
misguided, I will also argue that it is misguided in a way that is resourceful. As 
will be explained, Rose’s challenge is resourceful in that it encourages a subtler 
statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy – that is, a statement in which the 
method of genealogy is clarified as a method of problematisation. It will be on 
account of this clarification that I will argue that Rose’s challenge is misguided. 
However, as I will argue in the following chapter, this clarification will also serve 
to clarify a pivotal part of Rose’s critical project that is, in spite of being pivotal, 
largely unclear – that is, the part in Rose’s critical project requires criticism to 
yield the experience of identity and non-identity. Accordingly, although my central 
concern within this chapter is to defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against 
Rose’s challenge, this is my concern because I am, more generally, concerned 
with accounting for Foucault’s method of genealogy in a way that can serve to 
clarify Rose’s critical project.            
 
The argument of this chapter contributes towards the overarching argument of 
this thesis by removing one of the central blocks between the critical projects of 
Rose and Foucault. Above I argued that Rose’s commentators have largely read 
her critical project as being opposed to Foucault’s critical project, in particular, 
and the critical projects of “postmodernity”, in general. I argued also that this way 
of reading Rose has as basis in Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s critical project / 
critical projects of “postmodernity”. Arguing that this challenge is misguided 
removes this block – both by opening Rose’s critical project up to the possibility 
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of being supported by Foucault’s practice of genealogy, and by clarifying 
Foucault’s practice of genealogy as being of possible support for Rose’s critical 
project.    
 
The Structure of the argument 
 
The argument of this chapter will consist of three sections. First, I will explicate 
Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s’ practice of genealogy – that is, explain Rose’s 
reading of Foucault’s practice of genealogy as nihilistic, and how this results, for 
her, in it being critically blind. Second, in the light of Rose’s challenge, I will 
explicate Foucault’s practice of genealogy as a practice of problematisation – that 
is, a practice concerned not only with revealing that the authority of reason is 
contingent, but also with revealing how it is contingent. Third, I will return to 
Rose’s challenge, and argue that it is misguided. Rose only acknowledges one 
of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s practice of genealogy reveals 





Before beginning the first of these three sections, it is necessary to make two 
qualifications. First, Rose’s challenge to Foucault is broader than simply a 
challenge to Foucault’s practice of genealogy. This is to say, my presentation of 
Rose challenging specifically Foucault’s practice of genealogy is a simplification 
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of Rose’s broader challenge to Foucault.276 I simplify Rose’s challenge in this way 
because it is, I think, specifically Foucault’s practice of genealogy that can support 
Rose’s critical project.     
 
Second, I aim to defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against Rose’s 
challenge. Accordingly, the account I will give of this method – an account in 
which I will be concerned with explicating Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation – is one in which the focus follows from Rose’s challenge. In 
other words, the aspects of Foucault’s method of genealogy on which I will focus 
are only those aspects that relate to Rose’s challenge. The consequence of this 
is that there will be a number of aspects that I will not account for – aspects that, 
within the secondary literature on Foucault, have been construed as central. 
Accordingly, as is the case with my presentation of Rose’s challenge, my account 
of Foucault’s method of genealogy will be a simplification – a simplification that I 
would defend by repeating that the overarching argument of this thesis is, 
centrally, concerned with clarifying and supporting an aspect of Rose’s critical 
project. 
 
2.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF 
GENEALOGY?  
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
                                            
276 For Rose’s full account see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.  
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The aim of this section is to explicate Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy – that is, to explicate Rose’s argument that Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is nihilistic, and how she, on the basis of this argument, argues that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically impotent. Following this exposition, I 
will compare Rose’s challenge to the challenge expounded by Nancy Fraser. The 
aim of this comparison is to argue that while Rose and Fraser both conclude that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential, they do so, crucially, 
by way of different criteria.  
 
How has Rose’s challenge been explicated within the secondary literature?  
 
As was explained above, within the secondary literature on Rose, commentators 
have almost always taken Rose’s particular challenge to Foucault to be a part of 
a more general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. With the aim 
of understanding Rose’s challenge, such a general approach is resourceful. 
While Rose does offer particular challenges towards the particular 
representatives of her sense of “postmodernity”, the structure of these particular 
challenges can be generalised. The secondary literature is resourceful in that it 
clearly presents what this general challenge consists in. In general, according to 
such commentators, Rose challenges the critical projects of “postmodernity” for 
reasons similar to her reason for challenging Kant’s critical project – that is, for 
the reason that it results in a practice of criticism that is impotent to recognise the 
actuality of reason. For Rose, as has been explained, the implication of such 
impotence is, in her words, “that the world remains not only unchanged, but also 
unknown.”277  
                                            
277 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1. 
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How will I explicate Rose’s challenge to Foucault?  
 
While the general accounts of Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of 
“postmodernity” afforded by the commentators considered above are resourceful 
for the reason just described, they are largely unhelpful when it comes to critically 
engaging with this challenge. By “critical engagement” I here mean the task of 
thinking about how, in particular, Rose’s challenge might be defended or shown 
to be misguided. The secondary literature is unhelpful when it comes to this task 
because this task demands that Rose’s challenge be assessed not simply in 
general terms, but also in particular terms – that is, with particular reference to 
the critical projects that she claims to challenge. As was explained above, it is on 
account of the secondary literature being unhelpful in this way that I decided to 
focus specifically on Rose’s challenge to Foucault.     
 
What is the context of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy? 
 
To get a better sense of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, 
and of how this challenge follows from Rose’s reading of Kant, it is helpful to 
consider the context in which Rose presents this challenge. Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is presented most explicitly within the same book 
in which she engages most explicitly with Kant – that is, Dialectic of Nihilism. For 
the purposes of my argument, this is important – for it means that Rose’s 




As I explained above, Rose argues that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an 
antinomy of law – that is, an antinomy between the universality of our concepts 
and the particularities of experience. On Rose’s account, one of the implications 
of this is that Kant’s “question of law”278 – that is, the question Kant tasks criticism 
with answering – “remains unanswered”.279 For Rose, “post-Kantian” describes, 
among other things, the attempts at answering Kant’s unanswered question of 
law.280 Within such attempts, Rose distinguishes, and schematises, two 
predominating approaches – approaches that she characterises in terms of 
“rationalism” and “nihilism”.281 The approach Rose characterises as a form of 
rationalism is Kant’s approach – that is, as was explained above, an approach 
that seeks to purify reason of the errors. The approach Rose characterises as a 
form of nihilism is, for Rose, Foucault’s approach – that is, as will be explained, 
an approach that seeks to show that reason is irreducibly impure, to the point of 
undermining the possibility that reason could ever be render authoritative.282 On 
                                            
278 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1, 5. 
279 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 31. 
280 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 25. For additional accounts of this aspect of Rose’s work see Brower 
Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 3: Jurisprudential Wisdom, Lloyd, Law and 
Transcendence, 17-19, Shanks, Against Innocence, 30-40. 
281 See e.g. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface to the 1995 reprint, Love’s Work, 135, Mourning 
Becomes the Law, 1-14, ‘Beginnings of the Day’, 57.  
282 For Rose, this approach characterises the critical projects of “postmodernity” in general. See e.g. Rose, 
Love’s Work, 125: “Modern and postmodern philosophers continue the sceptical conceit according to which 
philosophers affect disaffection from philosophy. Traditionally, this is the way in which philosophy reclaims 
its originality. Postmodern philosophers are in deadly, unironic earnest. Philosophy, they claim, is revenge 
for the unbridgeable distance between thought or language and concrete being; metaphysics is spleen at 
the diversity and difference of beings; ethics is the violent domination of the troubling otherness of the other.” 
However, for reasons already given, I will be focusing on this characterisation of Foucault’s critical project in 
particular. See also Milbank, John, ‘On the Paraethical: Gillian Rose and Political Nihilism’, Telos 173 (2015), 
78: “Yet [Rose] also diagnosed the postmodern vaunting of difference as in reality a dialectic between 
univocal unity and erratic difference so extreme as always to issue in a theoretical and practical nihilism. For 
this outlook, every insertion of difference collapses back into the same, which once more is exhausted by its 
assertion of difference, with a kind of extreme Buddhist sense of illusion at either pole.”    
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this account, rationalism and nihilism each attempt to address Kant’s question of 
law by overstating one side of the antinomy of law – rationalism overstates the 
universality of concepts, nihilism overstates the particularities of experience.  
 
Although these two approaches are seemingly antithetical, for Rose, they both 
make the same mistake – that is, they both construe the task of criticism in terms 
of Kant’s question of law.283 For Rose, Kant’s question of law implies a rigorous 
distinction between the transcendental and the empirical. Accordingly, to 
construe the practice of criticism in terms of Kant’s question of law is to tacitly 
reinforce this distinction, and thereby reinforce the same blindness that, on 
Rose’s reading, besets Kant’s practice of criticism. “The result of this [blindness]”, 
Rose writes, “is that the world remains not only unchanged, but also unknown.”284 
In other words, for Rose, both the rationalistic and the nihilistic approaches to 
criticism fail to recognise that the antinomy of law is not something that should be 
reduced from reason, but something that is the result of reason accurately 
described, and something with which we should struggle. 
 
It is in the context of this argument that Rose presents her challenge to Foucault’s 
genealogy – that is, Foucault’s genealogy is beset by the same critical blindness 
that, for Rose, besets Kant’s practice of criticism. Given this overview, I will now 
explicate the details of Rose’s challenge, beginning with her reading of Foucault’s 
method of genealogy as “nihilistic”.          
                                            
283 See also Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48: “The idea of phenomenology can be seen as an alternative 
to Kant’s theoretical quaestio quid juris [i.e. the “question of law”], while the idea of absolute ethical life can 
be seen as an alternative to Kant’s justification of moral judgements. This, however, would be to concede 
the Kantian dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason.”    
284 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1. 
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Why does Rose read Foucault’s practice of genealogy as nihilistic? 
 
For Rose, Foucault’s method of genealogy is “nihilistic”.285 As I mentioned above, 
by “nihilism” Rose means a certain approach to Kant’s question of law. To 
approach this question “nihilistically” is, she argues, to read Kant’s failure to 
answer this question as a reason to disown his critical project – that is, the project 
of attempting to ascertain the authority of reason through criticism. On Rose’s 
account, Foucault’s practice of genealogy is concerned, not with ascertaining the 
authority of reason, but with undermining the authority of reason – specifically, 
through revealing what we construed as necessary and universal about reason 
to be contingent. Rose writes: 
 
Foucault is opposed to merely turning the table which opens up the 
space of the court-room – on the judge. He recommends that we 
smash it, and he is sanguine that the end of law, the finis, can be 
executed.286     
 
In this passage Rose is referring to the self-reflexive moment in Kant’s critical 
project in which reason turns to itself to criticise itself – to determine what 
concepts we can claim as lawful. The “space of the court-room” is, therefore, the 
space in which the laws of thought and action are to be found. Accordingly, in 
claiming that Foucault “recommends that we smash it”, Rose is claiming that 
                                            
285 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 172, 173, 187, 188, 191, 203, 207. See also The Broken Middle, xiv-
xv, ‘Beginnings of the Day’.  
286 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 171. 
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Foucault is, as she will write elsewhere, recommending that Kant’s critical project 
be disowned – where that means, specifically, disowning the project through 
which we criticise reason with reason in an attempt at justifying reason as a guide 
for thought and action.287  
 
The basis on which Rose reads Foucault’s practice of genealogy in this way – 
that is, as nihilistic – is his concept of “power”.288 For Rose, Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy is a practice concerned centrally with the “delineation of powers”.289 
The powers that genealogy delineates are, in Rose’s words, “the unjustifiable 
source which conforms to no regularity.”290 Although Rose never makes this 
explicit, Rose is here using Foucault’s concept of power to refer, in general, to 
the contingent processes that the practice of genealogy uncovers. Accordingly, 
What Rose is here saying is that, on her reading, the authority of reason is taken 
to have its source in the processes of power, which are unjustified and 
unjustifiable. In other words, Rose is here reading Foucault’s method of 
genealogy as a practice through which the authority of reason is undermined 
through being revealed as the result of contingent processes.  
 
                                            
287 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, The Broken Middle, xi-xv, 308-310. See also ‘Architecture after 
Auschwitz’, 247, Mourning Becomes the Law, 1-14, ‘Beginnings of the Day’.  
288 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault. 
289 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 172. 
290 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 172. See also See Habermas, Jürgen, ‘The Critique of Reason as an 
Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault’, in Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / 
Habermas Debate, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 64-65: “[Foucault] thinks of the 
transcendental practices of power as something particular that strives against all universals, and further as 
the lowly corporeal-sensual that undermines everything intelligible, and finally as the contingent that could 
also have been otherwise because it is not governed by any regulative order.”  
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Why does Rose read Foucault’s method of genealogy as impotent? 
 
As was mentioned above, for Rose, it is on account of it being nihilistic that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is beset by the same critical blindness that 
besets Kant’s practice of criticism. Such “blindness” is twofold. It refers to ways 
in which certain practices of criticism are blind to the antimony of law – that is, in 
part, the antinomy between the universality of our concepts and the particularities 
of experience – that structures reason. Such “blindness” also refers to the ways 
in which these practices of criticism are, in consequence, blind to ways in which 
reason could possibly be reconstructed. For Rose, to reconstruct reason 
requires, first, that we recognise the ways in which our concepts are both always 
unavoidable and partial, and therefore always at risk of failing to do justice to their 
objects. It is on the basis of this recognition that we can begin the work of, in her 
words, “being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the 
good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations 
in its exercise.”291  
 
Of all the accounts given of Rose’s argument for Foucault’s practice of genealogy 
being beset with such critical “blindness”, I find the one given by Lloyd to be the 
most resourceful.292 In the light of Lloyd’s account, Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s 
method of genealogy can be said to involve the argument that Foucault is, in 
claiming that the authority of reason is the result of processes of “power”, placing 
the concept of “power” in a “transcendental register”293 – that is, claiming that the 
                                            
291 Rose, Love’s Work, 124. 
292 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence. 
293 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3. 
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concept of “power” determines the conditions of possibility for the empirical 
world.294 In consequence, the concept of “power” becomes immune from 
criticism, in the sense that nothing in the empirical world can affect it.295 On this 
account, in arguing that the authority of reason is undermined through being 
revealed to be the result of contingent processes of “power”, Foucault is blindly 
assuming that the concept of “power” is authoritative, which, for Rose, results in 
Foucault’s practice of genealogy falling into “vicious circularity”.296 In other words, 
the nihilism of Foucault’s practice of genealogy is “dialectical” in that it remains 
blindly, and therefore dangerously, implicated in the oppositions which it claims 
to be rejecting.297 Rose writes:  
 
From magical nihilism to this administrative nihilism which 
completes itself as despair, that political voluntarism erupts to affirm 
the equally characterless ‘beyond’, which Foucault calls the 'until 
now' and which will most surely repeat just that. The nihilism which 
most explicitly engages with law would most dangerously blind us 
to it.298  
                                            
294 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3. 
295 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3. 
296 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 191. 
297 See Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24. For additional accounts of this “dialectic of nihilism” see also Murphy, 
‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ 397-398; Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3-4; 
Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, 29-30. 
298 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 207, 210: “The genealogical reconstruction of the tradition with its would-be 
exclusion of 'law' from 'power' cripples our reason [. . .] – for we cannot think the one without the other. 
Foucault sacrifices his own rule enough to apprehend us of the advent of administrative power and the 
demise of the civil law, but not enough to give us any space in which to relate to the ubiquitous and infinite 
points of power.” See also Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 7: “This ground is therefore held in a 
transcendence far off the ground, where, with a mixture of naivety and cynicism, without reason and in 
despair. post-modernism leaves analysed and unanalysed according to its tenets the pre-conditions and 
rampant consequences of power. domination and authority ‘Despairing rationalism without reason’ is, I 
claim. the story of post-modernism. It is the story of what happens when 'metaphysics' is barred from ethics.” 
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Why compare Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy with 
Fraser’s challenge?  
 
Having now explained what I take to be Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method 
of genealogy, it is, I think, worth considering how this challenge compares with 
the challenge expounded by Nancy Fraser, which I mentioned briefly above. Of 
all the many challenges that have been made against Foucault’s method of 
genealogy, the one expounded by Fraser is, if not one of the most cogent, then 
certainly one of the most influential. In comparing these two challenges I have 
two aims. First, to explain the respects in which the challenges of Rose and 
Fraser are similar. Second, to explain the respects in which they are different. As 
I will explain, while both Rose and Fraser conclude that Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is without critical potential, they do so by way of different criteria. In 
other words, what it would be for Foucault’s method of genealogy to have a critical 
potential is different for Rose than it is for Fraser. For Fraser, such critical 
potential demands normative foundations. For Rose, crucially, it does not. This 
will prove important for the overarching argument of this thesis because it points 
to a further respect in which Rose and Foucault converge on how they construe 
the task of criticism. Both Rose and Foucault, I will argue, take the task of criticism 
to be that of revealing, not that certain of our concepts are normative, but that the 
normativity of certain of our concepts is corrigible. 
 
                                            
See also Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style, 9: “The renunciation of reason discernible in 
postmodernity not only signifies a lack of trust but it also intensifies the very conditions that it claims to have 
overcome.” 
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Additionally, and more generally, by considering how Rose’s challenge to 
Foucault’s method of genealogy compares with Fraser’s challenge, I hope to 
open Rose’s critical project up to the potential of being influenced by, and 
influencing, the ways in which Foucault’s method of genealogy has been 
construed following Fraser’s challenge. To repeat, of the many challenges that 
have been made against Foucault’s method of genealogy, Fraser’s challenge is 
one of the most influential – both in the sense that it has influenced others to 
challenge Foucault along the same lines, and in the sense that it has influenced 
others to defend Foucault against this challenge.299 That said, I will now turn to 
explain the respects in which the challenges of Rose and Fraser are similar. 
 
What is Fraser’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy?  
 
As I mentioned above, Fraser challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy for 
being, in her words, “normatively confused”.300 This challenge is based on an 
interpretation of Foucault’s method of genealogy in which Fraser, like Rose, 
focuses on Foucault’s concept of “power”. In this regard, Fraser is more charitable 
than Rose. Fraser writes:   
 
Most generally, it is my thesis that [the most valuable 
accomplishment of Foucault’s method of genealogy] consists of a 
rich empirical account of the early stages in the emergence of some 
distinctively modern modalities of power. This account yields 
important insights into the nature of modern power, and these 
                                            
299 For an overview see Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power.  
300 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 31. 
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insights, in turn, bear political significance – they suffice to rule out 
some rather widespread political orientations as inadequate to the 
complexities of power in modern societies.301  
 
For Fraser, however, what allows Foucault’s method of genealogy to yield these 
important insights is also what leaves it normatively confused, and therefore 
without critical potential. This challenge centres on the way Foucault’s 
genealogical method involves, in her words, a practice of “suspension” / 
“bracketing”.302  
 
Foucault’s genealogical method, Fraser writes, “involves, among other things, the 
suspension of the standard modern liberal normative framework, which 
distinguishes between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power. Foucault 
brackets those notions, and the questions they give rise to, and concentrates 
instead upon the actual ways in which power operates.”303 Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy reveals that power actually operates contingently. “Genealogy takes it 
as axiomatic that everything is interpretation all the way down, or, to put it less 
figuratively, that cultural practices are instituted historically and are therefore 
contingent, ungrounded except in terms of other, prior, contingent, historically 
instituted practices.”304  
 
                                            
301 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 17-18. 
302 See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 20: “‘Bracketing’, of course, is not Foucault’s term; given its 
association with the phenomenological tradition to which he is so hostile, he would doubtless reject it. 
Nevertheless, the term is suggestive of the sort of studied suspension of standard categories and 
problematics that he practices.” See also Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 156: “But he does wish to preserve 
the second element, namely the epoché, in a modified form.” 
303 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18. 
304 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 19. 
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It is with respect to the suspension / bracketing that Fraser takes to be involved 
in Foucault’s genealogical method, that she directs the following sequences 
questions: 
 
Is Foucault’s bracketing of the normative merely a methodological 
strategy, a temporary heuristic aimed at making it possible to see 
the phenomena in fresh new ways? If so, then it would leave open 
the possibility of some subsequent normative assessment of power 
/ knowledge regimes. Or, alternatively, does Foucault’s bracketing 
of the normative represent a substantive, principled commitment to 
ethical cultural relativism, to the impossibility of normative 
justification across power / knowledge regimes?305  
 
For Fraser, such questions “have enormous importance for the interpretation and 
assessment of Foucault’s work.”306 The reason being, the critical potential of 
Foucault’s method of genealogy depends in large part on how these questions 
are answered.   
 
For Fraser, making reference to the “obvious politically engaged character of 
[Foucault’s] writing,”307 the practice of suspension / bracketing involved in 
Foucault’s method of genealogy implicates it in a number of mutually 
incompatible suppositions: “[either Foucault] has educed some other normative 
framework as an alternative to the suspended one; or, since none is readily 
                                            
305 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 21-22. 
306 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 21-22. 
307 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18. 
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apparent, that he has found a way to do politically engaged critique without the 
use of any normative framework; or, more generally, that he has disposed 
altogether of the need for any normative framework to guide political practice.”308 
Since these suppositions are mutually incompatible, and since Foucault’s 
practice of genealogy “seems simultaneously to invite all of them”, it is, for Fraser, 
“normatively confused.”309 “As a consequence”, Fraser concludes, “the [critical] 
potential for a broad range of normative nuances is surrendered”.310 
 
Colin Koopman has restated Fraser’s challenge to Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy as consisting in the charge that it commits the “genetic fallacy”.311 I 
take this restatement to be helpful – centrally because it helps give a more precise 
statement of the force of Fraser’s challenge, and therefore what it might be to 
defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against this challenge and challenges 
like it.312 What is the genetic fallacy? The genetic fallacy involves genetic 
                                            
308 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18. 
309 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18. 
310 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 32. 
311 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 87. 
312 Additionally, Koopman uses the lens of genetic fallacy to distinguish Foucault’s genealogy from the 
genealogies given by Nietzsche and Williams. See Genealogy as Critique, Chapter 2: Three Uses of 
Genealogy: Subversion, Vindication and Problematisation. About this distinction Koopman writes: “By 
reinterpreting Foucault’s primary analytics of genealogy and archaeology in terms of his concept of 
problematisation, as Foucault himself proposed near the end of his life, we can distinguish Foucaultian 
critique from other prominent engagements with history that have proceeded under the banner of 
archaeology and genealogy so as to arrive at a judgment. Specifically, I shall be arguing, we can distinguish 
Foucault’s problematising genealogy from the vindicatory genealogy of Bernard Williams (this is perhaps 
predictable) as well as from the subversive genealogy of Friedrich Nietzsche (certainly this thought is a bit 
more provocative). Whereas Williams and Nietzsche used genealogy to cast judgments on certain concepts 
(truthfulness and morality, for example) and the practices instantiating them, Foucault used genealogy to 
critically investigate the conditions of the possibility of the practical exercise of such concepts. The purpose 
of Foucault’s unique conception of genealogy as problematisation is to make manifest the constitutive and 
regulative conditions of the present as a material for thought and action that we would need to work on if we 
are to transform that present. If other genealogists have aimed at vindication or subversion of the 
problematisation at the heart of who we are, Foucault aims at a practice that would reveal our 
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reasoning, which “can be understood broadly, as any attempt to support or to 
discredit a belief, statement, position or argument based upon its causal or 
historical genesis, or more broadly, the way in which it was formed.”313 On this 
account, to charge that Foucault’s method of genealogy commits the genetic 
fallacy is to charge that it involves conflating the past historical development of a 
practice with the present justification of that practice.314 For example, certain of 
our concepts could be revealed to have histories that we, regarding them from 
the perspective of the present, regard as problematic and / or unproblematic.315 
In the case of this example, to commit the genetic fallacy is to think that the history 
of these concepts determines them as being legitimate or illegitimate (or, to use 
the terminology of the previous chapter, lawful or unlawful). For Koopman, Fraser 
charges Foucault’s practice of genealogy with committing the genetic fallacy 
insofar as she construes it as being concerned with using the empirical insights 
that it affords to establish normative conclusions.316        
 
Given this restatement, the force of Fraser’s challenge can be stated as follows. 
Fraser’s challenge is that Foucault cannot derive the normative conclusions from 
his genealogies that he, on her account, wishes. As Koopman has helpfully 
pointed out, to claim is this not the same as claiming that Foucault’s genealogies 
are value-laden despite a being presented as value-free. “Nobody, Foucault 
                                            
problematisation to facilitate their further transformation.” (18) For an alternative account of competing 
“genealogical strategies”, see Milbank, John, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006), Preface to the Second Edition: Between Liberalism and Positivism. 
313 Klement, Kevin C., ‘When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?’ Argumentation 16.4 (2002), 384. Cited 
by Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 62. 
314 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 62. 
315 For examples of this see esp. Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
316 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88. 
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included, ever thought of genealogical method as value-free. For instance, there 
are values already implicit in Foucault’s decision to focus on, say, the prison and 
the hospital rather than say, the university and the factory, or his methodological 
restriction of his analysis to the West rather than the Rest — clearly there is a 
normative load structuring genealogy (as is the case of any effort in social 
science) from the outset.”317 Accordingly, Fraser’s challenge must rest on the 
supposition that Foucault’s practice of genealogy is not only normatively loaded, 
but also normatively ambitious. In other words, for Fraser’s challenge to work, 
Foucault’s practice of genealogy needs to be construed as being concerned with 
both investigating the historical processes through which certain norms came to 
be, and deriving normative conclusions from these investigations (e.g. concluding 
that the normative force of certain of our concepts should be, on account their 
histories, accepted or rejected). On the condition that this construal is correct, 
Fraser’s challenge is forceful – for, if Foucault’s practice of genealogy is 
normatively ambitious, then it is unjustifiably (or confusedly) so, since it cannot 
derive normative conclusions from the empirical insights it affords, at least not 
without committing the genetic fallacy.318    
 
                                            
317 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88.  
318 That said, see also Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88: “Genetic reasoning is, I believe, somewhat less 
fallacious than is commonly presupposed by philosophers who are not inclined to take history very seriously. 
The impossibly strong claim that practices of logical justification are rightly conducted without the slightest 
concern for inquiry into the historical evolution of the objects of our judgment makes sense only by rigorously 
denying the counterclaim that justification itself is a temporal process that takes place both within and 
through time. This latter denial in turn makes sense only if one strongly affirms synchronic and therefore 
extremely rationalistic accounts of justification, knowledge, and truth.” A similar view is maintained by Hoy. 
See Hoy, Time of Our Lives, 229-230. 
 123 
Comparing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy with 
Fraser’s challenge 
 
I have spent as much time as I have explaining and clarifying Fraser’s challenge 
to Foucault’s method of genealogy – an explanation and clarification in which I 
emphasised the part played by normativity within this challenge –  because I think 
that it is both similar to and, crucially, different from Rose’s challenge. To repeat, 
I think that the challenges expounded by Rose and Fraser are both misguided. 
Both Rose and Fraser conclude that Foucault’s method of genealogy is without 
critical potential, and do so by way of misrepresentations of this method – 
misrepresentations that I will, in the following section, be concerned with 
correcting. To this extent, I take the challenges of Rose and Fraser to be similar. 
However, while I think that both challenges are misguided, I also think that the 
grounds for their respective misguidedness is, crucially, different. The difference 
is, to state it simply, whereas Fraser’s challenge works on the supposition that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is normatively ambitious, Rose’s does not. 
Rose’s challenge, by contrast, works on the supposition that Foucault’s method 
of genealogy is nihilistic – where that means, for Rose, that it is concerned 
centrally with undermining the normative force of certain of our concepts, of the 
normative force of the better reason. In other words, both Rose and Fraser 
conclude that Foucault’s practice of genealogy is without critical potential. For 
Fraser, this conclusion follows from Foucault unjustifiably (or confusedly) 
attempting to derive normative conclusions from the empirical insights afforded 
by his practice of genealogy. For Rose, this conclusion follows from Foucault’s 
practice of genealogy undermining the possibility of normativity tout court. 
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Given the overarching argument of this thesis, I take this difference between the 
challenges of Rose and Fraser to be crucial. My overarching aim is, to repeat, to 
argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with 
Foucault’s method of genealogy. The difference between the challenges of Rose 
and Fraser is crucial, I think, because it points to a possible convergence between 
the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism.  
 
Unlike Fraser’s challenge, which involves the claim that the critical potential of 
Foucault’s genealogical method demands normative criteria,319 Rose’s challenge 
does not – that is, Rose’s challenge does not involve her claiming that Foucault’s 
genealogical method is or should be normative. Rather, it involves her claiming, 
among other things, that Foucault’s genealogical method undermines the 
possibility of normativity. What I take to follow from this – or, more accurately, 
what I take this to suggest – is that Rose, unlike Fraser, does not construe the 
critical potential of Foucault’s practice of genealogy to depend on it being 
normative. The reason for this, I think, is that Rose is reading Foucault by way of 
different criteria. Like Fraser, Rose is concerned with challenging the critical 
potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy. However, what it would be for 
Foucault’s method of genealogy to have a critical potential is different for Rose 
than it is for Fraser. As I explained above, the context in which Rose’s challenge 
occurs is one in which Rose is, broadly speaking, concerned with demonstrating 
how the critical projects of “postmodernity” are blind (or impotent) to recognise 
the antinomy of law that issues from, on her account, Kant’s critical project. In the 
light of this, it can be said that, for Rose, Foucault’s method of genealogy is 
without critical potential, not because it is without normative criteria, but because 
                                            
319 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 32. 
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it cannot recognise the antinomy of normativity – that is, to make this more 
specific to the focus of this thesis, cannot recognise the corrigibility of 
conceptuality. For Rose, to repeat, the central task of criticism is not, at least not 
strictly, to afford normative conclusions. Rather, it is to encourage us to recognise 
the ways in which the authority of reason, or, more specifically, the normative 
force of our concepts, is always both unavoidable and partial – in short, 
reconstructable.  
 
Given the overarching argument of this thesis, this way of restating Rose’s 
challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is important because, as I 
mentioned above, it points to a possible convergence between the ways in which 
Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism. It is my contention that Rose 
and Foucault construe the task of criticism in ways that are constructively 
comparable. I have already, in the previous chapter, given some basis for this 
contention. In the previous chapter, to repeat, I argued that both Rose and 
Foucault come to construe the task of criticism by way of their respective 
continuations and corrections of Kant. On this account, both Rose and Foucault 
construe the task of criticism as twofold and continuous – to continually call into 
question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources 
for, not disowning the critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, but 
reconfiguring this authority – an authority that has, in this section, been stated in 
terms of normativity. Rose fails to recognise this comparison, and consequently 
challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy as a form of critique, because she 
misrepresents this method. Foucault’s method of genealogy is not nihilistic in the 
way that Rose represents it as being. Rather, as I will argue in the following 
section, Foucault’s method of genealogy is correctly represented as a method of 
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problematisation. What I take to follow from this correct representation is that the 
basis on which Rose, according to her own criteria, concludes that Foucault’s 
method of genealogy is without critical potential is misguided, but resourcefully 
so. Showing Rose’s challenge to be misguided is resourceful because it 
encourages a subtler statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy, and thereby 




In this section I have explicated Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy. According to this explication, Rose argues that Foucault’s practice of 
genealogy is nihilistic in the sense that it is concerned with undermining the 
authority of reason through revealing the authority of reason to be the result of 
contingent processes. It is on the premise of this argument that Rose argues that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically blind – that is, blind to ways in which 
reason is actually structured, and consequently blind to the ways in which reason 
could possibly be reconstructed. Following this, I compared Rose’s challenge 
with the challenge expounded by Fraser. On account of this comparison I was 
able to, among other things, clarify Rose’s challenge in a way that suggested a 
possible convergence between the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe 
the task of criticism.   
 
2.3. DEFENDING FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY AGAINST 
ROSE’S CHALLENGE  
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What is the aim of this section? 
   
The aim of this section is to explicate the critical potential of Foucault’s method 
of genealogy. On the account I will give, which will take its focus from Rose’s 
challenge, the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows from its 
capacity to problematise the authority of reason – that is, to reveal both that and 
how the authority of reason is the result of complex, historical and contingent 
processes. To recognise the authority of reason as being always problematic is 
to recognise it as always open to being potentially changed.    
 
Genealogy and contingency within the secondary literature 
 
As was explained above, Rose reads Foucault’s practice of genealogy as 
nihilistic – that is, a practice of criticism concerned with undermining the authority 
of reason through revealing it to be the result of contingent processes. This way 
of reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as being centrally concerned with 
revealing to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary (what 
Collin Koopman calls the “anti-inevitability thesis”320) is one that is endorsed by 
both Foucault and a number of his commentators. However, whereas for Rose 
this reading results in the critical blindness of Foucault’s method of genealogy, 
for Foucault and a number of his commentators it results in its critical potential. 
Foucault writes:    
 
What reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different 
forms of rationality offer as their necessary being, can perfectly well 
                                            
320 See e.g. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140.  
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be shown to have a history; and the network of contingencies from 
which it emerges can be traced. Which is not to say, however, that 
these forms of rationality were irrational. It means that they reside 
on a base of human practice and human history; and that since 
these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we 
know how it was that they were made.321  
 
Additionally, as Koopman has also recognised, the anti-inevitability thesis is one 
upheld by many of Foucault’s commentators.322 For example, David Couzens 
Hoy thinks that Foucault’s method of genealogy should be construed as 
suggesting that the “stultifying aspects of ourselves that we had assumed to be 
universal and natural might in fact be arbitrary and contingent features that could 
potentially be changed.”323 Additionally, Jana Sawicki writes: “Foucault brings to 
our attention historical transformations in practices of self-formation in order to 
reveal their contingency and to free us for new possibilities of self-understanding, 
new modes of experience, new forms of subjectivity, authority, and political 
identity.”324 Paul Rabinow writes that Foucault’s work aims at “cultivat[ing] an 
attention to the conditions under which things become “evident,” ceasing to be 
objects of our attention and therefore seemingly fixed, necessary, and 
unchangeable.”325 Nikolas Rose writes that “in showing the contingency of the 
                                            
321 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 450. See also Foucault, Michel, ‘Critical Theory / 
Intellectual History’, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, edited by 
Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1990), 37.  
322 See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140-141. For the following survey, I am indebted to Koopman’s 
own survey.    
323 Hoy, Critical Resistance, 72.  
324 Sawicki, Jana, ‘Foucault, Feminism and Questions of Identity’, in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 
edited by Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 288. 
325 Rabinow, Paul, ‘Introduction: The History of Systems of Thought’, in Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, 
Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), xix. 
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arrangements within which we are assembled, in denaturalising them, in showing 
the role of thought in holding them together, [Foucault’s method of genealogy 
shows] that thought has a part to play in contesting them.”326 Wendy Brown writes 
that, “[f]or Foucault, the project of making the present appear as something that 
might not be as it is constitutes the distinctive contribution of intellectual work to 
political life.”327 Finally, Judith Butler thinks that one of the central consequences 
of Foucault’s method of genealogy is “the recognition of a radical contingency in 
the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of 
causal unities that are regularly assumed to be natural and necessary.”328  
 
For Foucault, and the commentators here briefly considered, the critical potential 
of the method of genealogy is construed as a consequence of its capacity to 
reveal as contingent that which we formerly took as necessary. It will be on 
account of this construal that I will, in the following section, argue that Rose’s 
challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided. To afford the means 
for making this argument, my concern for the remainder of this section will be with 
clarifying that Foucault’s method of genealogy is, specifically, a method of 
problematisation. I will begin this clarification by developing what it means to say 
that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be 
“contingent”.  
 
                                            
326 Rose, Nikolas, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 59. 
327 Brown, Wendy, Politics Out of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 113. 
328 Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), 175. 
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How does Foucault’s method of genealogy reveal the authority of reason to 
be the result of contingent processes?  
 
Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals to be contingent that which we formerly 
took to be necessary. For Rose, this reading results in critical blindness. For 
Foucault, and a number of his commentators, it bears a critical potential. That 
this way of reading Foucault’s method of genealogy should provoke these two 
antithetical conclusions follows, in part, from the ambiguous concept of 
contingency.329 In other words, it is not immediately clear that a practice through 
which we reveal to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary is 
a practice of criticism.  
 
What is it to say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals to be contingent 
that which we formerly took to be necessary? With regard to the authority of 
reason – or, more specifically, with regard to the authority of the concepts that 
comprise reason – the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy 
concerns, centrally, the historical processes through which concepts come to 
acquire this authority.330 To repeat, in the context of this thesis, to say that a 
concept possesses an “authority” is simply to say that it possesses a normative 
force – that is, a potential to guide how we should think about and act within the 
world. What the practice of genealogy reveals is that the authority of a given 
concept, at a given time, in a given place implies a complex of different meanings 
                                            
329 For more on the ambiguity of the concept of contingency – specifically, when it is appealed to within the 
practice of criticism see Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 142. 
330 See also Koopman, ‘Foucault’s Historiographical Expansion’, 361: “The difference between a history of 
contingency and a history of arbitrariness is, at least in part, the difference between a history oriented to the 
present and a history without any orientation at all.” 
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– different meanings imposed on the same concept in the past, and which have 
succeeded in remaining embedded within the present content of that concept.331 
On this account, the authority of a given concept is contingent because there is 
nothing necessary about the historical processes through which this concept 
came to acquire this authority. What meanings a given concept will come to 
contain at a given point in time, and how these meanings relate to each other will 
be just the result of history, and this history will be contingent in a number of 
ways. It will be contingent which wills encounter and try to interpret / master this 
given concept, and at what times and under what circumstances. It will also be 
contingent how much force, energy, and success will be had in imposing these 
meanings.332  
 
It is on account of such contingent processes that Foucault has, on occasion, 
referred to the history of rationality, less in terms of a “bifurcation”, and more in 
                                            
331 See Foucault, Michel, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in Essential Works, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, 
and Epistemology, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 369-370: “Genealogy is gray, 
meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on 
documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. [. . .] Genealogy, consequently, 
requires patience and a knowledge of de- tails, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material. 
Its “cyclopean monuments” [see Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, translated by Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §7] are constructed from “discreet and apparently insignificant truths and 
according to a rigorous method"; they cannot be the product of "large and well-meaning errors” [see 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, translated by R. J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)]. In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. 
Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare 
to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for “origins.”” I have not, and will not, 
engage with this text. My reason is that this text, while it affords a descriptive account of the demands of 
genealogy (both as a verb and as a noun), remains an account of Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche reading 
of “genealogy” – which is to say, not strictly Foucault’s reading of “genealogy”.  
332 See Geuss, Raymond, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’, in Morality, Culture, and History: Essays on German 
philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13. 
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terms of an “endless, multiple bifurcation [. . . an] abundant ramification.”333 The 
occasion in question is an interview in which Foucault is asked about, among 
other things, his interpretation of Kant – specifically, the interpretation he 
expounds in his essay What is Enlightenment? – and the way this interpretation 
has been construed by Habermas.334 In this interview, Foucault is asked whether 
he agrees with the way certain members of the Frankfurt School have construed 
the “bifurcation of reason”335 – that is, “the dialectic of reason, [. . .] whereby 
reason becomes perverse under the effects of its own strength, transformed and 
reduced to instrumental knowledge.”336 In response, Foucault claims that such a 
construal of the bifurcation of reason betrays an instance of what he, in his essay 
What is Enlightenment?, refers to as an “intellectual blackmail”337 – that is, the 
blackmail of thinking that we must either accept rationality or fall prey to the 
irrational.338 For Foucault, it is this blackmail that has  been, in his words, “at work 
in every critique of reason or every critical inquiry into the history of rationality”, 
and which has had the consequence of making a “rational critique of rationality”, 
a “rational history of all the ramifications and all the bifurcations [of reason]”, or 
“contingent history of reason” appear as if it were impossible.339  
                                            
333 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442. 
334 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442.  
335 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. 
336 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. That said, for an account in which the critical 
projects of Adorno and Foucault are constructively compared, see e.g. Allen, ‘Adorno, Foucault, and the End 
of Progress’, 183-206. 
337 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 314.  
338 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. 
339 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. However, see also Bernstein, Adorno, 4: “[Adorno] 
unswervingly affirmed the values of Enlightenment, and believed that modernity suffered from a deficit rather 
than a surplus of reason and rationality. Because one of the central places in which Adorno works through 
his critique of modern rationalism is in his writings on art and aesthetics, it is widely believed that his project 
is to displace reason with aesthetic praxis and judgement. This is a massive misunderstanding and distortion 
of his thought. Adorno believes that scientific and bureaucratic rationalism are, in their claim to totality, 
irrational in themselves, and hence that the meaning deficit caused by the disenchantment of the world is 
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Underpinning this response is Foucault’s insistence that “[w]e have to move 
beyond the outside-inside alternative”.340 This means, to add to the explanation I 
gave above, that we, according to Foucault, have to resist thinking about the 
history of reason as being marked by one bifurcation in which reason, on account 
of the Enlightenment, became instrumental – that is, became concerned solely 
with efficiency, calculability, standardisation, etc.341 Rather, we have to begin 
thinking about the history of reason being marked by an abundance of 
branchings, ramifications, breaks, and ruptures. Foucault remarks:    
 
I would not speak about one bifurcation of reason but more about 
an endless, multiple bifurcation – a kind of abundant ramification. I 
do not speak of the point at which reason became instrumental. [. . 
.] In this abundance of branchings, ramifications, breaks, and 
ruptures, [the Enlightenment] was an important event, or episode; 
it had considerable consequences, but it was not a unique 
phenomenon.342  
                                            
equally a rationality deficit. Only an expanded conception of reason which derives from a reinscription of 
conceptuality can lead to a restoration of ethical meaning. But for Adorno to expand reason is to expand the 
scope and character of cognitive life, of knowing. It is toward a more capacious sense of cognition and thus 
reason that Adorno's struggles with the concept lead us. Thus the distinct and unique character of his project: 
Adorno pursues romantic ends (a quest for the renewal of ethical meaning) through hyper-cognitive means.” 
340 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315. 
341 Bernstein, Adorno, 10. 
342 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442. Compare with Rose, Love’s Work, 125-126: 
“Previously, modern philosophical irrationalism was seen retrospectively by philosophers and historians as 
the source of the racist and totalitarian movements of the twentieth century. Now, philosophical reason itself 
is seen by postmodern philosophers as the general scourge of Western history. To reason’s division of the 
real into the rational and the irrational is attributed the fatal Manichaeism and imperialism of the West.” See 
also Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 64: “Let us say, roughly, that as opposed to a genesis oriented towards 
the unity of some principia! cause burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a 
genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born 
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In other words, for Foucault, the way in which the authority of reason was 
reconfigured as a result of the Enlightenment is one reconfiguration among many. 
To say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be 
contingent is to say that it reveals the authority of reason, at whatever time and 
in whatever space, to be the result of an abundance of ramifications through 
which this authority has been reconfigured.343    
 
Foucault’s method of genealogy as a method of problematisation  
 
With the aim of explaining the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy, 
it is important to recognise that from this account of contingency it does not follow 
that Foucault’s method of genealogy, through revealing the authority of reason to 
be contingent, thereby undermines the authority of reason. Rather, what follows 
is that the authority of reason is called into question in a specific way – a way 
through which the authority of reason is not rejected, but “problematised”. 
Foucault remarks: 
 
I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a 
problem in the solution of another problem raised at another 
moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the 
                                            
out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the effect. A process of making 
it intelligible but with the clear understanding that this does not function according to any principle of closure. 
There is no principle of closure for several reasons." 
343 Allen, ‘Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress’, 197-198: “Adorno and Foucault offer a radically 
different way of thinking about the backward- and forward-looking conceptions of progress in relation to the 
project of critical theory. Both reject any vindicatory, backward-looking story of historical progress as a “fact” 
about what has led up to “us,” but they do so not in favour of a romantic story of decline and fall but rather 
in the service of a critical problematization of the present.” 
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history of solutions – and that's the reason why I don't accept the 
word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of 
problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If 
everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So 
my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic 
activism.344  
 
In this remark Foucault is describing his method of genealogy as a method of 
problematisation – that is, a method through which we come to recognise the 
respects in which the present is, because it is the result of complex, historical and 
contingent processes, problematic. With regard to the authority of reason, to 
recognise this as problematic is, for Foucault, to recognise that it is something 
that demands, not rejection, but acute attention. When Foucault writes that he 
does not accept the word “alternative”, he is committing himself to a form of 
realism – “realism” in the sense that he is concerned with the authority of reason, 
not as it is experienced in some idealised or imagined set of circumstances, but 
as it is really experienced, as it is really used, in the present.345 In the present, 
                                            
344 Foucault, Michel, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in Essential Works, 
Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 256. 
Foucault, Michel, ‘The Concern for Truth’, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 
1977-1984, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1990), 257: “The notion common to all the 
work that I have done since Histoire de la folie is that of problematization”. 
345 See Hoy, David Couzens, ‘The Temporality of Power’, in Foucault’s Legacy, edited by Carlos Prado (New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 11. See also Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 10-11: “A realist can fully admit 
that products of the human imagination are very important in human life, provided he or she keeps a keen 
and unwavering eye upon the basic motto Respice finem, meaning in this case not “The best way to live is 
to keep your mind on your end: death,” but “Don’t look just at what they say, think, believe, but at what they 
actually do, and what actually happens as a result.” An imagined threat might be an extremely powerful 
motivation to action, and an aspiration, even if built on fantasy, is not nothing, provided it really moves people 
to action. This does not mean that it is any less important to distinguish between a correct perception of the 
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the authority of reason will always be problematic, for Foucault, because it will 
always have an actual past and a potential future.346 On this account, to recognise 
that the authority of reason is problematic is to recognise that it can always 
potentially be changed through continual work.347  
 
Accordingly, far from disowning reason in the way that Rose claims, Foucault’s 
method of genealogy, as he understood it, encourages us to pay closer attention 
to the actuality of reason – which, for Foucault, means attending to the “intrinsic 
dangers” that crisscross this actuality. Foucault remarks:   
 
I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since 
the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, 
remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its 
historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? 
                                            
world and illusion. The opposite of reality or the correct perception of reality is in any case not the imagination 
but illusion; however, even illusions can have effects. The realist must take powerful illusions seriously as 
factors in the world that have whatever motivational power they in fact have for the population in question, 
that is, as something to be understood. This is compatible with seeing through them, and refusing steadfastly 
to make them part of the cognitive apparatus one employs oneself to try to make sense of the world. It is no 
sign of gimlet-eyed realism to deny the enormous real significance of religious practices, beliefs, and 
institutions in the world, past and present, but, rather, a sign of simple blindness. This, however, does not 
imply that the cognitive or normative claims made by religious believers have any plausibility whatever.” 
346 Compare this with the way certain commentators have characterised Rose’s concept of the “broken 
middle”. For example, Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38: “The ‘broken middle’ to which Rose refers can 
be characterised in several ways: a break between the potentiality and actuality of the world, between 
universal and particular, between freedom and unfreedom, between legality and morality.”   
347 See Dean, Critical and Effective Histories, 56: “There is also a reversal of perspective here. Rather than 
posing the problem of reason and freedom in terms of a necessary and universal limitation, Foucault’s 
writings on enlightenment, and his historical studies, start from the actual limits to forms of rationality and 
action. The point is not to seek the universal conditions that make it possible to speak and act, and to 
enshrine them in foundational moral codes and epistemologies, but to discover what it is possible to think, 
to say, and to do under various contingent conditions. This is not to say anything is possible in an irrationalist 
or libertarian fashion, but that there always remains to be determined a space of contingency and freedom 
within the conditions of experience and identity.”  
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How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to 
practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by intrinsic 
dangers? One should remain as close to this question as possible, 
keeping in mind that it is both central and extremely difficult to 
resolve. In addition, if it is extremely dangerous to say that reason 
is the enemy that should be eliminated, it is just as dangerous to 
say that any critical questioning of this rationality risks sending us 
into irrationality. One should not forget – and I'm saying this not in 
order to criticise rationality but to show how ambiguous things are 
– it was on the basis of the flamboyant rationality of social 
Darwinism that racism was formulated, becoming one of the most 
enduring and powerful ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, 
an irrationality, but an irrationality that was at the same time, after 
all, a certain form of rationality. [. . .] This is the situation we are in 
and must combat. If intellectuals in general are to have a function, 
if critical thought itself has a function – and, even more specifically, 
if philosophy has a function within critical thought – it is precisely to 
accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that 
refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and, at the same 
time, to its intrinsic dangers.348  
                                            
348 Foucault, Michel, ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 358. Cited, in part, by Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88-89. See 
also Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 149-150.] See also Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 50: “Reason as much 
as you want, but do you really know up to what point you can reason without it becoming dangerous? Critique 
will say, in short, that it is not so much a matter of what we are undertaking, more or less courageously, than 
it is the idea we have of our knowledge and its limits.” See also Allen, The End of Progress, 106: “Foucault’s 
work challenges this central assumption of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory by asserting that 
rationality or normativity and power are always and necessarily entangled with each other, and that it is 
precisely this spiral that critical thought must ceaselessly interrogate.” 
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I cite this remark at length because it serves to capture both the respects in which 
I take Rose’s reading of Foucault’s method of genealogy to be misguided, and 
the respects in which Foucault’s construal of critical thought can be said to 
converge with Rose’s construal. In this remark Foucault, like Rose, speaks of 
critical thought as that through which we come to recognise both the 
unavoidability and the dangers of reason. For Foucault, reason is intrinsically 
dangerous precisely because it is unavoidable. This relates back to what was 
said above about the “intrinsic impurity” of reason – that is, as Thomas McCarthy 
describes it, “its embeddedness in culture and society, its entanglement with 
power and interest, the historical variability of its categories and criteria, the 
embodied, sensuous and practically engaged character of its bearers.”349 On this 
account, to use reason, to think and act by way of concepts, is substantively to 
use something that has been used by many others in the past for many purposes 
– purposes that, when considered genealogically, will rarely constitute an 
unbroken, coherent trajectory.350 For Foucault, as has been explained, genealogy 
is a method for revealing the contingent processes through which certain of our 
concepts come to possess a certain authority. What follows from this is not that 
                                            
349 McCarthy, Thomas, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical 
Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991), 43-44. See also Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, Chapter 3: The 
Impurity of Practical Reason.  
350 See Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics, 2: “I will myself have certain views about the political world 
and how it works, how it ideally ought to work, and so on, and these will have an important influence on the 
way I act. Even minimal reflection will suffice to make me aware that I have not myself invented these 
conceptions but have taken them over from various people in my environment, who in turn had them from 
others. When I use ‘undemocratic’ as a reproach, part of the reason I do so is because I have been subjected 
to a barrage of speech and writing about ‘democracy’ and its virtues during all of my conscious life. I do not 
mean that I feel I have been brainwashed; rather I feel that I have been given a good opportunity to develop 
proper views on this topic. I also know, however, that if had lived two hundred years ago, I would almost 
certainly have followed the then virtually universal use of 'democratic' as a term of reproach.” 
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the authority of reason, the normativity of our concepts, is something that should 
be disown, but something that we have reason to recognise as problematic.351 
 
Given this account of “problematisation”, the critical potential of Foucault’s 
method of genealogy follows from its capacity to reveal the authority of reason to 
be the result of complex, historical and contingent processes. Through revealing 
this, Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation affords the resources 
with which we can, potentially, reconfigure the authority of reason. To develop 
this point, I think it is helpful to read Foucault’s method of genealogy as Koopman 
reads it – that is, as having two parts, which I think map onto the negative and 
positive aspects that Foucault attributes to the method of genealogy through his 
reading of Kant. On the one hand, genealogy reveals that the present is always 
contingent. In this respect, the method of genealogy is negative. Starting from the 
present state of some concept construed as authoritative, a genealogy works its 
way backward in time, recounting the contingent processes through which the 
content of that concept was subject to a complex of interpretations.352 On the 
other hand, genealogy reveals how the present is always contingent.353 In this 
                                            
351 See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Culture as Ideal and as Boundary’, in Politics and the Imagination (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 87: “The Nietzschean genealogy is a complex and devious history of 
certain human reactions, which gradually work themselves free from the contexts within which they are 
embedded, and attempt to deny their origin, in order to become normatively absolute. The claim to 
(normative) absoluteness which is built into the usual use of the concept is what is thrown into question by 
the genealogical account: how exactly can a concept with such contingent historical origins make such a 
strong normative claim?” Although I lack the space to address this fully, I think this idea that reason is impure 
could be related, in part, to Rose’s account of “anxiety”. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 90: “‘Anxiety’, a 
psychological concept, is to be explored in relation to ‘the dogma of hereditary sin’, but sin cannot be 
explored psychologically, aesthetically, metaphysically or ethically, nor by any scientific reflection, for it is 
not a state, ‘de potentia’, according to possibility, ‘but de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in actuality] 
it is again and again’.” Rose is here citing parts of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety.  
352 Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’, 12. 
353 See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140. 
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respect, the method of genealogy is positive. Through recounting such contingent 
processes, a genealogy affords a sense of how the content of certain concepts 
have changed, and therefore a sense how they could potentially change again. 
Recognising both of these integrated parts is important because it is on account 
of their integration that Foucault’s practice of genealogy can be read as having a 
critical potential. Koopman writes:     
 
By showing [that and] how the present is contingently constructed, 
Foucault delivered precisely those materials [we] need to reform 
and improve [our] present. This suggests, of course, an 
interpretation of Foucault as a radical reformist rather than a 
revolutionary whose radicalism is merely oppositional. According to 
such an interpretation, problematisation does not so much disrupt 
or denounce the present, as it opens up the present as a problem 





                                            
354 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 143. See also Allen, Amy, ‘The History of Historicity: The Critique of 
Reason in Foucault (and Derrida)’, in Between Foucault and Derrida, edited by Yubraj Aryal, Vernon W. 
Cisney, Nicolae Morar and Christopher Penfield (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 132: “All of 
which suggests that just as Foucault is sceptical of the notion of a Reason in general, he is likewise sceptical 
of the idea that there is a historicity proper to reason in general. The most that he would say is that there is 
a historicity proper to our modern form of rationality – a form which, following Hegel, takes reason to be 
Historical, and history to be rational – and it is precisely the historicity of History that Foucault aims to reveal, 
as part of his critical effort to uncover the contingency of that form of knowledge, thus opening up the 
possibility of moving beyond it.” 
 141 
The aim of this section has been to explicate the critical potential of Foucault’s 
method of genealogy. On the account I have given, which took its focus from 
Rose’s challenge, the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows 
from its capacity to problematise the authority of reason – that is, to reveal both 
that and how the authority of reason is the result of complex, historical and 
contingent processes. To recognise the authority of reason as being always 
problematic is to recognise it as always open to being potentially changed.    
 
2.4. ASSESSING ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF 
GENEALOGY 
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
The aim of this section is to argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is misguided. It is misguided, I will argue, because it acknowledges 
only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy 
reveals the authority of reason to be contingent, and consequently fails to 
acknowledge its critical potential.  
 
Repeating Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy 
 
To repeat, Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is that it is 
critically blind. Central to this challenge is her reading of Foucault’s method of 
genealogy as nihilistic – that is, concerned with undermining the authority of 
reason through revealing it to be contingent. For Rose, it is on account of it being 
nihilistic that Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically blind – critically blind in 
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the sense that it is blind to the ways in which it remains implicated in the 
oppositions it claims to reject. 
 
Assessing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy 
  
Given the above account of Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation, 
Rose’s challenge is misguided, I think, because it acknowledges only one of the 
two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the 
authority of reason to be contingent. To repeat, Foucault’s method of 
genealogical problematisation involves revealing both that and how the authority 
of reason is contingent. These two aspects are integrated in that the latter is 
informed by the former, and the former is motivated by the latter. In other words, 
the further we go back into the history of a concept, the greater our sense of how 
the content of that concept has changed, and, therefore, the greater our sense of 
how it could potentially change again in the future. In reading Foucault’s method 
of genealogy as nihilistic, Rose is, I think, acknowledging only the former of these 
two aspects – that is, the negative aspect. If Foucault’s method of genealogy 
were simply concerned with revealing that the authority of reason is contingent, 
then there would be at least room for reading it as nihilistic in the way that Rose 
does. For if this were the case, it would not be clear how the results of 
genealogical analyses could contribute towards the positive, constructive work in 
which we are concerned with the potential for restructuring the present structures 
of reason.  However, as I explained above, it is not the case that Foucault’s 
method of genealogy is simply concerned with revealing that the authority of 
reason is contingent – it is also concerned with revealing how it is contingent. It 
is for this reason, therefore, that I take Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
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genealogy to be misguided. Rose acknowledges only one of the two aspects that 
comprise Foucault’s method of genealogy, and consequently misses its critical 
potential. Additionally, since these aspects are integrated, Rose misrepresents 
the aspect that she does acknowledge.355       
 
Rose’s challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so 
 
Having now argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is 
misguided, I think it is important to recognise the respect in which Rose’s 
challenge is still resourceful. In spite of it being misguided, Rose’s challenge is 
still resourceful, I think, because it encourages a subtler statement of Foucault’s 
method of genealogy.356 The distinction between the respects in which Foucault’s 
method of genealogy reveals that and how the authority of reason is contingent 
is subtle, but crucial – crucial because it is on account of the integration of these 
two aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as having a critical 
potential.  
 
In the following chapter, I will argue that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear, 
and argue that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help clarify this part. That 
Foucault’s method of genealogy can do this is a consequence of its critical 
                                            
355 See also Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, 31: “That Foucault sought to think beyond the limits of the 
present attests to his desire to critique the juridical as such. But to critique the juridical is not to be 
automatically antijuridical and certainly not to be nihilistic. For similar reasons, I would question Rose's 
reading of Foucault's relationship to Nietzsche.” Although I lack the space to develop this point, I would say, 
if only as a suggestion, that the misguidedness of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is, 
in part, a consequence of her overstatement of the relationship between the ways in which Nietzsche and 
Foucault construe “genealogy” – both as a something done and as something revealed. See Dialectic of 
Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.    
356 I am not claiming that only Rose’s challenge is the only challenge that does this. 
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potential – a critical potential that I have argued, in this chapter, follows from its 
capacity to problematise the authority of reason. Accordingly, Rose’s challenge 
is additionally (albeit indirectly) resourceful in that the subtler statement of 
Foucault’s method of genealogy that it encourages is also the statement that I 





The aim of this section has been to argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s 
method of genealogy is misguided. It is misguided, I have argued, because it 
acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method 
of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent, and consequently 




What have I argued in this chapter? 
 
In this chapter I have argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is misguided. Rose challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy for 
being critically blind, and does so because she reads it as nihilistic – that is, as 
being concerned exclusively with undermining the authority of reason through 
revealing it to be contingent. This challenge is misguided, I have argued, because 
it acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s 
method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent. On the 
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account I have given, Foucault’s practice of genealogy is, specifically, a practice 
of problematisation – that is, a practice through which we come to recognise both 
that and how the authority of reason is contingent. It is from the integration of 
these two respects that the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy 
follows: through revealing that the authority of reason is contingent, it reveals how 
it has changed, and how it could potentially be changed. Rose’s challenge, 
through acknowledging only one of these two integrated respects, fails to 




















ON READING ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT 
CONSTRUCTIVELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH 







In this chapter I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation can help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project that is unclear. 
As was explained in chapter one, Rose’s critical project involves a concern with 
avoiding the blindness, and consequent ignorance, of Kant’s critical project. As 
will be explained in this chapter, it is on account of this concern that Rose turns 
to Hegel – that is, Rose reads Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism 
as affording an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach. According 
to this reading, criticism is required, in part, to yield the experience of identity and 
non-identity. While Rose is clear about this requirement, she is largely unclear 
about how criticism can achieve it. It is, I will argue, this pivotal, but unclear, part 
of Rose’s critical project that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation 
serves to clarify. It does this through affording a way of recognising both that the 
sense of universality that certain concepts come to possess is contingent, and 
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that this contingency does not undermine such universality. Rather, it shows that 
such universality is always problematic – that is, something that can be, on 
account of its actual past and possible future, continually called into question and 
potentially reconfigured. In other words, I will argue that Foucault’s method of 
genealogical problematisation yields the experience of identity and non-identity 
in the way required, but left unclear, by Rose’s critical project. 
 
The structure of the argument 
 
The argument of this chapter will consist of two sections. First, I will argue that 
Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. This argument will involve me 
accounting for Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism 
as an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach. According to this 
account, Rose’s critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience 
of identity and non-identity. Although Rose is clear about this requirement, she 
is, I will argue, unclear about how criticism can achieve this requirement. Second, 
I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can serve to 




Before beginning the first of these two sections, I need to make two qualifications 
about the content of this chapter. First, as was the case within my account of 
Rose’s reading of Kant, within my account of Rose’s reading of Hegel I will not 
be concerned, at least not directly, with comparing this reading with the ways in 
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which others have read Hegel.357 Second, my account of Rose’s reading of Hegel 
will be partial – partial in the sense that I will be focusing on Rose’s reading of 
Hegel’s idea of phenomenology. While Hegel’s idea of phenomenology 
constitutes a pivotal part within Rose’s critical project, it remains only a part of 
Rose’s broader speculative exposition of Hegel.358  
 
3.2. IS ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT UNCLEAR? 
 
What is the aim of this section? 
 
The aim of this section is to argue that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. 
The part in question relates to Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological 
approach to criticism as an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental 
approach to criticism. According to this reading, criticism is required to yield the 
experience of identity and non-identity. While Rose is clear about this 
requirement, she is, I will argue, unclear about how criticism can achieve this 
requirement.   
 
How has Rose’s reading of Hegel been explicated within the secondary 
literature?  
 
Within the secondary literature on Rose, most commentators, when accounting 
for her reading of Hegel, have been concerned with explaining and applying her 
                                            
357 To date, the best account of how Rose’s reading of Hegel compares with the way others have read Hegel 
is given by Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose. See also Brower Latz, Andrew, ‘Gillian Rose 
and Social Theory’, Telos 173 (2015), 37-54.   
358 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48. 
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“speculative exposition of Hegel”.359 For these commentators, Rose’s reading of 
Hegel results in a “speculative philosophy” that affords, among other things, a 
valuable way of comprehending, and consequently working through, the 
antinomies of social-political realities.360 For example, Andrew Brower Latz 
concludes his comprehensive, critical and constructive account of Rose’s reading 
of Hegel as follows: 
 
Rose’s [. . .] Hegelian speculative philosophy offers a better 
approach to social theory than the classical and early Frankfurt 
sociological traditions. Rose’s main criticism was of their neo-
Kantian or transcendental structure, whereby one term becomes 
the precondition for all others but thereby remains unknowable and 
unexplainable, affecting their judgments about society. 
Transcendental social theory is less able than speculative social 
theory to account for its own social determinations. Hegel’s 
speculative phenomenology avoids this problem by historical-
phenomenological knowing and a logic that articulates the structure 
of that knowing in a totality. The Phenomenology provides the 
motivation and some justification for the categorial structures 
                                            
359 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface for 1995 reprint. See also Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project 
of a Critical Marxism’, 28-29: “Rose is a philosophical intriguer. She is often referred to as a ‘Hegelian’, but 
this appellation is somewhat misleading. Rose’s ‘Hegel’ owes as much to Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno as 
it does to the historical Hegel. And yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the hermeneutical licence Rose 
adopts towards Hegel’s texts betokens a lack of method on her part; on the contrary, as we shall see, the 
philosophical style and terms of her presentation are progressively grounded in the course of the work itself.” 
360 See e.g. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, ‘Gillian Rose and Social Theory’; Hammond, 
Philosophy and the Facetious Style; Schick, A Good Enough Justice, Trauma and the Ethical in International 
Relations, Chapter 4: Gillian Rose: From Dialectical to Speculative Thought, Chapter 5: Acting Out and 
Working Through: Trauma and the International; Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’. See also 
Tubbs, Nigel, ‘Gillian Rose and Education’, Telos 173 (2015), 125-143. 
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explored in the Logic; even if the Logic fails as a complete system 
it nevertheless has much to teach us about how reason works. 
Rose’s social philosophy is thus its own metaphilosophy, which 
incorporates the meta-level into the substantive level of knowing, 
by considering its own logical and social preconditions. The use of 
speculative propositions brings into view the diremptions of society 
and theory so they can be speculatively handled. It relates 
philosophical claims about the nature of reason, phenomenology 
and metatheory, with sociological claims about society as 
permanently dirempted in various fundamental ways. Awareness of 
these features of philosophy and society are, for Rose, components 
of practical wisdom in modern society.361  
 
I cite this passage at length centrally because it serves to indicate the partiality of 
my own account. As this passage makes explicit, much can be read into Rose’s 
reading of Hegel. My own account of this reading will be partial in the sense that 
I will be focusing on a part of this reading – a part that I will now explain.      
 
How will I explicate Rose’s reading of Hegel?  
 
Within my own account of Rose’s reading of Hegel, my concern will be different 
from, and more modest than, the concern described above. My concern will be 
with a part of Rose’s speculative exposition of Hegel – that is, the part in which 
Rose reads Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism as yielding the 
                                            
361 Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 99-100.  
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experience of identity and non-identity.362 To repeat, I am concerned with this 
part specifically because it is this part that I think is unclear, and which can be 
made clearer on account of Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. 
Accordingly, the difference and modesty (or partiality) of my account, at least 
when considered relative to the accounts of other commentators, is a 
consequence of the overarching aim of this thesis – that is, to argue that Rose’s 
critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method 
of genealogical problematisation. I will begin this account by explaining the 
respect in which Rose reads Hegel as affording an alternative to Kant’s 
transcendental approach to criticism. 
 
Rose’s reading of Hegel as an alternative to Kant 
 
It is within the work of Hegel that Rose, on her account, finds a way of avoiding 
the critical blindness, and consequent ignorance, that she, as was explained 
above, takes to be the result of Kant’s critical project. In other words, Rose reads 
Hegel as affording an alternative approach to criticism. Such an approach is 
afforded by what Rose takes to be one of the central ideas within the work of 
Hegel – that is, unification of theoretical and practical reason. Rose writes:    
 
Hegel put a trinity of ideas in place of Kant’s idea of transcendental 
method: the idea of phenomenology, the idea of absolute ethical 
life (absolute Sittlichkeit), and the idea of a logic. The idea of 
phenomenology can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s theoretical 
quaestio quid juris [the question of law], while the idea of absolute 
                                            
362 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52. 
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ethical life can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s justification of 
moral judgements. This, however, would be to concede the Kantian 
dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason. The idea of all 
Hegel’s thought is to unify theoretical and practical reason. In his 
Logic, as in all his works, the unification is achieved by a 
phenomenology and the idea of absolute ethical life.363 
 
What, for Rose, is this unification of theoretical and practical reason? To answer 
this question, it is helpful to first think about what, for Rose, it is for theoretical 
and practical reason to be separated. One way of thinking about this is to think 
of this separation as being a consequence of the rigorous distinction Kant makes 
between the empirical and the transcendental.364 As was explained above, Kant’s 
rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental implies an 
asymmetrical relationship between particulars and universals – asymmetrical in 
the sense that the particulars of experience play no part in determining the 
lawfulness / authority of the concepts that capture these particulars. Rather, to 
practice criticism by way of Kant’s transcendental method is to determine the 
lawfulness (i.e. the necessity and the universality) of concepts through 
determining that they are the conditions of the possibility of experience. On this 
account, theoretical and practical reason are separate in that the processes 
through which they are shown to be lawful are distinct. Consequently, for Kant, 
there are two “courts” (or “tribunals”) of reason: that of theoretical reason 
responsible for adjudicating empirical experience in general, and of the natural 
                                            
363 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48. As I mentioned above, out this “trinity of ideas” my concern is with 
Rose’s reading of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology.  
364 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 3.  
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sciences, and that concerned with pronouncing the moral verdict of pure practical 
reason.  
 
Given this way of explaining how the separation between theoretical and practical 
reason results from Kant’s critical project, Rose’s reading of Hegel as affording a 
way of unifying theoretical and practical reason can be explained as follows.365 In 
contrast with Kant’s critical project, Rose reads Hegel’s critical project as implying 
a relationship between particulars and universals that is symmetrical – 
symmetrical in the sense that the authority of reason is determined through a 
experiential reciprocity between particulars and universals.366 On this account, 
just as universals can have authority over particulars, particulars can have 
authority over universals. To say the former is to say that our concepts are 
capable of capturing the particulars of experience. To say the latter is to say that 
the particulars of experience are capable of not cooperating with the concepts we 
use to capture them – that is, capable of revealing our concepts to be mis-
conceived, and demanding thereby that they be re-conceived.367 Accordingly, the 
                                            
365 To repeat, I am here concerned with explaining a part of Rose’s critical project. For a fuller account, see 
Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 209-214. 
366 In using the terminology of “symmetry” and “asymmetry” to capture this aspect of Rose’s reading of Hegel, 
I am following, in part, the work of Robert Brandom. See esp. Brandom, Robert, Reason in Philosophy, 
Chapter 2: Autonomy, Community, and Freedom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Chapter 6: Holism and 
Idealism in Hegel's Phenomenology, Chapter 7: Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism. For more on 
this aspect, and the arguments that surround this aspect, of Hegel’s work see e.g. Longuenesse, Béatrice, 
Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics, translated by Nicole J. Simek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), Chapter 2: Twists and Turns of Hegel’s Contradiction; Sedgwick, Sally, Hegel's Critique of Kant: From 
Dichotomy to Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapter 2: Organic Unity as the “True Unity” 
of the Intuitive Intellect.  
367 What is here in question is the experience of “contradiction” – an experience in which an attempt at using 
a concept seems, as Peter Steinberger writes, “somehow not to work, and it is in such circumstances that 
we come to investigate – sometimes philosophically – our conceptual practices. Specifically, we often 
encounter in the world some reason for believing that a particular “structure of conceptualisation” is not quite 
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reciprocity between particulars and universals is one that revolves around the 
successes and failures of conceptuality. It is for this reason that Rose refers to 
the relationship between particulars and universals as a struggle – a struggle in 
which theoretical and practical reason are unified and undone (or broken) through 
the experience of the difficulty of reason.368 
 
Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism 
 
                                            
right. In the light of such an encounter, we may thus be led to revise the structure somehow [. . .] so that this 
sense of inadequacy can be dispelled.” (Logic and Politics: Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 70) 
368 Accordingly, the “reciprocity” between universals and particulars should not be construed as connoting, 
for example, a movement that is “easy”. As will be explained, for Rose, the reciprocity that I am here 
describing – which is the movement of phenomenology – is a “gamble” (Hegel Contra Sociology, 168). A 
“gamble” that is, for Rose, less tragic than it is comic. See ‘The Comedy of Hegel’, 72: “[F]irst, spirit in the 
Phenomenology means the drama of misrecognition which ensues at every stage and transition of the work 
– a ceaseless comedy, according to which our aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other, and 
provoke yet another revised aim, action and discordant outcome. Secondly. reason, therefore, is comic, full 
of surprises, of unanticipated happenings. so that comprehension is always provisional and preliminary. This 
is the meaning of Bildung, of formation or education, which is intrinsic to the phenomenological process. 
Thirdly, the law is no longer that of Greek ethical life; it is no longer tragic.” See also Love’s Work, 134-135: 
“The comical as such implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised altogether 
above his own inner contradiction and not bitter or miserable in it at all; this is the bliss and ease of a man 
who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustrations of his aims and achievements.” This is Hegel’s version 
of the divine comedy. [See Hegel, G. W. F., Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II, translated by T. M. 
Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1200] No human being possesses sureness of self: this can 
only mean being bounded and unbounded, selved and unselved, “sure” only of this untiring exercise. Then, 
this sureness of self, which is ready to be unsure, makes the laughter at the mismatch between aim and 
achievement comic, not cynical; holy, not demonic.” For more on the relationship between comedy and 
reason see Williams, ‘“The Sadness of the King”’. Accordingly, in using “reciprocity” here I am not attributing 
to Rose a position like that advocated by Rawls. See his “criterion of reciprocity” in Political Liberalism, which 
he clarifies (again on the idealised assumption of people are inherently “reasonable”) as a criterion for 
cooperation (see esp. §1.2). Whereas Rawls, arguably, works with an idealised account of reason – that is, 
an account of reason that only works in idealised circumstances – Rose works with a realistic account of 
reason – that is, an account of reason riddled with errors, mistakes, failures, tragedies, injustices, successes, 
laughter, good enough justices.  
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For Rose, this struggle between particulars and universals – a struggle in which 
the authority of reason is configured and reconfigured369 – demands criticism. For 
criticism is what reveals particulars and universals to be something with which 
we can struggle. In other words, for Rose, the aim of criticism is to continually call 
into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the 
resources for reconfiguring this authority. This is the aim of criticism as Rose 
construes it. What is now in question is how she thinks criticism achieves this 
aim. 
 
For Rose, this aim is achieved by way of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to 
criticism.370 On Rose’s account, Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism 
contrasts with Kant’s transcendental approach centrally through resisting Kant’s 
“method” – a method that implies Kant’s rigorous distinction between the 
empirical and the transcendental, and which, as has been explained, leaves 
criticism blind to the actual relationship between universals and particulars. For 
Rose: 
 
There can be no question of changing from Kant’s method to a 
different method, for all ‘method’, by definition, imposes a schema 
                                            
369 See also Bernstein, Adorno, 132: “The condition of being beyond dispute is achievable only by dissolving 
the relation between experience and reason whose synthesis alone can account for the authority of reason.” 
370 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48. Rose continues to make reference to Hegel’s idea of 
phenomenology throughout her subsequent works. See e.g. Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, 208-212; The Broken 
Middle, a work that has been described as a “phenomenology” (see Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life, 8, 
cited above (n104)); ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’; Mourning Becomes the Law, 13-14; ‘The comedy of Hegel and the 
Trauerspiel of Modem Philosophy’.  
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on its object, by making the assumptions that it is external to its 
object and not defining it.371  
 
Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism, as read by Rose, resists Kant’s 
method by shifting the part played by method from criticism to that which is being 
criticised.372 Rose writes:       
 
A phenomenology thus presents the forms of knowledge according 
to their own methodological standards as they have occurred, or, 
as they appear [. . .], and it presents the realm of appearance as 
defined by limited forms of consciousness.373 
 
On this account, it can be said that Rose reads Hegel’s idea of phenomenology 
as affording a form of criticism that is immanent as opposed to being 
transcendent.374 
                                            
371 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48-49. See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §51: “This method, which 
consists in taking the pair of determinations out of that universal schema and then plastering them onto 
everything in heaven and earth, onto all the natural and spiritual shapes and then organising everything in 
this manner, produces nothing less than a “crystal clear report on the organism of the universe.” This “report” 
is like a tabular chart, which is itself a little bit like a skeleton with small bits of paper stuck all over it, or 
maybe a bit like the rows of sealed and labelled boxes in a grocer’s stall. Either of these makes just as much 
sense as the other, and, as in the former case, where there are only bones with the flesh and blood stripped 
off of them, and as in the latter case, where something equally lifeless has been hidden away in those boxes, 
in this “report,” the living essence of what is at stake has been omitted or concealed.” In other words, such 
a method (which can be specified as Kant’s “method”, although Hegel does not specify it as such) leaves its 
object lifeless. 
372 Or, as Finlayson will state it: “What makes a criticism immanent is that the standard of criticism belongs 
to or inheres in (in a suitably specified sense) the object of criticism.” (‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of 
Immanent Criticism’, 1144-1145)   
373 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48-49.  
374 To be sure, Rose never explicitly explicates her reading as such. However, she does so implicitly 
throughout her reading of Hegel. See esp. Hegel Contra Sociology, 159: “The Phenomenology does not 
consist solely of the presentation of the experiences of natural consciousness, but also of the science of that 
 157 
 
What is it to criticise something immanently? Or, more specifically, what is it to 
read Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording a form of immanent critique?  
There are a number of ways in which this question can be answered, and a 
number of ways in which the answers to this question can prove, and have 
proven, contentious.375 For the purposes of understanding how such a form of 
criticism is consistent with Rose’s critical project – that is, conducive to the 
struggle between particulars and universals – I think it is helpful to understand 
                                            
experience. It consists both of a presentation of the contradictions of natural consciousness and a doctrine 
of that consciousness. This is the distinction between what is experienced by consciousness, ‘für es’, and 
what is experienced by us, ‘für uns’. At the end of the Introduction a new object arises ‘for us, behind its 
[natural consciousness’] back, as it were’. To natural consciousness this knowledge would appear as a ‘loss 
of itself’. A negative experience for natural consciousness is a positive result for us, for natural 
consciousness has been presented as phenomenal knowledge. Natural consciousness does not know itself 
to be knowledge, but it experiences the contradiction between its definition and its real existence. It thus 
contains its own criterion of awareness, the precondition of immanent change. But this change is only a 
change in perspective and results in further contradictions. Natural consciousness changes its definition of 
itself and of its existence, but this change is itself determined. It does not abolish the determination of 
consciousness by substance as such, a consciousness which persists as a natural consciousness in relation 
to the substance which determines it.” See also Brower Latz, ‘Gillian Rose and Social Theory’, 37-54, The 
Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 56: “Rose’s speculative social theory proceeds somewhat like Hegel’s 
Phenomenology: at once the immanent critique of current social forms and the historical-philosophical 
reconstruction of past forms: beginning in the middle.” Osborne, Peter, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the 
Critique of Reason and Society’, Radical Philosophy 32 (1982), 14; Schick, A Good Enough justice, 30. 
375 Contentious, in part, because Hegel never used the term “immanent criticism”. See Finlayson, ‘Hegel, 
Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1145: “It is striking, given how widely shared the story of its 
Hegelian origins is, that the term ‘immanent criticism’ is nowhere to be found in Hegel’s corpus (or Marx’s 
come to that). Hegel was methodologically self-aware, and took great care with his 
philosophical terminology. Not only did he not call his own philosophy or philosophical method ‘immanent 
criticism,’ he did not and would not call any of his mature philosophies works of ‘criticism’.” See also de Boer, 
‘Hegel’s Conception of Immanent Critique’, 83. For readings of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording 
a form of immanent criticism, see e.g. Rosen, Michael, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticisms (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 23-54; Smith, Steven B., Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism Rights in Context 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 169-175; Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, Chapter 1: 
The Origins of Immanent Critique. See also Becker, ‘On Immanent Critique in Hegel’s Phenomenology’, 1–
23. 
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such a form of criticism as committed to a form of “realism”.376 As was mentioned 
above, for Rose, an immanent approach to criticism involves criticising something 
according to its own methodological standards. When that “something” is reason 
itself, this approach can be restated as one in which concepts are criticised 
according to how they are actually used as reasons for thinking and acting within 
actual contexts. In other words, to immanently criticise a concept is, broadly 
speaking, to begin by attending to the use of that concept, not according to some 
external standard for how that concept should be used, but according to the 
present reality of its use – a reality in which the use of a concept will be bound up 
within a specific time and a place, and within specific institutions.377 For Rose, 
approaching conceptuality / rationality in this immanent / realistic way is what 
reveals the dynamic processes through which the use of concepts is experienced 
as entailing both successes and failures. Accordingly, for Rose, to criticise a 
concept immanently, is to yield the experience of both its successes and failures. 
 
In the context of Rose’s reading of Hegel, what has here been stated as the 
experience of the successes and failures of conceptuality, is stated as the 
experience of identity and non-identity. Rose writes: 
 
Only when the lack of identity between subject and predicate has 
been experienced, can their identity be grasped. ‘Lack of identity’ 
does not have the formal meaning that subject and predicate must 
be different from each other in order to be related. It means that the 
                                            
376 See Bernstein, ‘A Work of Hard Love’; Milbank, ‘Obituary’. See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy 
of Gillian Rose, 200-203.  
377 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 5; Mourning Becomes the Law, 6-7.  
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proposition which we have affirmed, or the concept we have 
devised of the nature of an object, fails to correspond to the state 
of affairs or object which we have also defined as the state of affairs 
or object to which it should correspond. This experience of lack of 
identity which natural consciousness undergoes is the basis for 
reading propositions as speculative identities.378  
 
In the light of this passage, Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological / 
immanent approach to criticism can be construed as having the central aim of 
yielding the experience of identity and non-identity – where that means, 
specifically, an experience in which a concept is revealed as both succeeding 
and failing to correspond to the object / objects to which it should correspond. I 
emphasise Rose’s use of the word “should” because it points to the importance 
of this experience, and therefore the importance of criticism. In the context of 
Rose’s critical project, the experience of identity and non-identity is important 
because it is this experience that affords the resources for potential “re-
cognition”379 – that is, the process through which a concept is re-conceived to 
bring it closer to corresponding with the object / objects to which it should 
correspond.380 In turn, and crucially for Rose’s critical project, the experience of 
identity and non-identity yields the ability to think by way of “speculative identities” 
                                            
378 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52; see also 55-63, 63-77, 78-84; Dialectic of Nihilism, 5, 7; ‘From 
Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’.  
379 See esp. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 64, 76-77.  
380 For a constructive account of Rose’s concept of “re-cognition” see esp. Schick, ‘Re-cognizing 
Recognition’. 
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– identities that are, in Rose’s words, “uncertain and problematic, gradually 
acquiring meaning as the result of a series of contradictory experiences.”381     
 
Is Rose’s critical project unclear? 
 
With this reference to Rose’s use of the word “should” it is necessary to return to 
the worry referenced above – that is, the worry that Rose’s critical project is, in 
part, implicated in the problem of normativity.382 To repeat, this problem concerns 
the confusions that can arise when normative claims are made without the 
foundations to do so, at least not justifiably. Within this thesis I have been arguing 
that, for Rose, the aim of criticism is not to yield normative conclusions, but to call 
normativity into question – that is, render the relationship between theory and 
praxis equivocal / problematic. This is what it means to say that, for Rose, 
criticism yields an aporia, a non-foundational account of reason. However, if this 
is the aim of criticism, is Rose justified in claiming that anything should follow from 
this form of criticism? For example, is Rose justified in claiming that when we 
                                            
381 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52. Gorman helpfully restates this aspect of Rose reading of Hegel as 
follows: “A ‘speculative proposition’ [or the act of thinking by way of “speculative identities”] denotes both the 
identity and the lack of identity between subject and predicate. It is the experience of the lack of identity 
between what the subject takes the predicate term or object to be and what the object is in-itself that enforces 
the re-cognition of the object. The re-cognition of the object in turn brings about the de-position of the subject, 
and the transition to a new subject–object configuration, or another form of relative recognition.” (‘Gillian 
Rose and the project of a Critical Marxism’, 29)    
382 An additional problem could be stated in terms of Rose’s reliance on the idea (or belief) that the 
experience of contradiction will inevitably yield change or transformation. See Geuss, Philosophy and Real 
Politics, 3-4: “Not all contradictions resolve into temporal change of belief or desire. Any attempt to think 
seriously about the relation between politics and ethics must remain cognitively sensitive to the fact that 
people’s beliefs, values, desires, moral conceptions, etc., are usually half-baked (in every sense), are almost 
certain to be both indeterminate and, to the extent to which they are determinate, grossly inconsistent in any 
but the most local, highly formalised contexts, and are constantly changing. None of this implies that it might 
not be of the utmost importance to aspire to ensure relative stability and consistency in certain limited 
domains.” 
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come to recognise that a concept misconceives its object / objects, we should 
thereby reconceive that concept? If not, does Rose’s practice of criticism 
preclude the possibility of transforming, reconfiguring the authority of reason. As 
I understand it, and as I will explain, this worry (i.e. the worry that Rose’s critical 
project is without critical potential383) is a consequence of part of Rose’s critical 
project being unclear – specifically, the part in which Rose contends that a 
phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-
identity. To develop this worry, I will return to the challenge raised by Gorman.      
 
As I mentioned briefly above, this worry is one partially addressed by Anthony 
Gorman. For Gorman, the worry is that Rose’s critical project, on account of the 
“aporetic stance” that it yields, seems to preclude “formative work”.384 Gorman 
frames this argument by way of a split that he sees within Rose’s oeuvre. He 
writes: “Rose represents her oeuvre as a unified philosophical project centred 
around her three main texts: Hegel contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and 
The Broken Middle. However, this claim does not withstand critical examination. 
The exposition of speculative experience in the late works diverges markedly 
from the mode of presentation adopted in the ‘first phase’ of her output.”385 
According to Gorman’s critical examination: “In Hegel contra Sociology, Rose 
presents a phenomenological account of the relation between ‘substance’ 
(objective ethical life) and subjectivity in which the possibilities of self-
transformation are predicated upon overcoming the limitations and constraints 
placed on society by the continued domination of bourgeois law and private 
                                            
383 A worry advanced by Osborne (in ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’) 
and Gorman (in ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’), albeit by different means. 
384 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35. 
385 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 25. 
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property. In the late works, this ‘objective’ treatment of subjectivity is displaced 
by a contrary emphasis on faith, inwardness and an ethic of singularity. While this 
ethic continues to demand an engagement with the political, the terms of this 
engagement are no longer predicated upon a politics of revolutionary 
transformation.”386  
 
For Gorman, therefore, Rose’s work does not form a unified whole. Rather, it 
“comprises two halves that do not add up.”387 They do not add up, on Gorman’s 
account, because “The Broken Middle represents a fundamental departure from 
the form of speculative exposition presented in Hegel Contra Sociology. The 
difference is this: in Hegel Contra Sociology, the antinomies of sociological 
reason are comprehended and criticised from the standpoint of the universal (‘the 
Absolute’) which, though not ‘posited’ or ‘pre-judged’, is nonetheless understood 
to be latent or implicit within the antinomies themselves. In The Broken Middle, 
on the other hand, the antinomies of theological reason are comprehended from 
the standpoint of a particular culture which is taken to stand for or point towards 
the universal.”388 In other words, Gorman reads Rose’s work as involving a 
reorientation in which the relation to the universal is relativised. It is on the basis 
of this relativisation that, he argues, Rose’s later work undermines (or 
impedes389) the critical potential of her earlier work – a consequence that leaves 
                                            
386 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 25. 
387 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35. 
388 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 54. Gorman continues: “In her late authorship Rose speaks 
entirely from within the crisis of modern subjectivity. She contends that the diremption between the universal 
and the particular must be comprehended, lived and transformed by the single individual, who is willing to 
stake and risk her identity and to make it possible for others to risk theirs, while at the same time eschewing 
all dogmatic and illusory certainties.” (54) 
389 For Gorman, his critical assessment notwithstanding, Rose’s critical project is not a lost cause. See 
Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35: “The challenge that Rose has left 
us with, then, is to find a way of integrating the two phases of her authorship. It is not sufficient to recover 
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her critical project closer to the critical projects of “postmodernity” that she 
continually challenged. “By relativising the relation to the universal to the fate of 
a particular culture and of a single individual within that culture, she is unable to 
prevent her own position from being assimilated to the perspectivist, relativist and 
agonal politics of postmodernism against which she herself so relentlessly and 
vociferously protests.”390 
 
In short, Gorman’s argument involves reading Rose’s work as comprising two 
halves. The first half is oriented by Rose’s concern with thinking the particular 
from the standpoint of the universal. The second half is oriented by her concern 
with thinking the universal from the standpoint of the particular. For Gorman, 
whereas the first half has a critical potential to transform our social-political 
relations, the second half does not. Within the second half of her work “Rose 
demands that we work with this aporia [between universality and particularity] 
rather than seek to resolve it. But what if the aporetic stance itself precludes 
formative work?”391  
 
                                            
the lost trajectory of her thought; we must also seek to complete it.” However, see Hammond, Philosophy 
and the Facetious Style, 172: “Gorman risks recreating the terror that Rose says Marxism recreates, and 
which she argues Hegel acknowledges, since his separation of Rose's work into two phases is 
methodological. It is, however, purposely and necessarily staged. Gorman's aim is “to complete” the “lost 
trajectory” of Rose's authorship, or otherwise, to understand it. To simply argue that Gorman repeats the 
mistakes that a left wing reading of Hegel makes, therefore, is to concede the opposition between a left and 
right wing reading of Hegel's thought, when Gorman, like Rose before him, acknowledges, reinforces and 
undermines it too. Thus it is also argued that the theologian Rowan Williams does not so much repeat the 
mistakes that this opposition between a left and right wing reading of Hegel repeats as it argues that he 
employs the very form of style that Rose is also forced to employ.”   
390 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 55. See also Milbank, ‘On the Paraethical’, 78: “Yet we have 
already seen that the transcendental horizon of death remained for her the non-ethical precondition of the 
ethical as both pagan and heroic, and equally (as today in the case of Žižek), her accurate exposition of 
Hegel appears uncannily close to the very nihilism that she refuses.” 
391 Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35. 
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As I mentioned above, I think that Gorman’s challenge is misguided.392 It is 
misguided centrally because it fails to recognise that the aim of criticism, as Rose 
construes it, is to yield an aporia – an aporia that implicates both of the 
standpoints that he sees as separate. It is, in other words, the aporia of 
recognising that reason is always both unavoidable and partial – that is, non-
foundational. To recognise this is to recognise both that the universality of our 
concepts can succeed in capturing the particulars of experience, and that the 
particulars of experience can prove recalcitrant towards the universality of our 
concepts, and thereby encourage the transformation of such universality. 
 
That said, I also think that Gorman’s challenge is resourceful. It is resourceful 
because it points to a part of Rose’s critical project that is unclear, and which 
needs to be made clearer in order to keep its critical potential intact. The part in 
question concerns Rose’s contention that a phenomenological approach to 
criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity. Does Rose think that 
this experience follows necessarily from criticism? In other words, does she think 
that, providing we attend to the ways in which we actually use concepts as 
reasons for thinking and acting within certain contexts, we will necessarily come 
to recognise the respects in which these concepts simultaneously succeed and 
fail?  
 
Within the secondary literature on Rose, some commentators seem to think that 
it will follow necessarily. For example, Rowan Williams writes:  
 
                                            
392 See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 13-14, 57-58; Hammond, Philosophy and 
the Facetious Style, Chapter 4: The Facetious Style.  
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That we misrecognise the character of thinking by entertaining the 
deliverances of natural consciousness is all-important: entertain the 
particular in its strangeness, and out of that will, properly, come the 
speculative recognition of the unsustainable character of the 
‘natural’. The thinking subject over against the object thought 
succumbs to the contradictions of this opposition.393  
 
With respect to this passage, my question is: What is it to “entertain the particular 
in its strangeness”? If it is to recognise the ways in which the particulars of 
experience and particular experiences can prove recalcitrant within our attempts 
at capturing them with our concepts, then what prevents this recognition from 
remaining at, what Rose calls, the “negative stage of reason”394 – that is, the 
                                            
393 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 10. See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian 
Rose, 45: “It is by attention to particulars, beginning with immanent analysis and including ever deepening 
or widening awareness of determination, that Rose’s Hegelianism avoids the crude determinism of vaguely 
referring to society or capitalism (etc.) to explain phenomena.” 
394 This is a part of Rose’s criticism of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. See Rose, ‘From Speculative to 
Dialectical Thinking’, 61: “Adorno, true to Hegel’s distinction [see Hegel, G. W. F., The Letters, trans. Clark 
Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 275-282], confines himself to 
‘dialectic’, which is the second, negative stage of reason. [. . .] In passage after passage of Negative 
Dialectics Adorno represents Hegel in terms of oppositions – between individual and ideal, or between 
particular and universal – which Hegel is alleged to have invariably reconciled in favour of the latter term of 
the opposition against the former [. . .].” However, Rose continues, “[w]hile claiming that Hegel is ‘siding with 
the universal’, Adorno does not relate these oppositions to each other as they come to light in a dynamic 
historical development but argues that they are frozen [. . .]. He thereby preserves them under the spell and 
brings mediation to a standstill.” (61-62) In other words, for Rose, Adorno fails to recognise that the 
oppositions (or antinomies) between our concepts and their objects gesture towards “speculative identities” 
– that is, identities that acquire their content through the work of re-cognition. In his review of Negative 
Dialectics, Geuss alludes to a comparable complaint made by Walter Benjamin: “Adorno's early mentor, 
Walter Benjamin, once wrote: “Alle entscheidenden Schläge werden mit der linken Hand geführt werden.” 
Negative Dialectics shows that philosophically Adorno has no right hand.” (Geuss, Raymond, ‘Review of 
Negative Dialectics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 72.6 (1975), 175) For more on the part played by “negativity” 
within Adorno’s work see also Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘On Not Being Silent in the Darkness: Adorno's 
Singular Apophaticism’, The Harvard Theological Review, 105.1 (2012), 19-21.  
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stage in which we, with reason, “recognise that we have erred”?395 In the context 
of Rose’s critical project, while such negativity, or the recognition of non-identity 
is integral to criticism, it always risks bringing criticism “to a standstill”396 – by 
which she means, it always risks leaving criticism one-sided, and thereby without 
the potential to afford the resources for potentially transforming / reconfiguring 
what is being criticised.397 For Rose, it is on account of this risk that criticism 
cannot simply be negative, but must also be positive – positive in the sense that 
this potential for transformation / reconfiguration is retained. It is these two 
aspects of criticism that Rose is addressing when she contends that a 
phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-
identity.    
 
However, this is to return to a variant of the question asked above: How does 
Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism yield the experience of identity 
and non-identity? While it is clear that Rose’s critical project requires this, I do not 
think that it offers a clear answer to this question – which is to say, I take this 
pivotal part of Rose’s critical project to be unclear, and, because it is pivotal, in 
need of being made clearer. In the following section I will argue that this unclear 
part of Rose’s critical project can be made clearer by way of Foucault’s method 
of genealogical problematisation. Before turning to make this argument, it is 
necessary to address two possible objections to what I have here claimed against 
Rose.  
                                            
395 See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §256. For Rose’s uses of this citation see Hegel Contra Sociology, 
143 and The Broken Middle, 66.  
396 Rose, ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’, 62. 




The first possible objection runs as follows. I have claimed that Rose’s critical 
project is, in part, unclear. The part in question concerns Rose’s contention that 
a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and 
non-identity. In claiming that this part is unclear I am claiming, specifically, that 
Rose is not clear about how such an approach to criticism has the yield that she 
claims and needs it to have. In other words, I am claiming that within Rose’s 
phenomenological approach to criticism there is a methodological deficit. 
However, in claiming this, someone might object that I am failing to take sufficient 
heed of Rose’s rejection of Kant’s “method”.398 In response to this objection I 
would make the following counter-objection. 
 
While Rose rejects Kant’s method, it does not follow that she rejects a 
methodological approach to criticism tout court. As has been explained, Rose 
rejects Kant’s method because she reads it as resulting in a form of ignorance – 
a form of ignorance that, in her words, “prevents us from recognising, criticising, 
and hence from changing the social and political relations which determine us.”399 
Accordingly, Rose’s rejection of Kant’s method can be read as a rejection of the 
                                            
398 The ambiguity of the part played by “method” within Rose’s work is one partly present within the ways in 
which Hegel has been interpreted. See e.g. Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent 
Criticism’, 1145-1146: “Of course, some commentators even recoil at the suggestion there is such a thing 
as a philosophical method in Hegel [. . .]. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hegel had a method, the one 
he labels in the Science of Logic the “absolute method of knowing” [Science of Logic, 10]. And one can 
describe this method more or less aptly, as Michael Forster does: “it is a method of exposition in which each 
category in turn is shown to be implicitly self- contradictory and to develop necessarily into the next (thus 
forming a continuously connected hierarchical series culminating in an all-embracing category that Hegel 
calls the Absolute Idea).” [‘Hegel’s Dialectical Method’, 132] Forster’s description captures the structure and 
movement from one shape of consciousness to the next Hegel’s Phenomenology, and the dynamic of 
Hegel’s Logic in the chain of transitions from one category to another.” 
399 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48 
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idea that criticism is something that is done once and for all. To read Rose in this 
way leaves room for the possibility of a method that is consistent with Rose’s 
critical project – that is, a methodological approach to criticism that is open-
ended. Or, and this is to say the same thing, a methodological approach to 
criticism that yields an aporia. In support of this, there are points within Rose’s 
later work in which she explicitly concedes the possibility of a methodology that, 
in her words, “does not know the outcome in advance.”400   
 
To understand the second possible objection that might be made against my 
claim that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear, it is necessary to say 
something about her concept of the “absolute”.401 To this point, my references to 
this concept have been largely indirect. In the context of her reading of Hegel, by 
contrast, this concept is of central importance.402 Rose writes:   
 
Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute cannot be 
thought. If we cannot think the absolute this means that it is 
therefore not our thought in the sense of not realized. The absolute 
is the comprehensive thinking which transcends the dichotomies 
                                            
400 Rose, ‘Beginnings of the Day’, 58. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, xv: “Not that comprehension [i.e. 
the comprehension that results from criticism] completes or closes, but that it returns diremption to where it 
cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in partial action – as long as its political history persists.” See 
also Rose, Judaism and Modernity: ix “The speculative method of engaging with the new purifications 
whenever they occur, in order to yield their structuring but unacknowledged third, involves deployment of 
the resources of reason and of its crisis, of identity and lack of identity.”  
401 I lack the space to explicate this important concept sufficiently. For further accounts see e.g. Brower Latz, 
The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose; Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the project of a Critical Marxism’, 28-31, 
‘Whither the Broken Middle?’; Osborne, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’; 
Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’.    
402 As a testament to its importance, Rose repeats the claim that Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if 
the absolute cannot be thought approximately 4 times within Hegel Contra Sociology. See Hegel Contra 
Sociology, 45, 98, 218, 223.  
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between concept and intuition, theoretical and practical reason. It 
cannot be thought (realized) because these dichotomies and their 
determination are not transcended. [. . .] Once we realize this we 
can think the absolute by acknowledging the element of Sollen in 
such a thinking, by acknowledging the subjective element, the limits 
on our thinking the absolute. [. . .] Thinking the absolute means 
recognizing actuality as determinans of our acting by recognizing it 
in our acts. Thus recognizing our transformative or productive 
activity has a special claim as a mode of acknowledging actuality 
which transcends the dichotomies between theoretical and 
practical reason, between positing and posited. Transformative 
activity acknowledges actuality in the act and does not oppose act 
to non-act.403  
 
In the light of this passage, Rose’s concept of the absolute can be said to 
conceive the phenomenological process through which we (i.e. users of reason) 
pass through various contradictory experiences, and thereby come to recognise 
that reason is inherently antinomical – that is, capable of transforming, and being 
transformed by, social-political experiences.404 Or, to use the terminology that I 
have used throughout this thesis, Rose’s concept of the absolute conceives 
conceptuality (or the act of, as Williams writes, “thinking about thinking”405) as 
                                            
403 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 218.  
404 See Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 18: “Hegel's question – not one raised in these terms 
by Rose, yet insistently in the background of what she writes – is how, historically, we come to think of 
thinking in the framework of dispossession; and his answer is, of course, that this requires a history that can 
be told as the narrative of the absolute's self-loss and self-recovery.”  
405 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 5. 
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always both unavoidable and partial.406 Accordingly, for Rose, the absolute is not 
something that can be know, but something that “can only become known as a 
result of the process of the contradictory experiences of consciousness which 
gradually comes to realise it.”407 The concept of the absolute is important, for 
Rose, because it brings together, and keeps together, without reducing either 
side of the antinomies of reason.408 This importance is social in the sense that, 
as was explained above, it is through recognising the antinomies of reason (or 
the antinomy of law) that we recognise that reason has changed, and therefore 
could potentially change again – a change that could potentially bring about 
transformation in our relationships with others and with ourselves.409 
 
Given this brief account of Rose’s concept of the absolute, it can be (and has 
been) argued that her phenomenological approach to criticism is without critical 
potential – that is, without the potential to afford the resources for potentially 
restructuring the structure of reason – if the absolute cannot be thought.410 
Accordingly, it might be objected that my argument for Rose’s phenomenological 
approach to criticism being, in part, unclear is a consequence of me failing to read 
this approach as being informed by her concept of the absolute. In other words, 
according to this objection, in order to understand how Rose’s phenomenological 
approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity, it is 
                                            
406 Alternatively, Rose’s concept of the absolute conceives the antinomy of law – as described above (see 
section 1.2.).  
407 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 49. In other words, for Rose, the “absolute” can only be known 
“speculatively”. See Hegel Contra Sociology, 99.  
408 For a similar account of what Rose means by the “absolute” see e.g. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy 
of Gillian Rose, 27.  
409 For Rose’s answer to the question “How can the absolute be thought, and how does the thinking of it 
have social import?” see Hegel Contra Sociology, Chapter 3: The Philosophy of History.  
410 See esp. Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35.  
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necessary to construe such experiences as a part of a whole – that is, the 
absolute.   
 
In response to this objection I would say the following. Evidently, in the context 
of Rose’s critical project, the concept of the absolute is, in her words, “not an 
optional extra”.411 However, as I understand it, rather than clarifying Rose’s 
practice of criticism (which is my current concern), her concept of the absolute 
presupposes this practice – for it is, on Rose’s account, the practice of criticism 
that affords the specific form of contradictory experiences through which we 
gradually come to conceive of the absolute. Rather than help explain how Rose’s 
phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-
identity, therefore, her concept of the absolute only helps to explain that this part 
of her critical project is important, and needs to be made clearer.  
 
That said, introducing Rose’s concept of the absolute at this stage of my 
argument is not without worth. I take its worth to follow from the following 
passage:          
 
If the absolute cannot be pre-judged but must be achieved, it must 
be always present and have a history.412 
 
While Rose’s concept of the absolute does not serve to fill the methodological 
deficit of Rose’s critical project, it does serve to clarify an additional requirement 
of what it might be to fill this deficit. If Rose’s critical project is to be clarified by 
                                            
411 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 45. 
412 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 50 
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way of a methodology, this method, in addition to being open-ended, is required 
to be open-ended on account of history. In other words, if Rose’s practice of 
criticism is to be clarified in the way required by her critical project, it needs to be 
shown how history can be brought to bear on the present form of reason such as 
to make the future form of reason something that cannot be pre-judged – that is, 
something without foundations or grounds, something that can be potentially 
reconfigured. In the following section, I will argue that Foucault’s method of 
genealogical problematisation affords a way of clarifying or supplementing 





In this section I have argued that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. Rose’s 
critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience of identity and 
non-identity. It is this part of Rose’s critical project that I have argued is unclear – 
unclear because, while Rose is clear about this requirement, and clear about the 
ways in which criticism can fail to meet this requirement, she is not clear about 
how criticism can meet this requirement.     
 
3.3. CAN FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY CLARIFY ROSE’S 
CRITICAL PROJECT? 
 
What is the aim of this section? 
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The aim of this section is to argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation clarifies the part of Rose’s critical project that, in the previous 
section, I argued is unclear – that is, the part in which Rose’s critical project 
requires criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. Foucault’s 
method of genealogy clarifies this part of Rose’s critical project, I will argue, 
through affording a methodology for revealing the complex, contingent and 
historical processes through which reason comes to possess certain forms of 
authority – or, and this is to say the same thing, uncovering the complex, 
contingent and historical processes through which concepts come to be 
considered and used as universals. Through revealing this consistency between 
contingency and universality, Foucault’s method of genealogy does not 
undermine the authority of reason, but problematises it. It is such 
problematisation that yields the experience of identity and non-identity in the way 
that Rose’s critical project requires.  
 
Repeating what is unclear within Rose’s critical project 
 
To be clear about what is here in question, it is worth repeating what I have 
argued is unclear within Rose’s critical project. As I explained in the previous 
section, Rose’s critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience 
of identity and non-identity. It is, as I have argued, this part of Rose’s critical 
project that is unclear – and it is, as I will argue, this part that Foucault’s method 
of genealogy can help to clarify.   
 
What is this experience of identity and non-identity? Given what has been said 
above, by the experience of identity and non-identity Rose can be read as 
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referring to the experience of coming to comprehend the ways in which reason 
or, more specially, the concepts by which we reason are always both unavoidable 
and partial – “unavoidable” in the sense that we need concepts to comprehend 
our relationships with others and ourselves, “partial” in the sense that our 
concepts, on account of these relationships, always fail to correspond completely 
to the state of affairs or object which we have also defined as the state of affairs 
or object to which they should correspond. On this account, for criticism to yield 
the experience of identity and non-identity in the way required by Rose’s critical 
project, it is required to reveal the antinomy of law. On the one hand, criticism is 
required to reveal the ways in which our concepts have authority (or have the 
normative force of universals) – in the sense that they constitute a rational basis 
for thought and action. On the other hand, criticism is required to reveal the ways 
in which our concepts do not have authority – in the sense that such authority is 
revealed as having changed, and therefore revealed as changeable.413    
 
In claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can help 
clarify Rose’s critical project, I am claiming simply that it affords a practice of 
criticism that can help clarify what it is, or (more modestly) what it might be, to 
pursue the two seeming contradictory tasks that I have just described, and which 
are required by Rose’s critical project. It is this claim that I will now attempt to 
substantiate.414               
                                            
413 See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?’: “For critique to operate as part of a praxis, for Adorno, is for it to 
apprehend the ways in which categories are themselves instituted, how the field of knowledge is ordered, 
and how what it suppresses returns, as it were, as its own constitutive occlusion. Judgments operate for 
both thinkers as ways to subsume a particular under an already constituted category, whereas critique asks 
after the occlusive constitution of the field of categories themselves.” 
414 That said, I am not claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is the only way in 
which this part of Rose’s critical project can be clarified. Rather, I am claiming that it is one possible way of 
clarifying this part – one possible way that has the advantage of making explicit what is often only implicit 
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Is the contingency revealed through Foucault’s method of genealogy 
consistent with a sense of universality?    
 
Central to my conviction that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help clarify 
Rose’s critical project – that is, specifically, help clarify how criticism can yield the 
experience of identity and non-identity that Rose’s critical project requires, and in 
the way that it requires – is the idea that the contingency revealed by this method 
can be thought of as consistent with a sense of “universality”. Arguing for the 
coherence of this seemingly incoherent idea is important for my argument – 
centrally because it affords a way of clarifying how Foucault’s method of 
genealogy can yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and thereby help 
fill the methodological deficit that besets Rose’s critical project.415 As has been 
explained, for Rose, this experience is aporetic in that it involves coming to 
recognise that reason is always both unavoidable and partial. Or, to say the same 
thing with different words, this experience is aporetic in that it involves coming to 
recognise universality and contingency as always both playing a part within 
reason.416 By arguing that the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of 
                                            
within Rose’s accounts of phenomenology – that is, her commitment to there being a close connection 
between genealogy and phenomenology. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 27-28: “Since the Phenomenology 
of Spirit is historical, genealogical and futural, once the flight into thought has occurred the conflict can never 
be unmediated again.”  
415 A peculiar idea, but not one without its proponents. See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 230: “An 
attempt to think of contingency and universality together is not wholly new on the theoretical scene, even if 
it still grates against many ears. One prominent context in which it has been featured in recent years is in a 
set of debates between the influential post-Marxist Ernesto Laclau, the post-Lacanian Slavoj Žižek, and the 
post-Foucaultian Judith Butler. [. . .] Although in these debates Butler often develops arguments to the effect 
that universality must always be contingent, her reflective position seems to be that one of our most urgent 
tasks today is that of the analysis of actual contingent universals.” See Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto, Žižek, 
Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (London: Verso, 2000).  
416 This is a further way of stating what Rose aims to capture with her concept antinomy of law.  
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genealogy is consistent with a sense of “universality” I aim, therefore, to clarify 
how it can be read as methodologically yielding the aporia required by Rose’s 
critical project.    
 
As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the concepts 
that we formally took to be universal to be contingent. On this account, there 
would seem to be a basis on which to read Foucault’s method of genealogy as a 
part of an “anti-universalist” project.417 However, if “universality” is here taken to 
mean the ways in which certain of our concepts are capable of serving as shared 
norms for thinking and acting, then to read Foucault’s method genealogy as anti-
universalist is to make a similar mistake as Rose makes, and others also, in 
reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as nihilistic. As I have explained, 
Foucault’s method of genealogy has both a negative and a positive aspect. To 
think of Foucault’s method of genealogy as anti-universalist is to recognise only 
the negative aspect, and therefore, because these aspects are integrated, to 
misunderstand this aspect. 
 
                                            
417 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 231. This is a view held by, for example, Habermas. See Habermas, 
Jürgen, ‘The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault’, in Critique and 
Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 
64-65: “[Foucault] thinks of the transcendental practices of power as something particular that strives against 
all universals, and further as the lowly corporeal-sensual that undermines everything intelligible, and finally 
as the contingent that could also have been otherwise because it is not governed by any regulative order.” 
See also Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79, edited by 
Michel Senellart and translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 3: “So what I would like to 
deploy here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a 
critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can 
do.” However, in the context of this passage, it is important to recognise that Foucault is here deciding “that 
universals do not exist” as a part of his critical method, not as a product of it. For a comparable account see 
Hoy, Time of Our Lives, 235.     
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Although the concept of “universality” is not a dominant one within Foucault’s 
work, there are, as Colin Koopman has noted, points in which he does appeal to 
this concept. For example, in the following passage Foucault describes a form of 
criticism that simultaneously pursues the universal and the historical / contingent:  
 
Posing the question in this way brings into play certain altogether 
general principles. Singular forms of experience may perfectly well 
harbour universal structures; they may well not be independent of 
the concrete determinations of social existence. [. . .] That [thought] 
should have this historicity does not mean it is deprived of all 
universal form but, rather, that the putting into play of these 
universal forms is itself historical. And that this historicity should be 
proper to it means not that it is independent of all the other historical 
determinations (of an economic, social, or political order) but that it 
has complex relations with them, which always leave their 
specificity to the forms, transformations, and events of thought.418 
 
For my present purposes, this is an important passage. In this passage Foucault 
can be (and has been419) read as wanting to leave room for “universality” within 
his problematisations420 – at least, provided such “universality” can be construed 
as compatible with temporality and historicity (i.e. contingency). According to 
such a construal, “universality is a dynamic process of universalisability rather 
                                            
418 Foucault, Michel, ‘Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume Two’, in in Essential Works, Volume 1: 
Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 201. See also 
Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Poststructuralism’, 450, Foucault, Michel, ‘Useless to Revolt?’, in Essential 
Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 452-453. 
419 See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232. 
420 See n3 above.  
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than a static property theorised under universalism.”421 However, that the concept 
of universality “is consistent with Foucault’s [method of] genealogy is far from 
obvious. It is thus unsurprising that Foucault’s commentators have almost 
universally decried universalism.”422  
 
Colin Koopman (following, in part, the work of David Couzens Hoy423) has, 
however, argued that the contingency revealed through Foucault’s genealogy is 
consistent with a sense of “universality”. Koopman’s argument centres on a 
conception of universality which he calls “universalisation-in-action”424 For 
Koopman, it is this sense of “universality” that is consistent with the contingency 
revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy. “Taking this conception seriously 
helps us see that contingency and complexity contrast respectively to necessity 
and simplicity, but neither need contrast to universality.”425 For Koopman, a 
“universalist interpretation of universality implicates necessity.”426 As was shown 
above, it is this sense of “universality” that Foucault rejects – both because he 
rejects necessity and because he rejects our urge to simplify universals. For 
Koopman, “Foucault did not teach us to reject universals so much as he taught 
us to reject our urge to simplify universals.”427 In other words, Foucault’s method 
of genealogy (and his concrete genealogies) encourage us to be wary of anyone 
who would perpetuate a simple answer to a complicated question – for example, 
                                            
421 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232.  
422 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232.  
423 See Hoy, ‘The Temporality of power’, The Time of Our Lives, 234: “Genealogy need not be opposed to 
universals. The problem is not universals per se. Although genealogy may be suspicious of claims to 
universality, it need not reject all appeals to universal structures or values.” 
424 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 234. 
425 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. 
426 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. 
427 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 234. 
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the question about the relationship between theory and praxis. On this account – 
that is, an account concerned with avoiding such simplifications –  “a conception 
of universality as universalisability [implicates] contingency rather than necessity. 
In so doing it inspires complexity rather than simplicity. Foucault, I think, can be 
profitably read as focusing much of his energy on universals in precisely these 
aspects of their contingency and complexity. Foucault’s [method of genealogy 
and his concrete] genealogies are in part a commitment to explicating the 
complex and contingent conditions of possibility of some of our most constraining 
universals.”428 
 
On this account, to be clear, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is consistent with a sense of “universality”.429 This is because such 
contingency shows, not the impossibility of certain of our concepts being 
universal, but the complex, historical and contingent processes through which the 
universality of certain of our concepts became possible.430 This account is a 
                                            
428 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. Foucault, Michel, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’, in Essential 
Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 288.  
429 Although this is not a connection I can pursue here, it is worth mentioning that the idea of universality 
implicating contingency is one that bears noticeable connections with the pragmatist tradition – particularly 
in the way certain representatives of this tradition construed the norms of thought and action. See e.g. 
Westphal, Kenneth R. (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1998), xii: “Another central theme in pragmatism [. . .] is that the norms of thought and 
action do not descend to us from a Platonic heaven by rational insight. Norms are culturally and historically 
developed, and they are embodied by and in agents who are educated in particular traditions.” 
430 See Foucault, Michel, ‘Foucault’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion 
(New York: New Press, 2000), 461-462: “In regard to human nature or the categories that may be applied 
to the subject, everything in our knowledge which is suggested to us as being universally valid must be 
tested and analysed. Refusing the universal of "madness," "delinquency," or "sexuality" does not imply that 
what these notions refer to is nothing, or that they are only chimeras invented for the sake of a dubious 
cause. Something more is involved, however, than the simple observation that their content varies with time 
and circumstances: It means that one must investigate the conditions that enable people, according to the 
rules of true and false statements, to recognise a subject as mentally ill or to arrange that a subject recognise 
the most essential part of himself in the modality of his sexual desire. So the first rule of method for this kind 
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development of the account given above in which Foucault’s method of 
genealogy was said to reveal both that and how the authority of reason is 
contingent. In other words, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals not only that 
the universality of certain of our concepts is contingent, but also how it is 
contingent. This is important because it is through the integration of these two 
aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as having a critical 
potential – that is, by revealing how the authority of reason has been configured 
and reconfigured through history, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals how it 
could potentially be reconfigured further.    
 
However, it might be objected that the sense of universality that has here been 
accounted for as consistent with the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method 
of genealogy is far from the sense of universality with which, for example, Kant 
works – that is, a sense of university that implicates necessity.431 This objection 
works on the assumption that “[u]niversality is a concept that does not admit of 
degrees.”432 In response to this possible objection,433 Koopman makes an 
important point – that is, the point that we, if we are to take seriously the critical 
potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy (and, I would add, Rose’s critical 
project), “need to learn to understand universality as our achievement, and to do 
so we need to understand it as an ideal that guides processes that admit of 
degrees. If universality is interpreted according to the traditional requirements of 
                                            
of work is this: Insofar as possible, circumvent the anthropological universals (and, of course, those of a 
humanism that would assert the rights, the privileges, and the nature of a human being as an immediate and 
timeless truth of the subject) in order to examine them as historical constructs.” See also Foucault, Michel, 
‘Life: Experience and Science’, in Essential Works, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, edited 
by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 469. 
431 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235.  
432 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. 
433 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. 
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philosophical universalism, we will be severely and rightly chastened in any 
search for universals that we might want to mount. The actual researches (social-
scientific and philosophic) explicating our actuality can do much with a concept 
of universalisability but very little with a theory of universalism.”434  
 
In this response, Koopman makes the point that “[t]he actual researches (social-
scientific and philosophic) explicating our actuality can do much with a concept 
of universalisability but very little with a theory of universalism.”435 This point 
returns my argument back to the twofold task of criticism that I have been 
attributing to both Rose and Foucault throughout this thesis. For Rose and 
Foucault, to repeat, the task of criticism is twofold and continuous in that it 
involves continually calling into question the authority of reason, and doing so in 
a way that affords the resources for potentially reconfiguring that authority. Given 
this twofold and continuous task, the concept of universalisability is resourceful 
in that it affords a way of giving some coherence to this aporetic task. For if, as 
has been explained, the concept of universalisabilty implicates contingency as 
opposed to necessity, then the task of calling into question the authority of reason 
without thereby undermining that authority is coherent. To call into question the 
authority of reason is, it can now be said, to investigate the complex, historical 
and contingent processes through which certain of our concepts are 
universalised. In turn, such investigations, through revealing the ways in which 
certain of our concepts have actually been universalised, afford the resources for 
                                            
434 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. See Rabinow, Paul and Marcus, George E., Designs for an 
Anthropology of the Contemporary (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 110: “Science is universal, but 
human beings do it so that means it's historical, and it could have been otherwise, and it's contingent.” Cited 
by Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9. 
435 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. 
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thinking about how such universality could potentially be reconfigured. In other 
words, “what matters [. . .] is the practical universalisation of the assemblages in 
virtue of which standards, rights, and whatnot are instantiated in an ever-
expanding set of contexts. These universals may be contestable, and we may 
want to unseat or entrench them, as the case may be. But the point is that we will 
lack practical grip on how these universals work if we treat them as abstract 
principles only”436 – for in doing so we lose sight of the apparatus through which 
they function, and through which they could potentially be made to function 
otherwise. 
                                            
436 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 241. Due to a lack of space, I have been required to heavily abbreviate 
Koopman’s account. For Koopman’s full account see Genealogy as Critique, 231-241. For further examples 
of what Koopman calls “contingent universals” see also Hacking, Ian, The Emergence of Probability: A 
Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), Hacking, Ian, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). About the latter Koopman writes: “In describing the contingent construction of the statistical 
world in which we live, Hacking helps us realize that an explication of the achievement of universality need 
not invoke a realist ontology according to which the universals of science are part of the fabric of an 
independent nature. We can affirm the achievement of universality as the culmination of long historical 
processes whose outcome is a portable and successful scientific procedure that no one is prepared to doubt. 
Probability works everywhere. That it does so is an achievement. It is something we humans have struggled 
to enact. That struggle was complex and full of contingencies. There is nothing that necessitated that it had 
to work.” (Genealogy as Critique, 236) Note the terminology that Koopman employs in his account of 
Hacking’s work – specifically, his employment of the word “struggle” –  and how it corresponds to Rose’s 
own terminology when accounting for the relationship between universality and particularity. See esp. The 
Broken Middle. Koopman also makes reference to Benhabib, Seyla, Another Cosmopolitanism, edited by 
Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt, Friction: An Ethnography of 
Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), citing from the latter the following passage: 
“This book is about aspirations for global connection and how they come to life in “friction,” the grip of worldly 
encounter. Capitalism, science, and politics all depend on global connections. Each spreads through 
aspirations to fulfil universal dreams and schemes. Yet this is a particular kind of universality: It can only be 
charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters. This book explores this practical, 
engaged universality as a guide to the yearnings and nightmares of our times.” (1) I repeat Koopman’s 
citation of this passage because it evinces Tsing concern with maintaining a grip on a sense of universality 
within the reality of practical encounters – a concern that comparable to those evinced by Rose. For a helpful 
account of how some of the issues introduced in this section – specifically, how they relate to the problems 
of “relativism” and “ultimate grounding” – see Milbank, John, The World Made Strange: Theology, Language, 
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 24-32. 
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Clarifying Rose’s critical project with Foucault’s method of genealogy  
 
Having now presented an argument for thinking of the complex, contingent and 
historical processes revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy as being 
consistent with a sense of universality, I will now turn to consider how, on the 
basis of this argument, Foucault’s method of genealogy serves to clarify the part 
of Rose’s critical project that I have argued is unclear. In other words, I will now 
turn to consider how Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to yield the 
experience of identity and non-identity in the way that Rose’s critical project 
requires. I will begin by explaining how this method yields the experience of non-
identity and identity respectively. I will then bring these two explanations together.  
 
As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a way to 
comprehend the complex, contingent and historical processes through which 
certain of our concepts come to be authoritative – that is, come to possess the 
normative force of universals within the present. It is, I think, on account of this 
that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to yield the experience of what 
Rose refers to as “non-identity”. To repeat, for Rose, non-identity refers to that 
which our concepts fail to comprehend, but which could / should comprehend. In 
claiming Foucault’s method of genealogy yields the experience of non-identity I 
am claiming that the complex, contingent and historical processes revealed by 
this method qualify as such a form of non-identity. In other words, I am claiming 
that the complex, contingent and historical processes through which the authority 
of our concepts are configured and reconfigured qualifies as that which these 
concepts fail to comprehend, but which could / should comprehend.  
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As has also been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy, by affording a way 
to comprehend the complex, contingent and historical processes through which 
certain of our concepts come to be authoritative, affords thereby a way to begin 
comprehending the complex, contingent and futural processes through which the 
authority of certain of our concepts could potentially be configured and 
reconfigured further. It is, I think, on account of this that Foucault’s method of 
genealogy can be said to yield the experience of what Rose refers to as “identity”. 
To repeat, for Rose, identification refers simply to the act of using concepts to 
capture (or identify) the particulars of experience. While Rose thinks that our 
concepts can fail, she also thinks that they can also succeed – that is, as has 
been emphasised throughout this thesis, she thinks that conceptuality is always 
both unavoidable and partial. In claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogy 
yields the experience of identity I am claiming simply that affords a way to 
continue to identify the particulars of experience, and to do so in a way that is 
different and more encompassing – different and more encompassing on account 
of its capacity to bring the contingent to bear on the universal. This idea that the 
method of genealogy affords a different and more encompassing way of using 
concepts is one to which I take Foucault to be also committed when he writes:  
 
But, then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean 
– if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In 
what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to 
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what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of 
legitimating what is already known?437  
 
I have now explained the ways in which I think that Foucault’s method of 
genealogy yields a form of the experience of identity and non-identity as 
construed by Rose.438 For the sake of clarity, I have done so respectively. 
However, it would be more accurate to do so simultaneously. The reason being 
that Foucault’s method of genealogy yields the experience of identity and non-
identity, not in the sense that it affords a way of experiencing each in isolation of 
                                            
437 Foucault, Michel, History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 8-9. It should be stressed that, for Foucault, this “endeavour” is anything but 
easy or simple. See e.g. Foucault, ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’, 288: “My role is to raise questions in an 
effective, genuine way, and to raise them with the greatest possible rigor, with the maximum complexity and 
difficulty so that a solution doesn't spring from the head of some reformist intellectual or suddenly appear in 
the head of a party's political bureau. The problems I try to pose-those tangled things that crime, madness, 
and sex are, and that concern everyday life-cannot easily be resolved. Years, decades, of work and political 
imagination will be necessary, work at the grass roots, with the people directly affected, restoring their right 
to speak. Only then will we succeed, perhaps, in changing a situation that, with the terms in which it is 
currently laid out, only leads to impasses and blockages. I take care not to dictate how things should be. I 
try instead to pose problems, to make them active, to display them in such a complexity that they can silence 
the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others or to others. In this way, it will be possible for the 
complexity of the problem to appear in its connection with people's lives; and, consequently, through 
concrete questions, difficult cases, movements of rebellion, reflections, and testimonies, the legitimacy of a 
common creative action can also appear. It's a matter of working through things little by little, of introducing 
modifications that are able if not to find solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem.” For 
more on the critical potential of thinking “differently”, specifically within the framework of identity and non-
identity, see e.g. Adorno, T. W., ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’, New German Critique, 26 (1982), 119-
150. See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Art and Criticism in Adorno’s Aesthetics’, in Outside Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 161-183.	 
438 Again, this is not to say that I think that Foucault’s method of genealogy is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for such experience. Rather, to repeat, I take what I have here explained to be one way of clarifying 
what is unclear within Rose’s critical project – that is, the way in which a phenomenological approach to 
criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity in precisely the way that is required by this critical 
project. To claim, as I have claimed, that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help clarify Rose’s critical 
project is to claim, in short, that phenomenology is best pursued in conjunction with a method of genealogy. 
Rose is also committed to the close connection between phenomenology and genealogy, although this 
commitment is rarely and unfortunately made explicit. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 27-28 (see n414). 
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the other, but in the sense that it affords a way of experiencing the relationship 
between them both as problematic. As I have explained, to say that Foucault’s 
method of genealogy reveals something as being problematic is not to say that it 
reveals it as something that should be rejected. In other words, it does not follow 
from Foucault’s method of genealogy that reason, because its authority is 
revealed as being contingent, is therefore without authority. Rather, it is to say 
that it reveals the authority of reason to be a reality that is the result of complex, 
contingent and historical processes. In short, Foucault’s method of genealogy 
reveals that the authority of reason is, because of the problematic relationship 
between identity and non-identity that this authority implies, something that 
demands our continuous and acute attention.439  
 
Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is open-ended 
 
Given this account of Foucault’s method of genealogy as yielding the experience 
of identity and non-identity – specifically through problematising the relationship 
between them – I will now return back to what I said above about Rose’s critical 
project being open to a methodological approach to criticism, provided that such 
a methodology is open-ended. I have explained how Foucault’s method of 
genealogy helps clarify what it is for a form of criticism to yields the experience of 
identity and non-identity in the way that Rose’s critical project requires. The 
question now is whether Foucault’s method of genealogy can be construed as 
open-ended in the way required by Rose’s critical project.    
 
                                            
439 See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 159.  
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As was explained above, Rose rejects Kant’s method, and reads Hegel’s idea of 
phenomenology as affording an alternative to Kant’s methodological approach to 
criticism. In the context of Hegel Contra Sociology, Rose appears to be rejecting 
wholesale the idea that criticism can be methodological – preferring, instead, the 
idea of criticism as a “gamble”.440 However, reading this rejection of Kant’s 
method in the light of Rose’s later works, it is possible to say that Rose is here 
rejecting a specific sense of “method” – that is, a sense in which “method” is taken 
to refer to a sequence of steps orientated towards, centrally, bringing something 
to a close. In the case of Kant’s method, what is brought to a close is, for Rose, 
is the potential for comprehension, and therefore transformation. It is, to repeat, 
for this reason that Rose thinks of Kant’s criticism as resulting in “the demarcation 
of new areas of ignorance”.441 Accordingly, within Rose’s critical project, there is 
still room for thinking of criticism as methodological provided that it is that is open-
ended. 
 
The idea of an open-ended442 form of criticism is one that is implied by much of 
Rose’s work. In the context of her critical project – at least as it has been 
accounted for within the argument of this thesis – to think of criticism as open-
ended is to think of it as being continually renewed.443 This continual renewal of 
                                            
440 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 168: “The Phenomenology is not the revocation of alienated 
externalization, nor a teleology of reconciliation, nor a dominating absolute knowledge. The Phenomenology 
is not a success, it is a gamble.” 
441 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 47.  
442 Or non-foundational (see Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, Preface for 1995 reprint. See also Judaism and 
Modernity, 10; Love’s Work, 127-128), aporetic (See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 212; Mourning Becomes 
the Law, 7-8; Love’s Work, 128-129), or incessant (Rose, The Broken Middle, 308-309). 
443 See Williams, Between Politics and Metaphysics, 10: “For it is in the continual renewal of the 'natural' 
errors of pre-speculative thinking that speculation (self-aware thinking, thinking that thinks the nature of 
thinking) is itself renewed. Of course we go on having determinate experiences of objects that we think of 
as other to the natural consciousness; it is in a continued re-engagement with these experiences that we 
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criticism is a consequence of the twofold task of criticism. For Rose, to repeat, 
the task of criticism is twofold in the sense that it is required to call into question 
the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for 
potentially reconfiguring that authority. This twofold task makes criticism open-
ended in that, for Rose, any reconfiguration of this authority will need to be, in 
turn, called into question – that is, the renewal of criticism. On this account, the 
renewal of criticism follows from the consequences of criticism itself. 
 
Given this brief account of what it means, in the context of Rose’s critical project, 
for criticism to be open-ended, I will now turn back to Foucault, and argue that 
his method of genealogical problematisation can be read as consistent with this 
sense of open-endedness. Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation 
is open-ended for two reasons – two reasons that correlate with the negative and 
positive aspects of genealogy that were accounted for above. I will give these two 
reasons in turn.444  
                                            
move constantly and afresh into the properly speculative mode in which we 'unmake' the natural 
consciousness.” 
444 See Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 64-65: “The first is that this singular effect can be accounted for in 
terms of relationships which are, if not totally, at least predominantly, relationships of interactions between 
individuals or groups. In other words, these relationships involve subjects, types of behaviour, decisions and 
choices. It is not in the nature of things that we are likely to find support. Support for this network of intelligible 
relationships is in the logic inherent to the context of interactions with its always variable margins of non-
certainty. There is also no closure because the relationships we are attempting to establish to account for a 
singularity as an effect, this network of relationships must not make up one plane only. These relationships 
are in perpetual slippage from one another. At a given level, the logic of interactions operates between 
individuals who are able to respect its singular effects, both its specificity and its rules, while managing along 
with other elements interactions operating at another level, such that, in a way, none of these interactions 
appear to be primary or absolutely totalising. Each interaction can be re-situated in a context that exceeds 
it and conversely, however local it may be, each has an effect or possible effect on the interaction to which 
it belongs and by which it is enveloped. Therefore, schematically speaking, we have perpetual mobility, 
essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what 




The negative aspect of Foucault’s method of genealogy is, to repeat, the aspect 
concerned with calling into question the authority of reason – where that means, 
specifically, revealing the complex, historical and contingent processes through 
which certain of our concepts come to possess a certain authority. Or, as was 
explained above, processes through which certain of our concepts are 
universalised. This negative aspect can be read as open-ended because the 
contingency that it is concerned with revealing is open-ended. As has been 
explained, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy is a 
contingency in which the emphasis falls less on the absence of necessity, and 
more on the presence of complexity.445 The historical processes through which 
certain of our concepts are universalised are contingent because they are 
complex – complex in the sense that they, in Geuss’s words,  “arise from the 
historically contingent conjunction of a large number of such separate series of 
processes that ramify the further back one goes and present no obvious or natural 
single stopping place that could be designated ‘the origin’.”446 “This is”, in 
Foucault’s words, “a domain of very complex relations, which demand infinite 
reflection.”447  
 
The positive aspect of Foucault’s method of genealogy is, to repeat, concerned 
with employing the contingency that it reveals within the task of thinking about 
the limits and potentialities of reconfiguring the authority of reason. This positive 
                                            
445 See Foucault, Michel, ‘The Will to Knowledge’, in Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and 
Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 12.  
446 Geuss, Nietzsche and Genealogy, 4. 
447 Foucault, Michel, ‘Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual’, History of the Present 4 (1988), 1-2, 11-13. 
See also Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 90. 
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aspect is can be read as open-ended because what is being reconfigured is the 
authority of reason as it is experienced within the present – that is, within a 
particular point in time. As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy 
affords the resources for thinking about the limits and potentialities of 
reconfiguring the authority of reason through uncovering the processes through 
which certain of our concepts come to be universalised. The universality in 
question is one that is experienced within the present, and one that is the result 
of past processes. However, just as Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the 
present authority of reason to be the product of an actual past, it also shows how 
the present could be the beginning of a possible future – a possible future that 
we could potentially configure and reconfigure given ways in which the present 
has been configured and reconfigured in the past. Since this possible future 
begins with the present, and since the present is continually renewed, it is open-
ended – or, it is something that cannot be, to return to Rose’s words, “pre-judged 
but [something that] must be achieved, it must be always present and have a 
history.”448  
 
It is for these two reasons, therefore, that I think that Foucault’s method of 
genealogical problematisation can be read as open-ended. In other words, it is 
for these two reasons, in addition to those given above, that I think that Foucault’s 
method of genealogical problematisation can be read as consistent with, and as 
helping to clarify, Rose’s critical project.  
 
Foucault’s genealogy is not reducible to Rose’s critical project    
 
                                            
448 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 50. 
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To be clear, the argument of this section is an argument for reading Foucault’s 
method of genealogy as playing a constructive part within Rose’s critical project. 
The constructive part it plays, I have argued, consists in it serving to clarify the 
part of Rose’s critical project that is, as I argued above, unclear – that is, the part 
in which criticism, in the context of Rose’s critical project, is required to yield the 
experience of identity and non-identity. In this section I have argued that 
Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation affords one way in which this 
pivotal part of Rose’s critical project can be clarified. Accordingly, in arguing that 
Foucault’s genealogy can help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project, I am not 
arguing that the former displaces a part of the latter. Rather, the clarification 
afforded by Foucault’s method of genealogy is such as to supplement Rose’s 
critical project, in general, and her reading of Hegel’s phenomenological 
approach to criticism, in particular.449 
 
Critical Potential / Problem of Normativity 
 
I have presented Rose and Foucault as construing criticism in a comparable way 
– a way that has been schematised as follows. Both Rose and Foucault take the 
                                            
449 In spite of her challenge to Foucault’s genealogy, there are points within Rose’s work within which she 
seems to construe phenomenology as consistent with genealogy. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 27: “the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is historical, genealogical and futural, once the flight into thought has occurred the 
conflict can never be unmediated again.” See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 58 
n198: “He thinks Rose’s later work does not have this philosophy of history, whereas I am about to argue it 
does. He argues her later work is genealogical rather than phenomenological, but I think he ignores the way 
Rose assimilates genealogy to phenomenology. For the same reason I disagree with his view that Rose’s 
later work is perspectival.” For additional accounts of the close and constructive relationship between 
Foucault’s genealogy and Hegel’s phenomenology see esp. Brandom, Reason, Genealogy, and the 
Hermeneutics of Magnanimity and Sembou, Hegel’s Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy. For a 
contrasting account see e.g. Brassier, Ray, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 65.  
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task of criticism to be twofold and continuous – to continually call into question 
the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for, 
neither strictly disowning the critical project of ascertaining the authority of 
reason, nor strictly legitimating the authority of reason, but potentially 
reconfiguring this authority. Having now substantiated this comparison by arguing 
that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with 
Foucault’s method of genealogy, I will conclude this section by returning to the 
question concerning the critical potential of this form of criticism.  
 
Throughout this thesis a question has appeared and reappeared – that is, the 
question concerning the critical potential of the form of criticism practiced by Rose 
and Foucault. This question stems from a worry – the worry that the aporia or 
problematisation yielded by this form of criticism seems to leave it without critical 
potential. As has been explained, this worry works on the assumption that 
criticism, if it is to have a critical potential, needs to be normative (i.e. needs to 
afford conclusions about what we should think, do, believe, admire, etc.). Since 
Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to involve, centrally, calling into 
question the normative force of our concepts, it seemingly cannot be normative, 
and therefore seems to be without critical potential. With respect to the critical 
projects of Rose and Foucault, I think that this worry is misguided. While I think 
the form of criticism upon which these projects are respectively based does not 
aim to afford normative conclusions, at least not ambitiously so, I do not think that 
this compromises its critical potential – as I will now explain.  
 
As Gordon Finlayson has importantly (and I think rightly) noted, “the practice of 
criticism varies according to domain, according to its object, and according to its 
 193 
purpose”.450 This note is important because it emphasises the need to be specific 
when speaking about, and assessing, practices of criticism. In this thesis, the 
form of criticism that I have taken to be practiced by both Rose and Foucault has 
been explicated as, specifically, a self-reflexive practice in which reason is used 
to criticise the authority of reason. Given this specificity, what would it be for this 
form of criticism to have critical potential? Before answering this question, it is 
important to note that, as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, for both 
Rose and Foucault this is a crucial question. It is crucial in the sense that both 
Rose and Foucault are, within their respective critical projects, concerned with 
renewing and transforming the practice of criticism precisely because they want 
it to retain its critical potential – that is, the potential to afford the resources for 
potentially reconfiguring the authority of reason.  
 
Accordingly, for the criticism practiced by both Rose and Foucault to have critical 
potential is for it to be able to afford such resources. What are such resources? 
For Rose and Foucault, the potential to reconfigure the authority of reason follows 
from the recognition that such authority is reconfigurable. It is this recognition that 
the criticism practiced by both Rose and Foucault encourages. It does this by 
revealing the authority of reason to be, broadly speaking, always both 
unavoidable and partial – unavoidable because we always need concepts in 
order to make sense of our relations to others and to ourselves, partial because 
such relations, in their particularity and singularity, will always compromise the 
                                            
450 Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1144 n10. See also Butler, ‘What is 
Critique?’, 1: “What is it to offer a critique? This is something that, I would wager, most of us understand in 
some ordinary sense. But matters become more vexing if we attempt to distinguish between a critique of 
this or that position and critique as a more generalized practice, one that might be described without 
reference to its specific objects.” 
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authority of such concepts. Crucial to the criticism practiced by both Rose and 
Foucault is to resist construing this compromised authority as a reason for 
rejecting the possibility of reason being authoritative – that is, of our concepts 
serving to guide how we should think and act. Rather, both Rose and Foucault, 
within their respective and comparable critical projects, construe this 
compromised authority as a reason to recognise that reason is always, to use 
Rose’s word, “difficult” and, to use Foucault’s word, “dangerous”. The implication 
being that, for Rose and Foucault, reason is something in which we are always 
difficultly and dangerously implicated. The central aim of criticism, as they 
practiced it, is to encourage us to be continually and acutely aware of the 
difficulties and dangers of reason.451   
 
That said, can more be said about the critical potential of this practice of criticism? 
Or, more specifically, given the difficulties and dangers of reason that this practice 
of criticism reveals, what becomes of the authority of reason, of the normative 
force of our concepts? To answer this question, I think it is helpful to follow Colin 
Koopman, and distinguish between those practices of criticism that are 
                                            
451 See Foucault, Michel, ‘Question of Method’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, ed. James D. Faubion 
(New York: New Press, 2000), 236: “The necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of 
blackmail serving to limit, reduce, or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay 
attention to those who tell one: "Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform." That's 
ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, "this, then, is 
what needs to be done." It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. 
Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down 
the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is.” See also Geuss, 
Raymond, ‘Must Criticism Be Constructive?’, in A World Without Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014), 90:  “In the political realm appeals to the need for “constructive” criticism can in principle represent a 
(generally laudable) attempt to remind those involved in some evaluation of human action of the need to 
remain aware of a kind of internal demand under which such criticism operates, namely of the need to keep 
Tschernyschevsky’s (and later Lenin’s) central question “What is to be done?” firmly in mind; in fact, 
however, the demand for “constructive criticism” in general functions as a repressive attempt to shift the 
onus probandi and divert attention from the possibility of radical criticism.” 
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normatively ambitious and those that are normatively modest.452 For a practice 
of criticism to be normatively ambitious is for it to claim that it affords conclusions 
about what we should think and do. The criticism practiced by Rose and Foucault 
is not, I have argued, normatively ambitious. However, as I have also argued, this 
does not imply that they took the task of criticism to reveal normativity to be 
impossible or of no significance to the way reason is really used. This would be 
to misunderstand what it means for Rose to refer to reason as “difficult” and 
Foucault to refer to it as “dangerous”. The point of both of these descriptors is 
that the present normative status of reason has an actual history, and therefore 
a potential future –  a future in which the present normative status of reason can 
be potentially reconfigured.453 Herein lies the critical potential of their practice of 
criticism – to show that reason is configured, and thereby show how it could 
potentially be reconfigured.454 It is in this sense that the criticism practiced by 
                                            
452 See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 62. 
453 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 50: “These changes in theoretical and moral consciousness wrought 
by its internal contradictions, its experiences, can only take place over time, as a series of shapes of 
consciousness. If the absolute cannot be pre-judged but must be achieved, it must be always present and 
have a history.” See also Hutchings, Kimberly, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global 
Era (London: Sage, 1999), 150: “The Hegelian [and Rosean] / Foucauldian approach to normative theory is 
premised on the possibility of normative truth but without the sanitizing effect achieved by the translation of 
this truth to a higher, first best sphere. Normative truth is in the world, it is contested and, in the process of 
that contestation, it is likely to be experienced by some . . . as painful.” Cited by Sembou, Evangelia, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 51, See Brower Latz, The Social 
Philosophy of Gillian Rose, 194: “Rose like Hegel believes in free, right action as in some way universal, but 
that we “can formulate the content of such a universal law . . . [only] by reference to the history of ethical 
institutions, the history of what we have come to regard as counting as universal, as what all others would 
or could accept as a maxim. Just as when we attempt to “judge objectively” or “determine the truth,” we 
inherit an extensive set of rule-governed, historically concrete practices, so when we attempt to “act rightly,” 
and attempt to determine our action spontaneously, we must see ourselves as situated in a complex 
collective and historical setting’.” Citing Pippin, Robert B., Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), 71. 
454 An account comparable to the one I have given within this thesis is given, in brief, by Hoy. See Hoy, The 
Time of Our Lives, 229-230: “Both critical theory and genealogy have a similar attitude toward the past, 
present, and future. In relation to the past, their recognition of the situatedness of the inquiry means that the 
so-called genetic fallacy is no longer considered fallacious. Traditional theory assumes that the question of 
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Rose and Foucault can be described as normatively modest. Such modesty 
relates to the ways in which both Rose and Foucault are, within their critical 
projects, concerned with calling the normativity of reason into question. The aim 
of this is not strictly to ascertain the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such normativity. 
Rather, it is to recognise how reason is, at present, and has been, in the past, 
structured through its actual use. Such recognition, as they construe it, does not 
teach us what we should think and do. However, it does teach us about the actual 
structure of reason, about its difficulties and its dangers, and therefore teaches 
us about what we need to be wary of within our always unavoidable and partial 
uses of reason.455 Or, to return to Rose’s words with which this thesis began, it 
teaches us to “resume reflexively what we always do: to know, to misknow and 




                                            
how we acquired our beliefs and knowledge is irrelevant to the validity of those beliefs. In contrast, both 
critical theory and genealogy are asking precisely how we came to forget the contingency of the historical 
beginnings of our practices and why we persuaded ourselves that these practices were necessary and 
universal rather than arbitrary and contingent. In relation to the present, both critical theory and genealogy 
view the theory itself as part of the problem, such that if there were no problem, there would be no need for 
the theory. In relation to the future, they both aim at social transformation, not justification of current social 
arrangements, which are veiled power relations.” For a contrasting account see e.g. Honneth, The 
Pathologies of Reason, 21: “Critical Theory, in contrast [to genealogy] – and in a way that may be unique to 
it – insists on a mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective rationality. That is, the 
historical past should be understood from a practical point of view: as a process of development whose 
pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome only by initiating a process of enlightenment 
among those involved.” However, in making this distinction, it is arguable that Honneth is working with an 
account of genealogy that is incapable of contributing towards a socially effective rationality – an account 
that I consider misguided for reasons given throughout this thesis.  
455 See Hoy, ‘The Temporality of Power’, 11. 
456 Rose, The Broken Middle, 310. 
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In this section I have argued that Foucault’s method of genealogy clarifies the 
part of Rose’s critical project that I argued, in the previous section, is pivotal, but 
unclear – that is, the part in which criticism is required by Rose’s critical project 
to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. This argument involved me 
arguing how the contingency revealed by genealogy can be read as consistent 
with a sense of universality. On the basis of this argument, I then argued how 
Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can be read as clarifying 
what it might mean for criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity, 
and to do so in a way that is open-ended.       
 
3.4. CONCLUSION  
 
What have I argued in this chapter? 
 
In this chapter I have argued that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively 
in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. This 
argument consisted of two sections. In the first section I argued that Rose’s 
critical project requires criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity 
– that is, the experience of reason as being always both unavoidable and partial 
– but that it is unclear about how criticism can achieve this two-fold task. Rose is 
unclear about this, I argued, because her critical project requires criticism to 
achieve this two-fold task in a way that is open-ended. In the second section I 
argued that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can clarify this 
unclear part of Rose’s critical project. This argument involved arguing, first, that 
Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the complex, historical and contingent 
processes through which certain of our concepts are universalised. On the basis 
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of this argument, I then argued that Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a 
way of clarifying what it is to yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and 
to do so in a way that is open-ended. According to this argument, the complex, 
historical and contingent processes revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy 
affords the resources for reasoning in a way that is different and more 
encompassing. In other words, Foucault’s method of genealogy, by revealing 





















What have I argued? 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis has been to argue that Rose’s critical project 
can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. 
The motivation behind this argument follows from my conviction that 
commentators on Rose are misguided in construing Rose’s critical project as 
being opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Such a construal is 
misguided, I have argued, not because it conflicts with Rose’s own claims, but 
because it is too general. To construe Rose’s critical project as being opposed to 
the critical projects of “postmodernity” is to misguidedly assume that the concept 
“postmodern” refers to a coherent set of commitments that can be coherently 
opposed. Although this way of construing Rose’s critical project has the 
advantage of being consistent with the way Rose construed her critical project, it 
has the disadvantage of furthering the unfortunate and unnecessary borders 
between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries. 
    
On account of the argument I have here recounted, I have in, this thesis, avoided 
contrasting Rose’s critical project with the critical projects of “postmodernity”. 
Instead, I have focused specifically on Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy. I did so with the conviction that a critical engagement with Rose’s 
challenge to “postmodernity” demands such specificity. Through critically 
engaging with Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy I argued that 
this challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so – that is, through defending 
Foucault’s method of genealogy against Rose’s challenge, Foucault’s method of 
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genealogy was shown to be, not something that contrasts with Rose’s critical 
project, but something bears the potential for clarifying and supporting it. 
Accordingly, it was through such specificity that I have been able to contribute to 
the secondary literature on Rose. This contribution consists in affording an 
alternative reading of Rose’s critical project – a reading in which Rose’s critical 
project is open to being read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method 
of genealogy.  
 
How have I argued this? 
 
In chapter one I argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are 
comparable – comparable in that they each imply a concern with continuing and 
correcting Kant’s critical project. This concern results in Rose and Foucault 
construing the task of criticism as twofold and continuous – that is, to continually 
call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the 
resources for reconfiguring this authority. 
 
The argument of chapter one contributed towards the overarching argument of 
this thesis in two ways. First, this argument called attention to a respect in which 
the critical projects of Rose and Foucault can be read as comparable – 
specifically, the respect in which they each construe the task of criticism in a way 
that is comparable. Second, this argument afforded the basis on which, in chapter 
two, I critically engaged with Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy – for in 
order to understand Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, it is 
necessary to understand Rose’s reading of Kant, and in order to understand why 
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Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, it is necessary 
to understand Foucault’s reading of Kant.           
 
In chapter two I argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy 
is misguided, but resourcefully so. Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of 
genealogy is an extension of her challenge to Kant – that is, for Rose, Foucault’s 
method of genealogy results in a critical blindness. This challenge works on the 
premise that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic. It is on account of this 
premise that I argued that Rose’s challenge is misguided. It is misguided because 
it recognises only one of the two integrated aspects that constitute Foucault’s 
method of genealogy – aspects that are negative and positive. The negative 
aspect involves showing that our concepts are contingent. The positive aspect 
involves showing how our concepts are contingent. It through the integration of 
these two aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy acquires its critical 
capacity – that is, the capacity of problematisation. To recognise that the authority 
of our concepts is the result of complex, historical and contingent processes is 
not necessarily to reject such authority. Rather, it is to recognise that it is 
problematic – problematic in the sense that such authority, because it is revealed 
as having been configured and reconfigured through history, is revealed as being 
potentially reconfigurable within the future.  
 
The argument of this chapter contributed towards the overarching argument of 
this thesis in two ways. First, this argument removed the central basis on which 
Rose’s critical project appears opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, and 
thereby opened up the possibility that Rose’s critical project could be read 
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constructively in conjunction with it. Second, this argument helped clarify the 
critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy.       
 
In chapter three I argued that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in 
conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. Rose reads Hegel’s idea of 
phenomenology as affording an approach to criticism that avoids the critical 
impotence / blindness that results from Kant’s transcendental approach. Through 
explicating this reading, Rose’s critical project was shown to require a form of 
criticism that can yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and to do so in 
a way that is open-ended. In other words, Rose’s critical project requires a form 
of criticism that can yield the aporia of recognising that reason is always both 
unavoidable and partial. While Rose is clear about this, she is not clear about 
how criticism can meet this requirement. Foucault’s method of genealogical 
problematisation is, I argued, one way of clarifying this unclear, but pivotal, part 
of Rose’s critical project. It does this, I argued, centrally through affording a way 
of thinking about contingency as being consistent with a sense of universality. 
Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the complex, historical and contingent 
processes through which certain concepts are universalised – that is, constituted 
as norms for certain thoughts and actions. By revealing this, Foucault’s method 
of genealogy does not undermine such a sense of universality. Rather, it shows 
that such a sense of universality is always problematic. In other words, Foucault’s 
method of genealogy reveals that the authority of reason, because of its actual 
past and possible future, can always be called into question.  
 
What are the implications of my argument? 
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As I mentioned above, the overarching argument of this thesis is motivated by a 
concern with opening Rose’s critical project up to the possibility of being 
influenced by and influencing alternative critical projects – specifically, the critical 
projects from which it has been unfortunately and unnecessarily barred. Such 
barring, I argued, is largely a product of the way in which both Rose, and her 
commentators, present her critical project as being generally opposed to the 
critical projects of “postmodernity”. By presenting Rose’s critical project as 
involving a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, and by arguing 
that this challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so, I have afforded an 
alternative way of reading Rose’s critical project – a reading in which Rose’s 
critical project is open to being read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s 
method of genealogy. If nothing else, I hope that the argument of this thesis 
provides a basis on which others might consider further, and more deeply, the 
possibility that Rose might be closer to those that she criticises than her criticisms 
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